The Legal Protection of Fundamental Human Values in Central and Eastern Europe and Modern Biotechnology: Towards European Harmonization

The protection of the fundamental human values (life, bodily integrity, human dignity, privacy) becomes imperative with the rapid progress in modern biotechnology, which can result in major alterations in the genetic make-up of organisms. It has become possible to insert human genes into pigs so that their internal organs coated in human proteins are more suitable for transplantation into humans (xenotransplantation), and micro-organisms that cam make insulin have been created, thus changing the genetic make-up of humans. At the end of the 1980s, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries either initiated new legislation or started to amend existing laws in this area (clinical testing of drugs, experiments on man, prenatal genetic diagnosis, legal protection of the embryo/foetus, etc.). The analysis here indicates that the CEE countries have not sufficiently adjusted their regulations to the findings of modern biotechnology, either because of the relatively short period they have had to do so, or because there are no definite answers to the questions which modern biotechnology has raised (ethical aspects of xenotransplantation, or of the use of live-aborted embryonic or foetal tissue in neuro-transplantation, etc.). In order to harmonise the existing regulations in CEE countries with respect to the EU and supranational contexts, two critical issues should be taken into consideration. The first is the necessity for CEE countries to recognise the place of humans within the achievements of modern biotechnology (a broader affirmation of the principle of autonomy, an explicit ban on the violation of the genetic identity of either born or unborn life, etc.). The second concerns the definition of the status of different biotechnological procedures and their permissibility (gene therapy, therapeutic genomes, xenotransplantation, etc.). The road towards such answers may be more easily identified once all CEE countries become members of the Council of Europe and express their wish to join the EU, which in turn presupposes taking over the entire body of EU legislation.

A Comparative Chronology of the History of Eastern Europe and the Climate

Two main areas were examined in this project: * The detailed climatic history of the second part of the Holocene (approximately the last 5500 calendar years) for the Zapadnodvinskaya lowland, making it possible to reconstruct general climatic changes in eastern Europe (taking other palynological, dendrochronological, historical and instrumental data into account). * The most important historical events for the period of the 9th-17th centuries that had an impact on Russian history. The comparative chronology of the main climatic changes and events of Russian social history showed that as local climatic conditions became worse (i.e. falling average annual temperature or precipitation rate) the density of significant events in society rose. This suggests that climatic deterioration is both a stimulus and an outstanding factor in social development.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

Trust and Social Networks in a Changing Europe.

This project set out to investigate the effects of the recent massive social transitions in Eastern Europe on the everyday social lives of the inhabitants of three very different nations: Georgia, Russia and Hungary. It focused in particular on the availability and nature of the support networks available to three different segments of each of the societies (manual workers, students and entrepreneurs) and the impact of network participation on psychological and physical well-being. The group set four specific questions to investigate: the part played by individual psychological beliefs in the formation and maintenance of social networks and the consequent formation of trusting relations; the implication of the size and quality of these networks for mental health; the nature of the social groups inhabited by the respondents and the implication of their work schedule and daily routines on the maintenance of a social and family life; and an analysis of how cultures vary in their social networks and intimacy. Three different methods were used to examine social support and its implications: structured questionnaires, semi-structured short interviews and a media analysis of newspaper materials. The questionnaires were administered to 150 participants in each country, equally divided between students studying full time, manual workers employed in factories, and business people (small kiosk owners, whose work and life style differs considerably from that of the manual workers). The questionnaires investigated various predictors of social support including the locus of control, relationship beliefs, individualism-collectivism and egalitarianism, demographic variables (age, gender and occupation), social support, both in general and in relation to significant events that have occurred since the transition from communism. Those with an internal locus of control were more likely to report a higher level of social support, as were collectivists, while age too was a significant predictor, with younger respondents enjoying higher levels of support, regardless of the measures of support employed. Respondents across the cultures referred to a decline of social support and the group also found a direct correlation between social support and mental health outcomes. All 450 respondents were interviewed on their general responses to changes in their lives since the fall of communism and the effects of their work lives on their social lives and the home environment. The interviews revealed considerable variations in the way in which work-life offered opportunities for a broader social life and also provided a hindrance to the development of fulfilling relationships. Many of the work experiences discussed were culture specific, with work having a particularly negative impact on the social life of Russian entrepreneurs but being seen much more positively in Georgia. This may reflect the nature of support offered in a society as overall support levels were lowest in Russia, meaning that social support may be of particular importance there. The way in cultural values and norms about personal relationships are transmitted in a culture is a critical issue for social psychologists and the group examined newspaper articles in those newspapers read by the respondents in each of the three countries. These revealed a number of different themes. The concept of a divided society and its implications for personal relationships was clearest in Russian and Hungary, where widely-read newspapers dwelt on the contrast between "new Russians/Hungarians" and the older, poorer ones and extended considerable sympathy to those suffering from neglect in institutions. Magyar Nemzet, a paper widely read by Hungarian students reflects the generally more pessimistic tone about personal relationships in Russia and Hungary and gave a particularly detailed analysis of the implications this holds for human relations in a modern society. In Georgia, however, the tone of the newspapers is more positive, stressing greater social cohesion. Part of this cohesion is framed in the context of religion, with the church appealing to a broader egalitarianism, whereas in less egalitarian Hungary appeals by the Church are centred more on the nuclear family and its need for expansion in both size and influence. The division between the sexes was another prominent issue in Hungary and Russia, while the theme of generational conflict also emerged in Hungarian and Georgian papers, although with some understanding of "young people today". The team's original expectation that the different newspapers read by the different groups of respondents would present differing images of personal relationships was not fulfilled, as despite variations in style, they found little clear "ideological targeting" of any particular readership. They conclude that the vast majority of respondents recognised that the social transition from communism has had a significant impact on the well-being of social relationships and that this is a pertinent issue for all segments of society. While the group see the data collected as a source to be worked on for some time in the future, their initial impressions include the following. Social support is clearly an important concern across all three countries. All respondents (including the students) lament the time taken up by their heavy work schedules and value their social networks and family ties in particular. The level of social support differs across the countries investigated, with Georgian apparently enjoying significantly higher levels of social support. The analysis produced an image of a relatively cohesive and egalitarian society in which even the group most often seen as distant from the general population, business people, is supported by a strong social network. In contrast, the support networks available to the Russian respondents seem particularly weak and reflect a general sense of division and alienation within the culture as a whole. The implications of low levels of social support may vary across countries. While Russians reported the lowest level of mental health problems, the link between social support and mental health may be strongest in that country. In contrast, in Hungary it is the link between fatalism and mental health problems which is particularly strong, while in Georgia the strongest correlation was between mental health and marital quality, emphasising the significance of the marital relationship in that country.

Comparative Czech and Polish Perspectives and Policies on the Eastern Enlargement of the EU and the Prominence of the German Factor

With the end of the Cold War, which for central and eastern Europe in many respects meant the real political end to the Second World War, Germany regained its central position in the region. The Federal Republic quickly established itself as a major political and economic partner for both the Czech Republic and Poland. More importantly, due to its support for the idea of EU and NATO enlargement. Germany also became the most active western advocate of the Czech and Polish 'return to Europe'. The question remains, however, of whether Germany's relations with Poland and the Czech Republic can mature into a close axis like that enjoyed between Paris and Bonn/Berlin, or whether they will continue to develop along the lines of 'strategic congruence' but 'emotional mistrust and reserve'. The research here looked at three aspects of this question. First it considered the idea of a link between perceptions of Germany and broader considerations of European integration in Poland and the Czech Republic and outlined the ways in which Germany has motivated Czech and Polish activities and policies on EU membership. The team then focused upon on-going Czech and Polish EU integration strategies and sought to identify the actual ways in which Germany's advocacy of EU enlargement in manifest in cooperation 'on the ground'. The group concluded by considering prospects for Czech/German and Polish/German cooperation in the context of the enlarged European Union.

Central Europe in the Process of European Integration. A Comparative Study of the Strategies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia towards the Deepening and Widening of the European Union

Membership of the European Union U is usually seen as a strategic goal of the associated states of central and eastern Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s central European countries, where the economic and political transformation was relatively advanced, received preferential treatment from the European Community, which was starting to evolve a policy of differentiation. Podraza studied the strategies of four central European countries towards changes under way in the European Union, analysing several aspects for each case: (1) the process of political transformation (2) decision-making structures in the field of foreign policy and European integration (3) integration strategies: (a) main foreign policy priorities (b) application for membership of the European Union (c) the Commission option on each country (d) accession partnership, including a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (e) regular Commission reports (f) accession negotiations

Industrial Restructuring in the Budapest agglomeration

The major 'motor' of the recent Hungarian industrial development has been foreign direct investment, particularly by multinational companies. This has stimulated the development process, as shown by the dynamism of production, exports and profitability of industry in Budapest. On the other hand, this has also led to a split of the industrial sphere into its foreign and domestic sections, or into foreign-owned companies and domestic SMEs. The major question asked in this project is where is Hungarian industry heading and will the gap between the contracting domestic part and the foreign multinationals continue to widen or will they be joined in a much more favourable scenario. Barta sees this as a question of whether Hungary can avoid the 'dead-end street' of South Asian industrialising countries, and instead move towards a new Eastern European or Hungarian model. He concludes that Budapest industry does not follow any given model and indeed its development probably cannot be seen as a 'model' proper in itself, but is, or will be, a mixture of different elements. This would be a welcome fusion of Hungary's rich human resources of accumulated knowledge with foreign direct investment. Budapest would play an exceptional role in such a process, as the gateway for foreign output to the rest of the country. The share of industry in the Budapest economy will continue to decrease, but it will become a more modern and profitable sector. It will also fulfil a technological transfer role between the developed world and the Hungarian countryside (or even a larger region of central and eastern Europe). Barta predicts that Budapest industry will develop a special structure, with a large subcontractor network supporting the large foreign enterprises, and alongside this industrial districts formed by SMEs.

Latin Sources of Inspiration for 15th and 16th Century Orthodox Prints

The project studied the history of Orthodox graphic art in the context of artistic links between the Eastern and Western worlds, tracing the routes by which iconographic models from western Europe penetrated into eastern Europe and underscoring the role of central European countries in the shaping of the culture of the modern Orthodox church. One important element was the identification of graphic prototypes and export routes for woodcutting blocks which travelled from Germany via Prague, Cracow and Vilnius to Moscow and Kiev, revealing the artistic ties between followers of different religions. Another major element was a study of the appearance of copper engraving in the second half of the 17th century.

The Permanent Income Hypothesis: A Test on Czech Privatisation

Since the late eighties, economists have been regarding the transition from command to market economies in Central and Eastern Europe with intense interest. In addition to studying the transition per se, they have begun using the region as a testing ground on which to investigate the validity of certain classic economic propositions. In his research, comprising three articles written in English and totalling 40 pages, Mr. Hanousek uses the so-called "Czech national experiment" (voucher privatisation scheme) to test the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). He took as his inspiration Kreinin's recommendation: "Since data concerning the behaviour of windfall income recipients is relatively scanty, and since such data can constitute an important test of the permanent income hypothesis, it is of interest to bring to bear on the hypothesis whatever information is available". Mr. Hanousek argues that, since the transfer of property to Czech citizens from 1992 to 1994 through the voucher scheme was not anticipated, it can be regarded as windfall income. The average size of the windfall was more than three month's salary and over 60 percent of the Czech population received this unexpected income. Furthermore, there are other reasons for conducting such an analysis in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the privatisation process took place quickly. Secondly, both the economy and consumer behaviour have been very stable. Thirdly, out of a total population of 10 million Czech citizens, an astonishing 6 million, that is, virtually every household, participated in the scheme. Thus Czech voucher privatisation provides a sample for testing the PIH almost equivalent to a full population, thus avoiding problems with the distribution of windfalls. Compare this, for instance with the fact that only 4% of the Israeli urban population received personal restitution from Germany, while the number of veterans who received the National Service Life Insurance Dividends amounted to less than 9% of the US population and were concentrated in certain age groups. But to begin with, Mr. Hanousek considers the question of whether the public percieves the transfer from the state to individual as an increase in net wealth. It can be argued that the state is only divesting itself of assets that would otherwise provide a future source of transfers. According to this argument, assigning these assets to individuals creates an offsetting change in the present value of potential future transfers so that individuals are no better off after the transfer. Mr. Hanousek disagrees with this approach. He points out that a change in the ownership of inefficient state-owned enterprises should lead to higher efficiency, which alone increases the value of enterprises and creates a windfall increase in citizens' portfolios. More importantly, the state and individuals had very different preferences during the transition. Despite government propaganda, it is doubtful that citizens of former communist countries viewed government-owned enterprises as being operated in the citizens' best interest. Moreover, it is unlikely that the public fully comprehended the sophisticated links between the state budget, state-owned enterprises, and transfers to individuals. Finally, the transfers were not equal across the population. Mr. Hanousek conducted a survey on 1263 individuals, dividing them into four monthly earnings categories. After determining whether the respondent had participated in the voucher process, he asked those who had how much of what they received from voucher privatisation had been (a) spent on goods and services, (b) invested elsewhere, (c) transferred to newly emerging pension funds, (d) given to a family member, and (e) retained in their original form as an investment. Both the mean and the variance of the windfall rise with income. He obtained similar results with respect to education, where the mean (median) windfall for those with a basic school education was 13,600 Czech Crowns (CZK), a figure that increased to 15,000 CZK for those with a high school education without exams, 19,900 CZK for high school graduates with exams, and 24,600 CZK for university graduates. Mr. Hanousek concludes that it can be argued that higher income (and better educated) groups allocated their vouchers or timed the disposition of their shares better. He turns next to an analysis of how respondents reported using their windfalls. The key result is that only a relatively small number of individuals reported spending on goods. Overall, the results provide strong support for the permanent income hypothesis, the only apparent deviation being the fact that both men and women aged 26 to 35 apparently consume more than they should if the windfall were annuitised. This finding is still fully consistent with the PIH, however, if this group is at a stage in their life-cycle where, without the windfall, they would be borrowing to finance consumption associated with family formation etc. Indeed, the PIH predicts that individuals who would otherwise borrow to finance consumption would consume the windfall up to the level equal to the annuitised fraction of the increase in lifetime income plus the full amount of the previously planned borrowing for consumption. Greater consumption would then be financed, not from investing the windfall, but from avoidance of future repayment obligations for debts that would have been incurred without the windfall.

Value Choice of Russia in the Reform Process: The Sociological Aspect

The transition in Central and Eastern Europe since the late 1980s has provided a testing ground for classic propositions. This project looked at the impact of privatisation on private consumption, using the Czech experiment of voucher privatisation to test the permanent income hypothesis. This form of privatisation moved state assets to individuals and represented an unexpected windfall gain for participants in the scheme. Whether the windfall was consumed or saved offers a clear test of the permanent income hypothesis. Of a total population of 10 million, 6 million Czechs, i.e. virtually every household, participated in the scheme,. In a January 1996 survey, 1263 individuals were interviewed , 75% of whom had taken part. The data obtained suggests that only a small quantity of transferred assets were cashed in and spent on consumption, providing support for the permanent income hypothesis. The fraction of the windfall consumed grows with age, as would be predicted from the lower life expectancy of older consumers. The most interesting deviation was for people aged 26 to 35, who apparently consumed more that they would if the windfall were annuitised. As these people are at the stage in their lives when they would otherwise be borrowing to cover consumption related to establishing a family, etc., this is however consistent with the permanent income hypothesis, which predicts that individuals who would otherwise borrow money would use the windfall to avoid doing so.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

The Redistribution of Property Rights, Corporate Governance and Company Restructuring after Privatisation"

The project covered the main issues of privatisation, corporate governance and company restructuring after privatisation in Hungary and in the Russian Republic, together with a summary of the broader picture of company-level changes in Central and Eastern Europe, discussing the issues of micro-financial restructuring in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The two countries selected as the focus of research can be regarded as the two most widely differing cases of the economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary began its transition very early in 1989, while Russia was very late in doing so. Hungary first implemented a series of institutional and systemic reforms before stabilising its public finances, while Russia has struggled with financial stabilisation for years without great success. Company restructuring and the introduction of new forms of governance only began in Russia in the mid-1990s. Hungary opted for "traditional" western methods of privatisation and invited a large amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) while in Russia the bulk of state-owned property was privatised either by free distribution or by a strange blend of ESOP-MBO schemes. FDI in Russia remained modest because of the high risk and uncertainty surrounding economic transactions there. Hungary was a forerunner in privatising public utilities, while Russia has moved cautiously in this area. The group's studies show that the Hungarian economy is now over the "transformation recession" and its economic success is largely due to its successful privatisation and to the dominant participation of foreign investors in company take-overs and in the restructuring process. The study of Russia provides a comprehensive account of the main factors in the so-far modest results in Russian privatisation and economic transformation.

The Social Desintegration of an Ethnical German Group from Romanian Village Community Comparative with a Romanian Group and Hungarian Group from some Village Their Integration into the German Society

Zarna is witness to the disappearance of the Swabian community in Santana, a process which seems to date back to before the major changes in Central and Eastern Europe. His project showed how a strong German ethnic community, formed more than 250 years ago, has virtually disappeared from the village of Santana (Romania). Zarna presents the causes leading to the loss of their ethnic identity, of their culture, traditions and of the collective reproduction of their ethnicity, although the last Swabians remaining in the village have preserved their individual identity and not let themselves be assimilated. The policy of the former communist regime is not sufficient to explain the decline of the German ethnic group, nor is the present international context with its varying effects on the form and reproduction of their ethnic identity. Zarna has analysed the origins of the Swabian community, its development, historical changes (both desired and imposed) and the disappearance of elements that determined their German culture and their pride in being German. The Germans have demobilised more rapidly than other ethnic groups in Romania, partly because of Germany's pro-emigration policy over the last two decades. Many of the emigrants were however, poorly prepared for emigration and have not been able to recreate the prosperous financial situation which they left. The prevalent feeling among those interviewed was disappointment and this increases with age and education.

The Man-Made Environment in Post-Stalinist Europe 1953-1968

This project looked at the various responses, both political and aesthetic, to the end of socialist realism and the return of pre-war modernism as a desirable ideal. It considered both the built environment and objects of daily use (furniture, radios, TV sets, etc.) in several countries of the region, including Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Romania, also comparing developments there with corresponding ones in the west. Among particular aspects considered were the effects of Kruschev's speech in December 1954 to workers in construction, machine-building and design industries, in which he argued against monumentalism and criticised both "classical architecture" and socialist realism. The team see the real issue in interpreting Eastern European architecture as its lack of a critical edge, since official discourses took the place of any form of criticism and architects sought to implement the "official line". Megastructures became increasingly popular from the 1960s onwards and in Romania, for instance, came to dominate the city in the late 1980s. Such structures proved an efficient way to control the environment in countries plagued by prefabrication and social housing, and the group see the exhibition of inflated concrete grids as perhaps the most important feature of Eastern European architecture in the 1960s and 1970s. They also point out the rarity of glass and steel architecture in the east, where the preferred material was concrete, a material seen as "revolutionary" as it was the product of heavy industry and was grey, i.e. the workers' colour. Tactile elements were more important here than the visual elements favoured in the west, and a solidity more in line with the dominant ideology than the ephemeral qualities of glass.