Development of Socio-Economic Behaviour and Attitudes of Baltic Nationalities: Perspectives for Integration with Europe

This project is the third stage of a comparative research project, The New Baltic Barometer, which was carried out simultaneously with the "New Democracies Barometer" of the Paul Lazerfeld Society (Vienna) and The Russian Barometer. It studied the opinion and behaviour of the largest Baltic ethnic groups (Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians). The main focus was on the attitudes of Baltic residents towards the changes in the economic and political system, attitudes towards political values, political trust, and attitudes to the Baltic countries joining the European Union. An analysis of macroeconomic indicators of the Baltic states made it possible to deduce the link between the country's economic development, and satisfaction with the political regime and attitudes towards democratic values. The study analysed the conditions for the democratisation of society, i.e. the development of culture and public opinion in the Baltic states. Attention was also paid to the development of a social network of individuals, showing the transition from informal networks to impersonal institutions. The group concluded that the participation of residents in formal organisations, NGOs in particular, considerably fosters political trust and also increases political efficacy. Participation in formal organisations also reduces the importance of esteem for an authoritarian leader.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Securities: Its Conception and Protection of Interests of its Holders

Theoretical studies of the problems of the securities markets in the Russian Federation incline to one or other of the two traditional approaches. The first consists of comparing the definition of "valuable paper" set forth in the current legislation of the Russian Federation, with the theoretical model of "Wertpapiere" elaborated by German scholars more than 90 years ago. The problem with this approach is, in Mr. Pentsov's opinion, that any new features of the definition of "security" that do not coincide with the theoretical model of "Wertpapiere" (such as valuable papers existing in non-material, electronic form) are claimed to be incorrect and removed from the current legislation of the Russian Federation. The second approach works on the basis of the differentiation between the Common Law concept of "security" and the Civil Law concept of "valuable paper". Mr. Pentsov's research, presented in an article written in English, uses both methodological tools and involves, firstly, a historical study of the origin and development of certain legal phenomena (securities) as they evolved in different countries, and secondly, a comparative, synchronic study of equivalent legal phenomena as they exist in different countries today. Employing the first method, Mr. Pentsov divided the historical development of the conception of "valuable paper" in Russia into five major stages. He found that, despite the existence of a relatively wide circulation of valuable papers, especially in the second half of the 19th century, Russian legislation before 1917 (the first stage) did not have a unified definition of valuable paper. The term was used, in both theoretical studies and legislation, but it covered a broad range of financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, government bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, etc. During the second stage, also, the legislation of the USSR did not have a unified definition of "valuable paper". After the end of the "new economic policy" (1922 - 1930) the stock exchanges and the securities markets in the USSR, with a very few exceptions, were abolished. And thus during the third stage (up to 1985), the use of valuable papers in practice was reduced to foreign economic relations (bills of exchange, stocks in enterprises outside the USSR) and to state bonds. Not surprisingly, there was still no unified definition of "valuable paper". After the beginning of Gorbachev's perestroika, a securities market began to re-appear in the USSR. However, the successful development of securities markets in the USSR was retarded by the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework. The first effort to improve the situation was the adoption of the Regulations on Valuable Papers, approved by resolution No. 590 of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, dated June 19, 1990. Section 1 of the Regulation contained the first statutory definition of "valuable paper" in the history of Russia. At the very beginning of the period of transition to a market economy, a number of acts contained different definitions of "valuable paper". This diversity clearly undermined the stability of the Russian securities market and did not achieve the goal of protecting the investor. The lack of unified criteria for the consideration of such non-standard financial instruments as "valuable papers" significantly contributed to the appearance of numerous fraudulent "pyramid" schemes that were outside of the regulatory scheme of Russia legislation. The situation was substantially improved by the adoption of the new Civil Code of the Russian Federation. According to Section 1 of Article 142 of the Civil Code, a valuable paper is a document that confirms, in compliance with an established form and mandatory requisites, certain material rights whose realisation or transfer are possible only in the process of its presentation. Finally, the recent Federal law No. 39 - FZ "On the Valuable Papers Market", dated April 22 1996, has also introduced the term "emission valuable papers". According to Article 2 of this Law, an "emission valuable paper" is any valuable paper, including non-documentary, that simultaneously has the following features: it fixes the composition of material and non-material rights that are subject to confirmation, cession and unconditional realisation in compliance with the form and procedure established by this federal law; it is placed by issues; and it has equal amount and time of realisation of rights within the same issue regardless of when the valuable paper was purchased. Thus the introduction of the conception of "emission valuable paper" became the starting point in the Russian federation's legislation for the differentiation between the legal regimes of "commercial papers" and "investment papers" similar to the Common Law approach. Moving now to the synchronic, comparative method of research, Mr. Pentsov notes that there are currently three major conceptions of "security" and, correspondingly, three approaches to its legal definition: the Common Law concept, the continental law concept, and the concept employed by Japanese Law. Mr. Pentsov proceeds to analyse the differences and similarities of all three, concluding that though the concept of "security" in the Common Law system substantially differs from that of "valuable paper" in the Continental Law system, nevertheless the two concepts are developing in similar directions. He predicts that in the foreseeable future the existing differences between these two concepts will become less and less significant. On the basis of his research, Mr. Pentsov arrived at the conclusion that the concept of "security" (and its equivalents) is not a static one. On the contrary, it is in the process of permanent evolution that reflects the introduction of new financial instruments onto the capital markets. He believes that the scope of the statutory definition of "security" plays an extremely important role in the protection of investors. While passing the Securities Act of 1933, the United States Congress determined that the best way to achieve the goal of protecting investors was to define the term "security" in sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include within the definition the many types of instruments that in the commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of "security' and to cover the countless and various devices used by those who seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits. On the other hand, the very limited scope of the current definition of "emission valuable paper" in the Federal Law of the Russian Federation entitled "On the Valuable Papers Market" does not allow the anti-fraud provisions of this law to be implemented in an efficient way. Consequently, there is no basis for the protection of investors. Mr. Pentsov proposes amendments which he believes would enable the Russian markets to become more efficient and attractive for both foreign and domestic investors.

The Hungarian Economic Elite After the Political Transition

Erzsebet Szalai (Hungary). The Hungarian Economic Elite after the Political Transition. Ms. Szalai is a research fellow in the Institute of Political Sciences in Budapest and worked on this project from July 1996 to June 1998. In the period following the political changes of 1989, the leading forces of the economic elite have gained increasing superiority over the political and cultural elites, with the clear ambition of putting the latter to their service. The power relations within the economic elite were characterised by "a war of all against all". The desire to gain precedence over others became an openly declared value. The formation of estates and the intensification of competition became embodied in a multitude of lobbies which cropped up to assert short-term interests. After the state socialist period, possession of at least two of the social, economic and cultural forms of capital is necessary to join one of the three segments of the elite: political, cultural or economic. What defines the ability of the members of the three elite groups to assert their interests is their ability to convert any of the three types of capital into another. That is to say, the basis on which they can retain and extend their position is "symbolic capital" as interpreted by Bourdieu. The concept of symbolic capital is useful for describing the power relations following the collapse of state socialist systems and societies. In the state-socialist system, the political, economic and cultural spheres are tightly interwoven, and this interpenetration slackens only slowly after the system's disintegration. A close institutional relationship between the three spheres continues to make it easier for power actors to convert social, economic and cultural capital from one type to another. Symbolic capital, or the easy transfer between the three spheres, in turn reproduces the institutional relationship, or more precisely, complicates the separation of the three spheres after the fall of state socialism.