The Position of Russian Provinical Officialdom in the Middle of the 19th Century: Law and Life

The study considered the discrepancy between the official status and real position of Russian provincial officialdom in the middle of the 19th century. The law was not entirely coherent in all aspects of the officials' life and activity, with ordinary deviations from the law being adopted in practice and accepted, albeit not openly, by the public and sometimes even by the authorities. The main law determining the rights and duties of governors was never followed to the letter and in reality governors' activities were determined by the common (unwritten) law existing in the governmental sphere. The volume and nature of the governors' rights depended on a range of factors, with specific regional features and the governor's personal qualities having a particular significance. The standard of living of government clerks was much higher than their official salary would permit and Matkhanova studied the most widespread cases of abuse, identifying those positions in the administration which offered the most opportunities for such abuses. At the start of the period and on the eve of the reforms public opinion towards the bribery of officials underwent a change. From the late 1850s onwards, there appeared among provincial officials a group of young well-educated clerks with liberal ideas and a new system of moral values which did not allow them to accept bribes or infringe the law in any way. There was also a non-official hierarchy side by side with the legally existing one. A significant role in governing the region, and one which has been underestimated by historians, was played by the head of the governor's office, but the reforms of the 1860s contributed to changing this state of affairs.

The Effects of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises in Poland and East Germany

The main goal of this project was to propose appropriate methods of analysing the effects of the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, methods which were then tested on a limited sample of 16 Polish and 8 German enterprises privatised in 1992. A considerable amount of information was collected relating to the six-year period 1989-1994 relating to most aspects of the companies' activities. The effects of privatisation were taken to be those changes within the enterprises which were the result of privatisation, in such areas as production, the productivity of labour and fixed assets, investments and innovations, employment and wages, economic incentives (especially for top managers), financing (internal and external sources), bad debts and economic effects (financial analysis). A second important goal was to identify the main factors which represent methodological obstacles in surveys of the effects of privatisation during a period of fundamental transformation of the entire economic system. The list of enterprises for the research was compiled in such a way as to allow for the differentiation of ownership structures of privatised firms and to permit (at least to a certain extent) the empirical verification of some hypotheses regarding the privatisation process. The enterprises selected were divided into the following three groups representing (as far as possible) various types of ownership structures or types of control: (1) enterprises control by strategic investors (domestic or foreign), (2) enterprises controlled by employees (employee-owned companies), (3) enterprises controlled by managers. Formal methods such as econometric models with varying parameters were used to separate pure privatisation effects from other factors which influence various aspects of an enterprise's working, including policies on the productivity of labour and capital, average wages, the remuneration of top managers, etc. While the group admits that their findings and conclusions cannot be treated as representative of all privatised enterprises in Poland and Germany, they found considerable convergence with their findings and those of other surveys conducted on a wider scale. The main hypotheses that were confirmed included that privatisation (especially in companies controlled by large investors and managers) leads to a significant increase in the effectiveness of these production process, growing pay differentials between different employee groups (e.g. between executives and rank-and-file employees) and between different jobs and positions within particular professional groups. They also confirmed the growing importance in incentives to top executives of incentives linked with the company's economic effects (particularly profit-related incentives), long-term incentives and the capital market.