The Influence of the Social and Cultural Environment on a Child's Playing in the First Three Years of Life

The research focused on children's behaviour in playing with objects both independently and in interaction with adults. It was based on studies of 40 Slovene children in 4 age groups (6,12,18 and 24 months) and of 23 Croatian children in 2 age groups (18 and 24 months). All the children were sampled proportionally by their gender and the educational level of their parents (middle and higher). Several coding check lists with satisfactory internal consistency were constructed during the study and used to analyse the video-recorded playing sessions with each child. The basic conclusion reached was that even in early childhood playing behaviour differs significantly between the infants from the two Central European countries. The difference lies not so much in the structure or the content of the playing actions, but in the way in which the infants deal playfully with the objects. This difference appears regardless of the type of object the infants are playing with and even regardless of the playing condition. It can best be described as the difference between the first significant discriminant function activity versus passivity. The Slovene infants were found to be on the active pole and the Croatians on the passive one. Social and gender differences were much less significant than cultural ones in determining the structure, the content and the way of playing. Significant age differences appeared in all three aspects, which was consistent with general trends in infants' psychological development. The group define the Slovene interactive playing style as object oriented, while the Croatian one was largely communicated oriented. Within the experimenter-infant dyads, children of both cultures played at a developmentally more advanced level than they did with their mothers, showing that the mothers were not as successful at reaching the ZPD as were the trained experimenters. In addition, the children of mothers who attributed more cognitive benefit to play played on a more advanced level than those whose mothers attributed more emotional benefit to play. The quality of the object the children were playing with was also significantly related to the structure, content and partly the way of dealing with the objects. Highly-structured objects stimulated complex play and low-structured ones stimulated simple play, regardless of playing conditions. The group concluded that both culture and the quality of the available object have an important impact on young children's play. Through the playing interaction, the infants internalise culturally specific patterns of behaviour and culturally specific meanings. These internalisations become apparent very early in their lives, even in non-social situations. On the other hand, the objects themselves have an impact on the level of infants' play. When they do not provide sufficient perceptive and functional support for a representational action, the infants' play will lag behind their actual developmental capacities.

The Ingrian Question as a Historical and Political Phenomenon

The project dealt with the political history of the Finnish-speaking minorities of the Russian northwest, mainly in the 20th century. The first part looks at the development of the national movement of the Ingrian Finns and other related ethnic groups (Izhoras, Votes) from the turn of the century to 1920, when Estonia and Finland signed peace treaties with Soviet Russia and the national rights of the Finnish minority in Russia were to some extent guaranteed. In the second section, on the history of the Ingrians during Soviet and post-Soviet times, areas covered include Ingrian national-cultural autonomy in the 1920s, the activities of Ingrian "ingri" organizations in Finland during the inter-war period, social and national repression and the end of autonomy in the 1930s, the dispersal of the Ingrians during the second world war, their first attempts to return home in the immediate post-war period, trends in the development of the social and cultural life of Ingrians during the last 40 years, and the prospects for their existence as an ethnic unity in the future. The research is based on documentary sources from 15 Russian archives, many of which have not previously been used.

Development of Socio-Economic Behaviour and Attitudes of Baltic Nationalities: Perspectives for Integration with Europe

This project is the third stage of a comparative research project, The New Baltic Barometer, which was carried out simultaneously with the "New Democracies Barometer" of the Paul Lazerfeld Society (Vienna) and The Russian Barometer. It studied the opinion and behaviour of the largest Baltic ethnic groups (Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians). The main focus was on the attitudes of Baltic residents towards the changes in the economic and political system, attitudes towards political values, political trust, and attitudes to the Baltic countries joining the European Union. An analysis of macroeconomic indicators of the Baltic states made it possible to deduce the link between the country's economic development, and satisfaction with the political regime and attitudes towards democratic values. The study analysed the conditions for the democratisation of society, i.e. the development of culture and public opinion in the Baltic states. Attention was also paid to the development of a social network of individuals, showing the transition from informal networks to impersonal institutions. The group concluded that the participation of residents in formal organisations, NGOs in particular, considerably fosters political trust and also increases political efficacy. Participation in formal organisations also reduces the importance of esteem for an authoritarian leader.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Legality and Human Rights: Administrative Justice in Russia 1862-1917

The question of how far pre-revolutionary Russia was from the ideal of a lawful state has received little academic attention, particularly as relates to the legal regulation of relations between person, society and state within the state administration. Pravilova explored the methods of settling disputes between individuals and the administration, and the emergence of legal controls of the administration, analysed projects for the organisation of administrative justice and studied the particular nature of concepts from Russian administrative justice. The idea of an organisation of special bodies examining complaints by private persons against the actions of officials and state bureaucratic organs first appeared in the early 1860s. In the 1870s-1890s various projects for the reform of administrative justice (reorganisation of the Senate and local administrative institutions) were proposed by the Ministries of Justice and Finance, but none of these was put into practice, largely due to resistance from the bureaucracy. At the same time, however, the rapid development of private enterprise, the activities of the zemstvo and self-government produced new norms and mechanisms for the regulation of authorities and social relations. Despite the lack of institutional conditions, the Senate did consider complaints from private persons against illegal actions by administrative officials, playing a role similar to that of the supreme administrative courts in France and Germany. The spread of concepts of a 'lawful state' aroused support for a system of administrative justice and the establishment of administrative tribunals was seen as a condition of legality and a guarantee of human rights. The government was forced to understand that measures to maintain legality were vital to preserve the stability of the system of state power, but plans for liberal reforms were pushed into the background by constitutional reforms. The idea of guarantees of human rights in relations with the authorities was in contradiction with the idea of the monarchy and it was only when the Provisional Government took power in 1917 that the liberal programme of legal reforms had any chance of being put into practice. A law passed in June 1917 ordained the organisation of local administrative justice bodies, but its implementation was hampered by the war, the shortage of qualified judges and the existing absolute legal illiteracy, and the few administrative courts that were set up were soon abolished by the new Soviet authorities. Pravilova concluded that the establishment of a lawful state in pre-revolutionary Russia was prevented by a number of factors, particularly the autocratic nature of the supreme authority, which was incompatible with the idea of administrative justice as a guarantee of the rights of citizens in their relations with the state.