Talents in Migration Processes in the Conditions of the Czech Republic of the Nineties

The transformation of the 1990s has had a bearing on the academic and scientific world, as is becoming increasingly obvious with the changing numbers of foreign students wishing to study in the Czech Republic and of Czech students wishing to study abroad, the virtual collapse of doctoral studies, and the rapidly increasing age of Czech academics (placed at 48 by official sources and at rather more by this research). At the same time there is an apparent lack of interest in analysing and understanding these trends, which Mr. Cermak terms an ostrich policy, although his research showed that academics are in fact both aware and concerned about them. The mid-1990s migration of talent to and from R+D in the Czech Republic is also reflected in the number of talented Czech students studying abroad, who represent the largest and most interesting group of actual and potential migrants. Mr. Cermak's study took the form of a Delphi enquiry participated in by 44 specialists, including experts in the problems of higher education and science policy from the Presidium of the Higher Education Council (n = 23), members of the Council's Science and Research Commission (n = 14), former and current managers of higher education authorities (n = 4) and selected participants of the longitudinal talent research (n = 3). Questions considered included the influence of continuing talent migration from domestic R+D on the efficiency of domestic higher education, the diversification of forms of the brain drain and their impact on other processes in society, the possibility of positive influence on the brain drain processes to minimise the risks it presents, and the use of the knowledge obtained about the brain drain. The study revealed a clear drop of interest in brain drain problems in higher education in the mid-1990s, which is probably related to the collapsed of Czech R+D in the field of talent education. The effects on this segment of the labour market appeared earlier, with a major migration wave in 1991-1993 which significantly "cleared" the area of scientific talent. In addition, prospective talents from the ranks of younger students have not been integrated into domestic R+D, leading to the increasing average age of those working in this field. "Talent scouting" tended to be oriented towards much younger individuals, even in some cases towards undergraduate students. The R+D institutions deprived of human resources considered as basic in a functional R+D system have lost much of their dynamism and so no longer attract not only domestic talent but also talent from other regions. As a result the public, including the mass media and political structures, have stopped regarding the support of domestic science as a priority. This is clear both among the young people who are important for the future development of R+D (support for the education of talented children has dropped), from the drop in the prestige of this area as a profession among university students, and from the lack of explicit support for R+D by any of the political parties. On the basis of his findings Mr. Cermak concludes that there is no basis for the belief that the brain drain will represent a positive force in stimulating the development of the open society. Migration data shows that the outflow of talent from the Czech Republic far exceeds the inflow, and that the latter is largely short-term. Not only has the number of returning Czech professors dropped to half of its level at the beginning of the 1990s, but they also tend to take up only short-term contracts and retain their foreign positions. Recruitment of scientific talent from other countries, including the Slovak Republic, is limited. Furthermore internal contacts between those already involved in R+D have been badly hit by economic pressures and institutional co-operation has dropped to a minimum. There have been few moves to counteract this situation, the only notable one being the Program 250, launched in 1996 with government support to try and attract younger (i.e. under 40) talent into R+D. Its resources are however limited and its effects have not so far been evaluated. The deficit of academic and scientific talent in the Czech Republic is increasing and two major directions of academic work are emerging. Classic higher education science based on the teaching process is declining, largely due to economic factors, while there is an increasing emphasis on special; ad hoc projects which cannot be related directly to teaching but are often interesting to specialists outside the Czech Republic. This is shown clearly by the increase in publishing and in participation in domestic and foreign grant projects, which often serve to supplement the otherwise low salaries in the higher education sector. This tend was also accelerated by the collapse of applied R+D in individual sectors of the national economy and by substantial cutbacks in the Czech Academy of Sciences, which formerly fostered such research. Some part of the output of this research can be used in the education system and its financial contribution does significantly affect the stability of the present staff, but Mr. Cermak sees it as generally unfavourable for the development of talent education. In addition, it has led to a certain resignation on the question of integration into international structures, due to the emphasis on short-term targets, commercial advantages and individualism rather than team work. At the same time, he admits that these developments reflect those in other areas of the transformation in the Czech Republic.

Immigrants in the Czech Republic (With Special Reference to Ukrainian Workers and "Western" Firms Operating in Prague)

International migration has increased rapidly in the Czech Republic, with more than 150,000 legally registered foreign residents at the end of 1996. A large proportion of these are in Prague - 35% of the total in December 1996. The aim of this project was to enrich the fund of information concerning the "environment", reasons and "mechanisms" behind immigration to the Czech Republic. Mr. Drbohlav looked first at the empirical situation and on this basis set out to test certain well-known migration theories. He focused on four main areas: 1) a detailed description and explanation of the stock of foreign citizens legally settled in Czech territory, concentrating particularly on "economic" migrants; 2) a questionnaire survey targeting a total of 192 Ukrainian workers (98 in the fall 1995 and 94 in the fall 1996) working in Prague or its vicinity; 3) a second questionnaire survey of 40 "western" firms (20 in 1996 and 20 in 1997) operating out of Prague; 4) an opinion poll on how the Czech population reacts to foreign workers in the CR. Over 80% of economic immigrants at the end of 1996 were from European countries, 16% from Asia and under 2% from North America. The largest single nationalities were Ukrainians, Slovaks, Vietnamese and Poles. There has been a huge increase in the Ukrainian immigrant community over both space (by region) and time (a ten-fold increase since 1993), and at 40,000 persons this represents one third of all legal immigrants. Indications are that many more live and work there illegally. Young males with low educational/skills levels predominate, in contrast with the more heterogeneous immigration from the "West". The primary reason for this migration is the higher wages in the Czech Republic. In 1994 the relative figures of GDP adjusted for parity of purchasing power were US$ 8,095 for the Czech Republic versus US$ 3,330 for the Ukraine as a whole and US$ 1,600 for the Zakarpatye region from which 49% of the respondents in the survey came. On an individual level, the average Czech wage is about US$ 330 per month, while 50% of the Ukrainian respondents put their last monthly wage before leaving for the Czech Republic at under US$ 27. The very low level of unemployment in the latter country (fluctuating around 4%) was also mentioned as an important factor. Migration was seen as a way of diversifying the family's source of income and 49% of the respondents had made their plans together with partners or close relatives, while 45% regularly send remittances to Ukraine (94% do so through friends or relatives). Looking at Ukrainian migration from the point of view of the dual market theory, these migrants' type and conditions of work, work load and earnings were all significantly worse than in the primary sector, which employs well educated people and offers them good earnings, job security and benefits. 53% of respondents were working and/or staying in the Czech Republic illegally at the time of the research, 73% worked as unqualified, unskilled workers or auxiliary workers, 62% worked more than 12 hours a day, and 40% evaluated their working conditions as hard. 51% had no days off, earnings were low in relation to the number of hours worked. and 85% said that their earnings did not increase over time. Nearly half the workers were recruited in Ukraine and only 4% expressed a desire to stay in the Czech Republic. Network theories were also borne out to some extent as 33% of immigrants came together with friends from the same village, town or region in Ukraine. The number who have relatives working in the Czech Republic is rising, and many wish to invite relatives or children to visit them. The presence of organisations which organised cross-border migration, including some which resort to organising illegal documents, also gives some support for the institutional theory. Mr. Drbohlav found that all the migration theories considered offered some insights on the situation, but that none was sufficient to explain it all. He also points out parallels with many other regions of the world, including Central America, South and North America, Melanesia, Indonesia, East Africa, India, the Middle East and Russia. For the survey of foreign and international firms, those chosen were largely from countries represented by more than one company and were mainly active in market services such as financial and trade services, marketing and consulting. While 48% of the firms had more than 10,000 employees spread through many countries, more than two thirds had fewer than 50 employees in the Czech Republic. Czechs formed 80% plus of general staff in these firms although not more than 50% of senior management, and very few other "easterners" were employed. All companies absolutely denied employing people illegally. The average monthly wage of Czech staff was US$ 850, with that of top managers from the firm's "mother country" being US$ 6,350 and that of other western managers US$ 3,410. The foreign staff were generally highly mobile and were rarely accompanied by their families. Most saw their time in the Czech Republic as positive for their careers but very few had any intention of remaining there. Factors in the local situation which were evaluated positively included market opportunities, the economic and political environment, the quality of technical and managerial staff, and cheap labour and low production costs. In contrast, the level of appropriate business ethics and conduct, the attitude of local and regional authorities, environmental production conditions, the legal environment and financial markets and fiscal policy were rated very low. In the final section of his work Mr. Drbohlav looked at the opinions expressed by the local Czech population in a poll carried out at the beginning of 1997. This confirmed that international labour migration has become visible in this country, with 43% of respondents knowing at least one foreigner employed by a Czech firm in this country. Perception differ according to the region from which the workers come and those from "the West" are preferred to those coming from further east. 49% saw their attitude towards the former as friendly but only 20% felt thus towards the latter. Overall, attitudes towards migrant workers is neutral, although 38% said that such workers should not have the same rights as Czech citizens. Sympathy towards foreign workers tends to increase with education and the standard of living, and the relatively positive attitudes towards foreigners in the South Bohemia region contradicted the frequent belief that a lack of experience of international migration lowers positive perceptions of it.

The Recent Structure of Wages in the Czech Republic

The project drew on an extensive firm-level sample of employees to describe in detail the recent evolution of the structure of wages in the Czech Republic between 1995 and 1998. The results of the analysis were then compared with information from EU countries. Regression analysis was used to study a number of specific questions, with particular emphasis being paid to proper weighting of the sample. Jurajda first quantified the effects on male and female hourly wages in the Czech Republic of worker age and education, firm size, region, industry and ownership type. He then examined whether these effects have been changing over time and how they differ by gender, and identified those industrial sectors that carry the largest wage premiums not accounted for by worker or firm characteristics, and measured the effect of unemployment on wages. He found a substantial increase in returns on human capital, with the earning differentials for education increasing substantially between 1995 and 1998, with these gains being largely comparable to those in western countries. Overall, the Czech structure of wages is now very responsive to market forces and is converging rapidly on EU-type flexibility in almost every dimension. It is likely, however, that due to the constrained supply of tertiary-educated workers in particular, the returns on education may keep on rising, surpassing levels typical of western economies and potentially reaching the high levels observed in developing countries.

The Culture of the Deaf Community in the Czech Republic

Romana Mazerova. The Culture of the Deaf Community in the Czech Republic Mazerova set out to discover if the deaf community in the Czech Republic can be said to have its own culture and if so what this is. She began with a comprehensive survey of the history of the deaf from 1786 to the present day, identifying a major turning point in the exclusion of sign language from the education of the deaf around 1930, a move then reinforced in the communist period to the extent that teachers of the deaf had to sign a commitment not to use sign language in their lessons. She also noted the difference between so-called signed Czech, which is an exact translation of the spoken language, and Czech sign language, which has its own structure and even dialects. Following the historical research, Mazerova studied a range of Czech and foreign materials relating to the culture of the deaf, interviewed deaf people about their experiences in school, their participation in the activities of associations for the deaf, and their experiences as a deaf person in a hearing society (these interviews are recorded on video), and visited various associations, clubs and schools for the deaf throughout the country. She concluded that while deaf people share certain behaviours which are quite distinct from those of hearing Czechs, there is little sense of a community as such. The vast majority of deaf people were not born into the deaf community and while feel that they belong together, they do not identify themselves as part of a deaf community and do not work together as a community to achieve their goals.

Central Europe in the Process of European Integration. A Comparative Study of the Strategies of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia towards the Deepening and Widening of the European Union

Membership of the European Union U is usually seen as a strategic goal of the associated states of central and eastern Europe. At the beginning of the 1990s central European countries, where the economic and political transformation was relatively advanced, received preferential treatment from the European Community, which was starting to evolve a policy of differentiation. Podraza studied the strategies of four central European countries towards changes under way in the European Union, analysing several aspects for each case: (1) the process of political transformation (2) decision-making structures in the field of foreign policy and European integration (3) integration strategies: (a) main foreign policy priorities (b) application for membership of the European Union (c) the Commission option on each country (d) accession partnership, including a National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (e) regular Commission reports (f) accession negotiations

Comparative Czech and Polish Perspectives and Policies on the Eastern Enlargement of the EU and the Prominence of the German Factor

With the end of the Cold War, which for central and eastern Europe in many respects meant the real political end to the Second World War, Germany regained its central position in the region. The Federal Republic quickly established itself as a major political and economic partner for both the Czech Republic and Poland. More importantly, due to its support for the idea of EU and NATO enlargement. Germany also became the most active western advocate of the Czech and Polish 'return to Europe'. The question remains, however, of whether Germany's relations with Poland and the Czech Republic can mature into a close axis like that enjoyed between Paris and Bonn/Berlin, or whether they will continue to develop along the lines of 'strategic congruence' but 'emotional mistrust and reserve'. The research here looked at three aspects of this question. First it considered the idea of a link between perceptions of Germany and broader considerations of European integration in Poland and the Czech Republic and outlined the ways in which Germany has motivated Czech and Polish activities and policies on EU membership. The team then focused upon on-going Czech and Polish EU integration strategies and sought to identify the actual ways in which Germany's advocacy of EU enlargement in manifest in cooperation 'on the ground'. The group concluded by considering prospects for Czech/German and Polish/German cooperation in the context of the enlarged European Union.

The Permanent Income Hypothesis: A Test on Czech Privatisation

Since the late eighties, economists have been regarding the transition from command to market economies in Central and Eastern Europe with intense interest. In addition to studying the transition per se, they have begun using the region as a testing ground on which to investigate the validity of certain classic economic propositions. In his research, comprising three articles written in English and totalling 40 pages, Mr. Hanousek uses the so-called "Czech national experiment" (voucher privatisation scheme) to test the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). He took as his inspiration Kreinin's recommendation: "Since data concerning the behaviour of windfall income recipients is relatively scanty, and since such data can constitute an important test of the permanent income hypothesis, it is of interest to bring to bear on the hypothesis whatever information is available". Mr. Hanousek argues that, since the transfer of property to Czech citizens from 1992 to 1994 through the voucher scheme was not anticipated, it can be regarded as windfall income. The average size of the windfall was more than three month's salary and over 60 percent of the Czech population received this unexpected income. Furthermore, there are other reasons for conducting such an analysis in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the privatisation process took place quickly. Secondly, both the economy and consumer behaviour have been very stable. Thirdly, out of a total population of 10 million Czech citizens, an astonishing 6 million, that is, virtually every household, participated in the scheme. Thus Czech voucher privatisation provides a sample for testing the PIH almost equivalent to a full population, thus avoiding problems with the distribution of windfalls. Compare this, for instance with the fact that only 4% of the Israeli urban population received personal restitution from Germany, while the number of veterans who received the National Service Life Insurance Dividends amounted to less than 9% of the US population and were concentrated in certain age groups. But to begin with, Mr. Hanousek considers the question of whether the public percieves the transfer from the state to individual as an increase in net wealth. It can be argued that the state is only divesting itself of assets that would otherwise provide a future source of transfers. According to this argument, assigning these assets to individuals creates an offsetting change in the present value of potential future transfers so that individuals are no better off after the transfer. Mr. Hanousek disagrees with this approach. He points out that a change in the ownership of inefficient state-owned enterprises should lead to higher efficiency, which alone increases the value of enterprises and creates a windfall increase in citizens' portfolios. More importantly, the state and individuals had very different preferences during the transition. Despite government propaganda, it is doubtful that citizens of former communist countries viewed government-owned enterprises as being operated in the citizens' best interest. Moreover, it is unlikely that the public fully comprehended the sophisticated links between the state budget, state-owned enterprises, and transfers to individuals. Finally, the transfers were not equal across the population. Mr. Hanousek conducted a survey on 1263 individuals, dividing them into four monthly earnings categories. After determining whether the respondent had participated in the voucher process, he asked those who had how much of what they received from voucher privatisation had been (a) spent on goods and services, (b) invested elsewhere, (c) transferred to newly emerging pension funds, (d) given to a family member, and (e) retained in their original form as an investment. Both the mean and the variance of the windfall rise with income. He obtained similar results with respect to education, where the mean (median) windfall for those with a basic school education was 13,600 Czech Crowns (CZK), a figure that increased to 15,000 CZK for those with a high school education without exams, 19,900 CZK for high school graduates with exams, and 24,600 CZK for university graduates. Mr. Hanousek concludes that it can be argued that higher income (and better educated) groups allocated their vouchers or timed the disposition of their shares better. He turns next to an analysis of how respondents reported using their windfalls. The key result is that only a relatively small number of individuals reported spending on goods. Overall, the results provide strong support for the permanent income hypothesis, the only apparent deviation being the fact that both men and women aged 26 to 35 apparently consume more than they should if the windfall were annuitised. This finding is still fully consistent with the PIH, however, if this group is at a stage in their life-cycle where, without the windfall, they would be borrowing to finance consumption associated with family formation etc. Indeed, the PIH predicts that individuals who would otherwise borrow to finance consumption would consume the windfall up to the level equal to the annuitised fraction of the increase in lifetime income plus the full amount of the previously planned borrowing for consumption. Greater consumption would then be financed, not from investing the windfall, but from avoidance of future repayment obligations for debts that would have been incurred without the windfall.

The Constitutional-Judicial Control of the Legislative and Executive Powers in Central and Eastern European Countries

This project looked at the nature, contents, methods, means and legal and political effects of the influence that constitutional courts exercise upon the legislative and executive powers in the newly established democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The basic hypothesis was that these courts work to provide a limitation of political power within the framework of the principal constitutional values and that they force the legislature and executive to exercise their powers and duties in strict accordance with the constitution. Following a study of the documentary sources, including primarily the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions and decisions of constitutional courts, Mr. Cvetkovski prepared a questionnaire on various aspects of the topics researched and sent it to the respective constitutional courts. A series of direct interviews with court officials in six of the ten countries then served to clarify a large number of questions relating to differences in procedures etc. that arose from the questionnaires. As a final stage, the findings were compared with those described in recent publications on constitutional control in general and in Central and Eastern Europe in particular. The study began by considering the constitutional and political environment of the constitutional courts' activities in controlling legislative and executive powers, which in all countries studied are based on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers. All courts are separate bodies with special status in terms of constitutional law and are independent of other political and judicial institutions. The range of matters within their jurisdiction is set by the constitution of the country in question but in all cases can be exercised only with the framework of procedural rules. This gives considerable significance to the question of who sets these rules and different countries have dealt with it in different ways. In some there is a special constitutional law with the same legal force as the constitution itself (Croatia), the majority of countries allow for regulation by an ordinary law, Macedonia gives the court the autonomy to create and change its own rules of procedure, while in Hungary the parliament fixes the rules on procedure at the suggestion of the constitutional court. The question of the appointment of constitutional judges was also considered and of the mechanisms for ensuring their impartiality and immunity. In the area of the courts' scope for providing normative control, considerable differences were found between the different countries. In some cases the courts' jurisdiction is limited to the normative acts of the respective parliaments, and there is generally no provision for challenging unconstitutional omissions by legislation and the executive. There are, however, some situations in which they may indirectly evaluate the constitutionality of legislative omissions, as when the constitution contains provision for a time limit on enacting legislation, when the parliament has made an omission in drafting a law which violates the constitutional provisions, or when a law grants favours to certain groups while excluding others, thereby violating the equal protection clause of the constitution. The control of constitutionality of normative acts can be either preventive or repressive, depending on whether it is implemented before or after the promulgation of the law or other enactment being challenged. In most countries in the region the constitutional courts provide only repressive control, although in Hungary and Poland the courts are competent to perform both preventive and repressive norm control, while in Romania the court's jurisdiction is limited to preventive norm control. Most countries are wary of vesting constitutional courts with preventive norm control because of the danger of their becoming too involved in the day-to-day political debate, but Mr. Cvetkovski points out certain advantages of such control. If combined with a short time limit it can provide early clarification of a constitutional issue, secondly it avoids the problems arising if a law that has been in force for some years is declared to be unconstitutional, and thirdly it may help preserve the prestige of the legislation. Its disadvantages include the difficulty of ascertaining the actual and potential consequences of a norm without the empirical experience of the administration and enforcement of the law, the desirability of a certain distance from the day-to-day arguments surrounding the political process of legislation, the possible effects of changing social and economic conditions, and the danger of placing obstacles in the way of rapid reactions to acute situations. In the case of repressive norm control, this can be either abstract or concrete. The former is initiated by the supreme state organs in order to protect abstract constitutional order and the latter is initiated by ordinary courts, administrative authorities or by individuals. Constitutional courts cannot directly oblige the legislature and executive to pass a new law and this remains a matter of legislative and executive political responsibility. In the case of Poland, the parliament even has the power to dismiss a constitutional court decision by a special majority of votes, which means that the last word lies with the legislature. As the current constitutions of Central and Eastern European countries are newly adopted and differ significantly from the previous ones, the courts' interpretative functions should ensure a degree of unification in the application of the constitution. Some countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Russia) provide for the constitutional courts' decisions to have a binding role on the constitutions. While their decisions inevitably have an influence on the actions of public bodies, they do not set criteria for political behaviour, which depends rather on the overall political culture and traditions of the society. All constitutions except that of Belarus, provide for the courts to have jurisdiction over conflicts arising from the distribution of responsibilities between different organs and levels in the country, as well for impeachment procedures against the head of state, and for determining the constitutionality of political parties (except in Belarus, Hungary, Russia and Slovakia). All the constitutions studied guarantee individual rights and freedoms and most courts have jurisdiction over complaints of violation of these rights by the constitution. All courts also have some jurisdiction over international agreements and treaties, either directly (Belarus, Bulgaria and Hungary) before the treaty is ratified, or indirectly (Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Romania, Russia and Yugoslavia). In each country the question of who may initiate proceedings of norm control is of central importance and is usually regulated by the constitution itself. There are three main possibilities: statutory organs, normal courts and private individuals and the limitations on each of these is discussed in the report. Most courts are limited in their rights to institute ex officio a full-scale review of a point of law, and such rights as they do have rarely been used. In most countries courts' decisions do not have any binding force but must be approved by parliament or impose on parliament the obligation to bring the relevant law into conformity within a certain period. As a result, the courts' position is generally weaker than in other countries in Europe, with parliament remaining the supreme body. In the case of preventive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality may act to suspend the law and or to refer it back to the legislature, where in countries such as Romania it may even be overturned by a two-thirds majority. In repressive norm control a finding of unconstitutionality generally serves to take the relevant law out of legal force from the day of publication of the decision or from another date fixed by the court. If the law is annulled retrospectively this may or may not bring decisions of criminal courts under review, depending on the provisions laid down in the relevant constitution. In cases relating to conflicts of competencies the courts' decisions tend to be declaratory and so have a binding effect inter partes. In the case of a review of an individual act, decisions generally become effective primarily inter partes but is the individual act has been based on an unconstitutional generally binding normative act of the legislature or executive, the findings has quasi-legal effect as it automatically initiates special proceedings in which the law or other regulation is to be annulled or abrogated with effect erga omnes. This wards off further application of the law and thus further violations of individual constitutional rights, but also discourages further constitutional complaints against the same law. Thus the success of one individual's complaint extends to everyone else whose rights have equally been or might have been violated by the respective law. As the body whose act is repealed is obliged to adopt another act and in doing so is bound by the legal position of the constitutional court on the violation of constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and rights of the complainant, in this situation the decision of the constitutional court has the force of a precedent.

The Dynamics of the Policies of Ethnic Cleansing in Silesia in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Through studying German, Polish and Czech publications on Silesia, Mr. Kamusella found that most of them, instead of trying to objectively analyse the past, are devoted to proving some essential "Germanness", "Polishness" or "Czechness" of this region. He believes that the terminology and thought-patterns of nationalist ideology are so deeply entrenched in the minds of researchers that they do not consider themselves nationalist. However, he notes that, due to the spread of the results of the latest studies on ethnicity/nationalism (by Gellner, Hobsbawm, Smith, Erikson Buillig, amongst others), German publications on Silesia have become quite objective since the 1980s, and the same process (impeded by under funding) has been taking place in Poland and the Czech Republic since 1989. His own research totals some 500 pages, in English, presented on disc. So what are the traps into which historians have been inclined to fall? There is a tendency for them to treat Silesia as an entity which has existed forever, though Mr. Kamusella points out that it emerged as a region only at the beginning of the 11th century. These same historians speak of Poles, Czechs and Germans in Silesia, though Mr. Kamusella found that before the mid-19th century, identification was with an inhabitant's local area, religion or dynasty. In fact, a German national identity started to be forged in Prussian Silesia only during the Liberation War against Napoleon (1813-1815). It was concretised in 1861 in the form of the first Prussian census, when the language a citizen spoke was equated with his/her nationality. A similar census was carried out in Austrian Silesia only in 1881. The censuses forced the Silesians to choose their nationality despite their multiethnic multicultural identities. It was the active promotion of a German identity in Prussian Silesia, and Vienna's uneasy acceptance of the national identities in Austrian Silesia which stimulated the development of Polish national, Moravian ethnic and Upper Silesian ethnic regional identities in Upper Silesia, and Polish national, Czech national, Moravian ethnic and Silesian ethnic identities in Austrian Silesia. While traditional historians speak of the "nationalist struggle" as though it were a permanent characteristic of Silesia, Mr. Kamusella points out that such a struggle only developed in earnest after 1918. What is more, he shows how it has been conveniently forgotten that, besides the national players, there were also significant ethnic movements of Moravians, Upper Silesians, Silesians and the tutejsi (i.e. those who still chose to identify with their locality). At this point Mr. Kamusella moves into the area of linguistics. While traditionally historians have spoken of the conflicts between the three national languages (German, Polish and Czech), Mr Kamusella reminds us that the standardised forms of these languages, which we choose to dub "national", were developed only in the mid-18th century, after 1869 (when Polish became the official language in Galicia), and after the 1870s (when Czech became the official language in Bohemia). As for standard German, it was only widely promoted in Silesia from the mid 19th century onwards. In fact, the majority of the population of Prussian Upper Silesia and Austrian Silesia were bi- or even multilingual. What is more, the "Polish" and "Czech" Silesians spoke were not the standard languages we know today, but a continuum of West-Slavic dialects in the countryside and a continuum of West-Slavic/German creoles in the urbanised areas. Such was the linguistic confusion that, from time to time, some ethnic/regional and Church activists strove to create a distinctive Upper Silesian/Silesian language on the basis of these dialects/creoles, but their efforts were thwarted by the staunch promotion of standard German, and after 1918, of standard Polish and Czech. Still on the subject of language, Mr. Kamusella draws attention to a problem around the issue of place names and personal names. Polish historians use current Polish versions of the Silesian place names, Czechs use current Polish/Czech versions of the place names, and Germans use the German versions which were in use in Silesia up to 1945. Mr. Kamusella attempted to avoid this, as he sees it, nationalist tendency, by using an appropriate version of a place name for a given period and providing its modern counterpart in parentheses. In the case of modern place names he gives the German version in parentheses. As for the name of historical figures, he strove to use the name entered on the birth certificate of the person involved, and by doing so avoid such confusion as, for instance, surrounds the Austrian Silesian pastor L.J. Sherschnik, who in German became Scherschnick, in Polish, Szersznik, and in Czech, Sersnik. Indeed, the prospective Silesian scholar should, Mr. Kamusella suggests, as well as the three languages directly involved in the area itself, know English and French, since many documents and books on the subject have been published in these languages, and even Latin, when dealing in depth with the period before the mid-19th century. Mr. Kamusella divides the policies of ethnic cleansing into two categories. The first he classifies as soft, meaning that policy is confined to the educational system, army, civil service and the church, and the aim is that everyone learn the language of the dominant group. The second is the group of hard policies, which amount to what is popularly labelled as ethnic cleansing. This category of policy aims at the total assimilation and/or physical liquidation of the non-dominant groups non-congruent with the ideal of homogeneity of a given nation-state. Mr. Kamusella found that soft policies were consciously and systematically employed by Prussia/Germany in Prussian Silesia from the 1860s to 1918, whereas in Austrian Silesia, Vienna quite inconsistently dabbled in them from the 1880s to 1917. In the inter-war period, the emergence of the nation-states of Poland and Czechoslovakia led to full employment of the soft policies and partial employment of the hard ones (curbed by the League of Nations minorities protection system) in Czechoslovakian Silesia, German Upper Silesia and the Polish parts of Upper and Austrian Silesia. In 1939-1945, Berlin started consistently using all the "hard" methods to homogenise Polish and Czechoslovakian Silesia which fell, in their entirety, within the Reich's borders. After World War II Czechoslovakia regained its prewar part of Silesia while Poland was given its prewar section plus almost the whole of the prewar German province. Subsequently, with the active involvement and support of the Soviet Union, Warsaw and Prague expelled the majority of Germans from Silesia in 1945-1948 (there were also instances of the Poles expelling Upper Silesian Czechs/Moravians, and of the Czechs expelling Czech Silesian Poles/pro-Polish Silesians). During the period of communist rule, the same two countries carried out a thorough Polonisation and Czechisation of Silesia, submerging this region into a new, non-historically based administrative division. Democratisation in the wake of the fall of communism, and a gradual retreat from the nationalist ideal of the homogeneous nation-state with a view to possible membership of the European Union, caused the abolition of the "hard" policies and phasing out of the "soft" ones. Consequently, limited revivals of various ethnic/national minorities have been observed in Czech and Polish Silesia, whereas Silesian regionalism has become popular in the westernmost part of Silesia which remained part of Germany. Mr. Kamusella believes it is possible that, with the overcoming of the nation-state discourse in European politics, when the expression of multiethnicity and multilingualism has become the cause of the day in Silesia, regionalism will hold sway in this region, uniting its ethnically/nationally variegated population in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity championed by the European Union.

Central Europeans towards Integration with the European Union: A Study of Public Opinion, Social Attitudes and National Identities

Since the turbulence of 1989, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have striven to "return to Europe". Agreements have been signed with ten post-communist countries, beginning in 1991 with Czechoslovakia (before its division), Hungary and Poland. Since that time several countries have expressed a desire to become members of the EU. In 1997 the European Commission announced its opinion on the applications for EU membership of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and seven other applicant countries. The Commission recommended the commencement of negotiations on accession with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. Mr. Kucia's report, presented in the form of a series of manuscripts totalling 91 pages, written in English and Polish and including many pages of tables and graphs, presents the results of a study of public opinion on European integration in four countries of Central Europe (CE): the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (H), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The research results are primarily based on a public-opinion survey known as the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB). CEEB has been conducted on behalf of the European Commission in the Central and Eastern European countries each year in autumn since 1990. Below is a very small selection of Mr. Kucia's research findings. Throughout the 90s people in the four countries increasingly saw their countries' future tied up with the EU, since economic and political connections to the EU were growing and prospects for EU membership were increasing. Regional co-operation within CE did not gain much popular recognition. However, initially high levels of enthusiasm for the EU were gradually superseded by a more realistic approach or even scepticism. Poland was the exception in this respect; its population was more positive about the EU in 1996 than ever before. Mr. Kucia concludes that, since the political "elites" in CE are more positive about the EU than the people they serve, they should do their best to bring people round to their beliefs, lest the project of European integration become purely the business of the elites, as Mr. Kucia claims it has been in the EU up till now. He accuses the governments of the region, the EU authorities and the media of failing to provide appropriate information, especially about the two subjects which most affect them, association with the EU and the PHARE assistance programme. Respondents were asked to rank in order the countries or regions they saw their country's future most closely tied up with. In the period 92-96 the EU received the highest ratings in all of CE. The ratings were highest in CZ in 92 and 93 (46%) and in Poland in 96 (46%). They were the lowest in Hungary (22% in 94). After the EU came "Other Western European countries (non EU)", that is Austria, Sweden and Finland (before they joined the EU in 1995), Switzerland and Norway. Mr. Kucia puts the high ratings of these countries down to historical connections and geographical proximity, particularly in the case of Austria. The USA always came second in Poland, and in Hungary too its standing has always been higher than in CZ or SK. Indeed Mr. Kucia suggests that the USA's standing is disproportionately low in especially the CZ. Germany was nominated frequently by Hungarians, though in the CZ and SK, figures have been consistently low (1-2%). "Other CE/EE countries" increased their ratings in all of CE except Poland between 92 and 96. With regard to these last figures, Mr. Kucia makes an interesting note. Assuming that for the respondents in the four countries this category covered the Visegrad 4, least support was found in Poland, whose government was the most in favour of close political co-operation within the V4, while most support was in evidence in CZ and SK, for whose governments V4 was simply not a priority. Again, there is evidence of a divide between the political elites and the people. Russia has occupied a consistently modest rank. It was the highest in PL, fairly low in H and SK and the lowest in CZ. The Slovak government's policy of closer ties with Russia is reflected in a growth in the figures from 2% in 93 to 6% in 95. Every year the spontaneous answer "we should depend on ourselves" appeared, which Mr. Kucia interprets as either a sign of isolationism and disillusionment or as a call for self-reliance. Unfortunately he regards both these tendencies as unfeasible in the uniting Europe. Moving to more general conclusions, Mr. Kucia finds that the concept "Central Europe" does not have much meaning for Central Europeans. He believes that this is probably due to the failure to establish a viable regional co-operation network. Group discussions also revealed that people thought themselves European as a consequence of being Czech or Polish etc. Thus European identity is based on national identities. Generally within the surveyed period, the numbers of those who said they often think themselves European decreased, while the numbers of those who said they never think themselves European increased from 41% in PL, 36% in CZ, and 30% in H in 1990, to 67% in CZ, 58% in PL, and 51% in H in 1995.

Pedagogical Aspects of Sustainable Development"

The project produced three main sets of results. The first is related to the conception of ecological education, the second to an investigation of the current situation in ecological education in secondary schools in the Czech Republic, and the third presents ways and means of improving ecological education in schools. Kvasnickova first developed ideas on attitudes to the environment, clarified the term "ecological education" and carried out a methodological analysis of the systematic conception of ecological education, She then investigated the current situation of such education in various types of secondary schools throughout the country. Her results showed that the main problems of ecological education are the lack of an integrated approach to such education, the inadequate preparation of teachers and the lack of information in the area. During the project, she ran many seminars to increase teachers' qualifications for ecological education and prepared various textbooks, methodological guides and teaching aids.

The Redistribution of Property Rights, Corporate Governance and Company Restructuring after Privatisation"

The project covered the main issues of privatisation, corporate governance and company restructuring after privatisation in Hungary and in the Russian Republic, together with a summary of the broader picture of company-level changes in Central and Eastern Europe, discussing the issues of micro-financial restructuring in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The two countries selected as the focus of research can be regarded as the two most widely differing cases of the economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary began its transition very early in 1989, while Russia was very late in doing so. Hungary first implemented a series of institutional and systemic reforms before stabilising its public finances, while Russia has struggled with financial stabilisation for years without great success. Company restructuring and the introduction of new forms of governance only began in Russia in the mid-1990s. Hungary opted for "traditional" western methods of privatisation and invited a large amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) while in Russia the bulk of state-owned property was privatised either by free distribution or by a strange blend of ESOP-MBO schemes. FDI in Russia remained modest because of the high risk and uncertainty surrounding economic transactions there. Hungary was a forerunner in privatising public utilities, while Russia has moved cautiously in this area. The group's studies show that the Hungarian economy is now over the "transformation recession" and its economic success is largely due to its successful privatisation and to the dominant participation of foreign investors in company take-overs and in the restructuring process. The study of Russia provides a comprehensive account of the main factors in the so-far modest results in Russian privatisation and economic transformation.

Civil Society and Political Parties in the Period of Transition

The major aim of Mr. Marada's project was to investigate the role of political parties on the one hand, and various institutional forms of civil society on the other, in the process of establishing mechanisms of political decision-making and policy-formation in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, after November 1989. Mr. Marada wanted to examine what consequences the interplay and tensions between political parties and institutions of civil society had on the status and practical understanding of citizenship and civil society. At the beginning of his research Mr. Marada found that, while the sphere of the political was relatively clearly defined, the phenomenon of civil society required a conceptual clarification. He devoted a great deal of time to analysing the emergence, development, and disintegration of Civic Forum as the major agent of the regime change and subsequent political reforms. Alongside this analysis is a commentary on Czech society in general, drawing on established research to show how, as yet, a kind of civic incompetence reigns within the country, and how this situation has its roots in the belief, promoted by politicians themselves, that politics is an activity for experts only. The final outcome of his research took the form of a series of articles, in English, totalling 40 pages.

Regional Differences in Living Standards in Eastern European Countries - Changes During the Transition

This research aimed to discover how differences in living standards between regional units changed during the period of transformation from 1990 to 1995 in Poland, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The standard of living was measured by the so-called Living Standard Index (LSI), a composite taxonomic measure. Fixed reference points make it possible to compare the standard of living in regional administrative units and to study its dynamics. The analysis was country-specific, since the lists of variable were not fully identical for all the countries studied. The main tools used were LSI variability measures (mainly variance and standard deviation). By identifying trend patterns in the characteristics of LSIs, it was possible to compare the different countries. It was found that * differences in living standards between regional units have been decreasing during the transformation in Poland and in the Czech Republic. In the latter this process is slow and smooth, while in Poland there was a relatively sharp decline which then stopped entirely in 1994 * the only country with increasing differences between regions is Hungary and these differences are growing at a constant rate * the lowest level of regional differences in the LSI was found in Poland, followed by the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic * the regional differences in Hungary are almost twice as high as in the Czech Republic

New Prosperity for Rural Regions

The project deals with problems of marginal rural regions in the period of transformation in Slovenia and the Czech Republic. The course of the transformation, its impact, related border problems and environmental aspects were studied in seven model regions of the two countries, using geographical, cartographic, sociological, historical and remote-sensing methods. The opinions of both the local populations and the local authorities were also taken into account. The most important problems observed included the deepening of marginality, the worsening situation in the labour market, structural demographic degradation of the most marginal settlements and a lack of development programmes. In the Czech Republic the state had no effective regional policy up to the time of the research. Possibilities for future prosperity include exploitation of human and other local resources, the elaboration of local and regional programmes capable of gaining financial support and the utilisation of tranquility and the positive environmental situation. It is the local people who usually represent the main wealth of marginal regions and care for them is the task of the local authorities.