The Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Through studying German, Polish and Czech publications on Silesia, Mr. Kamusella found that most of them, instead of trying to objectively analyse the past, are devoted to proving some essential "Germanness", "Polishness" or "Czechness" of this region. He believes that the terminology and thought-patterns of nationalist ideology are so deeply entrenched in the minds of researchers that they do not consider themselves nationalist. However, he notes that, due to the spread of the results of the latest studies on ethnicity/nationalism (by Gellner, Hobsbawm, Smith, Erikson Buillig, amongst others), German publications on Silesia have become quite objective since the 1980s, and the same process (impeded by under funding) has been taking place in Poland and the Czech Republic since 1989. His own research totals some 500 pages, in English, presented on disc. So what are the traps into which historians have been inclined to fall? There is a tendency for them to treat Silesia as an entity which has existed forever, though Mr. Kamusella points out that it emerged as a region only at the beginning of the 11th century. These same historians speak of Poles, Czechs and Germans in Silesia, though Mr. Kamusella found that before the mid-19th century, identification was with an inhabitant's local area, religion or dynasty. In fact, a German national identity started to be forged in Prussian Silesia only during the Liberation War against Napoleon (1813-1815). It was concretised in 1861 in the form of the first Prussian census, when the language a citizen spoke was equated with his/her nationality. A similar census was carried out in Austrian Silesia only in 1881. The censuses forced the Silesians to choose their nationality despite their multiethnic multicultural identities. It was the active promotion of a German identity in Prussian Silesia, and Vienna's uneasy acceptance of the national identities in Austrian Silesia which stimulated the development of Polish national, Moravian ethnic and Upper Silesian ethnic regional identities in Upper Silesia, and Polish national, Czech national, Moravian ethnic and Silesian ethnic identities in Austrian Silesia. While traditional historians speak of the "nationalist struggle" as though it were a permanent characteristic of Silesia, Mr. Kamusella points out that such a struggle only developed in earnest after 1918. What is more, he shows how it has been conveniently forgotten that, besides the national players, there were also significant ethnic movements of Moravians, Upper Silesians, Silesians and the tutejsi (i.e. those who still chose to identify with their locality). At this point Mr. Kamusella moves into the area of linguistics. While traditionally historians have spoken of the conflicts between the three national languages (German, Polish and Czech), Mr Kamusella reminds us that the standardised forms of these languages, which we choose to dub "national", were developed only in the mid-18th century, after 1869 (when Polish became the official language in Galicia), and after the 1870s (when Czech became the official language in Bohemia). As for standard German, it was only widely promoted in Silesia from the mid 19th century onwards. In fact, the majority of the population of Prussian Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia were bi- or even multilingual. What is more, the "Polish" and "Czech" Silesians spoke were not the standard languages we know today, but a continuum of West-Slavic dialects in the countryside and a continuum of West-Slavic/German creoles in the urbanised areas. Such was the linguistic confusion that, from time to time, some ethnic/regional and Church activists strove to create a distinctive Upper Silesian/Silesian language on the basis of these dialects/creoles, but their efforts were thwarted by the staunch promotion of standard German, and after 1918, of standard Polish and Czech. Still on the subject of language, Mr. Kamusella draws attention to a problem around the issue of place names and personal names. Polish historians use current Polish versions of the Silesian place names, Czechs use current Polish/Czech versions of the place names, and Germans use the German versions which were in use in Silesia up to 1945. Mr. Kamusella attempted to avoid this, as he sees it, nationalist tendency, by using an appropriate version of a place name for a given period and providing its modern counterpart in parentheses. In the case of modern place names he gives the German version in parentheses. As for the name of historical figures, he strove to use the name entered on the birth certificate of the person involved, and by doing so avoid such confusion as, for instance, surrounds the Austrian Silesian pastor L.J. Sherschnik, who in German became Scherschnick, in Polish, Szersznik, and in Czech, Sersnik. Indeed, the prospective Silesian scholar should, Mr. Kamusella suggests, as well as the three languages directly involved in the area itself, know English and French, since many documents and books on the subject have been published in these languages, and even Latin, when dealing in depth with the period before the mid-19th century. Mr. Kamusella divides the policies of ethnic cleansing into two categories. The first he classifies as soft, meaning that policy is confined to the educational system, army, civil service and the church, and the aim is that everyone learn the language of the dominant group. The second is the group of hard policies, which amount to what is popularly labelled as ethnic cleansing. This category of policy aims at the total assimilation and/or physical liquidation of the non-dominant groups non-congruent with the ideal of homogeneity of a given nation-state. Mr. Kamusella found that soft policies were consciously and systematically employed by Prussia/Germany in Prussian Silesia from the 1860s to 1918, whereas in Austrian Silesia, Vienna quite inconsistently dabbled in them from the 1880s to 1917. In the inter-war period, the emergence of the nation-states of Poland and Czechoslovakia led to full employment of the soft policies and partial employment of the hard ones (curbed by the League of Nations minorities protection system) in Czechoslovakian Silesia, German Upper Silesia and the Polish parts of Upper and Austrian Silesia. In 1939-1945, Berlin started consistently using all the "hard" methods to homogenise Polish and Czechoslovakian Silesia which fell, in their entirety, within the Reich's borders. After World War II Czechoslovakia regained its prewar part of Silesia while Poland was given its prewar section plus almost the whole of the prewar German province. Subsequently, with the active involvement and support of the Soviet Union, Warsaw and Prague expelled the majority of Germans from Silesia in 1945-1948 (there were also instances of the Poles expelling Upper Silesian Czechs/Moravians, and of the Czechs expelling Czech Silesian Poles/pro-Polish Silesians). During the period of communist rule, the same two countries carried out a thorough Polonisation and Czechisation of Silesia, submerging this region into a new, non-historically based administrative division. Democratisation in the wake of the fall of communism, and a gradual retreat from the nationalist ideal of the homogeneous nation-state with a view to possible membership of the European Union, caused the abolition of the "hard" policies and phasing out of the "soft" ones. Consequently, limited revivals of various ethnic/national minorities have been observed in Czech and Polish Silesia, whereas Silesian regionalism has become popular in the westernmost part of Silesia which remained part of Germany. Mr. Kamusella believes it is possible that, with the overcoming of the nation-state discourse in European politics, when the expression of multiethnicity and multilingualism has become the cause of the day in Silesia, regionalism will hold sway in this region, uniting its ethnically/nationally variegated population in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity championed by the European Union.

Gothic Taste and Russian Culture of the 18th Century

This project was an experiment in widening the traditional borders of study in the field and looking at the phenomenon of Gothic taste in many genres and kinds of art. The Gothic taste was a major element in the cultural image of the Enlightenment both in western Europe and in Russia. It was an essential component in the world outlook of an educated person and without studying this phenomenon it is impossible to fully understand the thinking of artistic professionals, amateurs and users in Russian society in the 18th century. Mr. Khatchatourov first analysed the reasons for the importance of Gothic taste in the culture of the European Enlightenment and then studied its linguistic and lexicographic evolution in 18th century Russian culture. He sought to determine the semantic context which actively formed the human mind set in the Enlightenment, including potential users and producers of articles in the Gothic taste. He then looked at the process of absorption of this concept by those forms of art which express it most strongly, in particular architecture and the theatre. His study was based on a comprehensive historical and culturological study using a wide range of sources, a formal stylistic method approach considering the interaction of non-classical styles of the Enlightenment with the dominant classicism, and an iconographic approach which revealed the essential aspects in a new image synthesis of the culture of the Enlightenment.

Democratic Transition and Political Patronage

Mr. Korosenyi begins by analysing the particular relationship holding between politics and administration in different countries. Within Europe three major patterns have emerged in the 20th century. Firstly there is the politically neutral British Civil Service, secondly the German and French state bureaucracies, which traditionally are supposed to embody the "common good", and thirdly there is the patronage system of the so-called consociate democracies, e.g. Austria. In general Mr. Korosenyi believes that, though politics do not penetrate into the Hungarian administration to the extent they do in Belgium and Austria, nevertheless, there is a stronger fusion than there is in the traditional British pattern. He is particularly interested in this relationship with regard to its effect on democratic institution building and the stabilisation of the new regime in Hungary, now the old "nomenklatura" system has been abolished. The structure of the Hungarian government was a result of the constitutional amendments of 1989 and 1990. Analysing this period, it becomes clear that for all the political actors who initiated and supported the democratic transition to democracy, the underlying assumption was a radical depoliticisation of the administration in order to maintain its stability. The political leadership of the executive is a cabinet government. The government is structured along ministries, each headed by a politician, i.e. the minister, who is a member of the cabinet. The minister's political secretary is not a cabinet member, but he or she is a politician, usually a member of the parliament. The head of the administration of the ministry is the administrative state secretary, who is a civil servant. He or she usually has four deputies, also civil servants. Naturally it is assumed that there should be a clear separation between politicians and civil servants. However in practice, the borders can be blurred, giving rise to a hybrid known as the "political civil servant". Mr. Korosenyi analyses the different faces of these hybrids. They are civil servants for the following reasons. They need special educational qualifications, working experience, a civil service exam etc., they are not allowed to do anything which is incompatible with their impartial role, and they cannot occupy political office nor may they appear in the name of any political party. On the other hand, the accepted political dimension to their function is revealed by the following facts. The state secretary (a civil servant) may participate in cabinet meetings instead of the minister. The state secretary is employed by the minister. A state secretary or any of their deputies can be dismissed at any time by the minister or the prime minister. In practice then, ministers appoint to these senior administrative positions civil servants whose personal and political loyaties are strong. To the second level of political patronage in ministries belong the ministerial cabinet, press office and public relation office. The ministerial cabinet includes the private advisors and members of the personal staff of the minister. The press office and the PR office, if they exist, are not adjusted to the administrative hierarchy of the ministry, but under the direct control of the minister. In the beginning of the 1990s, such offices were exceptions; in the second half of the 90s they are accepted and to be found in most ministries. Mr. Korosenyi's work, a 92-page manuscript of a book in Hungarian, marks the first piece of literature within the field of political science which analyses the structure of the Hungarian government in the 1990s and the relationship between the political leadership and the public administration.