Russian Opera as Cultural Text (The Golden Cockerel by N.A. Rimsky-Korsakov)

This project entailed a detailed study and analysis of the literary and musical text of Rimsky-Korsakov's opera The Golden Cockerel, involving source study, philological and musical-historical analysis, etc. Goryachikh studied the process of the creation of the opera, paying particular attention to its genre, that of a character fable, which was innovative for its time. He considered both the opera's folklore sources and the influences of the 'conditional theatre' aesthetics of the early 20th century. This culture-based approach made it possible to trace the numerous sources of the plot and its literary and musical text back to professional and folk cultures of Russia and other countries. A comparative study of the vocabulary, style and poetics of the libretto and the poetic system of Pushkin's Tale of the Golden Cockerel revealed much in common between the two. Goryachikh concluded that The Golden Cockerel was intended to be a specific form of 'dialogue' between the author, the preceding cultural tradition, and that of the time when the opera was written. He proposed a new definition of The Golden Cockerel as an 'inversed opera' and studied its structure and essence, its beginnings in the 'laughing culture' and the deflection of its forms and composition in a cultural language. He identified the constructive technique of Rimsky-Korsakov's writing at each level of musical unity and noted its influence on Stravinsky and Prokoviev, also finding anticipations of musical phenomena of the 20th century. He concluded by formulating a research model of Russian classical opera as cultural text and suggested further uses for it in musicology.

Democratic Transition and Political Patronage

Mr. Korosenyi begins by analysing the particular relationship holding between politics and administration in different countries. Within Europe three major patterns have emerged in the 20th century. Firstly there is the politically neutral British Civil Service, secondly the German and French state bureaucracies, which traditionally are supposed to embody the "common good", and thirdly there is the patronage system of the so-called consociate democracies, e.g. Austria. In general Mr. Korosenyi believes that, though politics do not penetrate into the Hungarian administration to the extent they do in Belgium and Austria, nevertheless, there is a stronger fusion than there is in the traditional British pattern. He is particularly interested in this relationship with regard to its effect on democratic institution building and the stabilisation of the new regime in Hungary, now the old "nomenklatura" system has been abolished. The structure of the Hungarian government was a result of the constitutional amendments of 1989 and 1990. Analysing this period, it becomes clear that for all the political actors who initiated and supported the democratic transition to democracy, the underlying assumption was a radical depoliticisation of the administration in order to maintain its stability. The political leadership of the executive is a cabinet government. The government is structured along ministries, each headed by a politician, i.e. the minister, who is a member of the cabinet. The minister's political secretary is not a cabinet member, but he or she is a politician, usually a member of the parliament. The head of the administration of the ministry is the administrative state secretary, who is a civil servant. He or she usually has four deputies, also civil servants. Naturally it is assumed that there should be a clear separation between politicians and civil servants. However in practice, the borders can be blurred, giving rise to a hybrid known as the "political civil servant". Mr. Korosenyi analyses the different faces of these hybrids. They are civil servants for the following reasons. They need special educational qualifications, working experience, a civil service exam etc., they are not allowed to do anything which is incompatible with their impartial role, and they cannot occupy political office nor may they appear in the name of any political party. On the other hand, the accepted political dimension to their function is revealed by the following facts. The state secretary (a civil servant) may participate in cabinet meetings instead of the minister. The state secretary is employed by the minister. A state secretary or any of their deputies can be dismissed at any time by the minister or the prime minister. In practice then, ministers appoint to these senior administrative positions civil servants whose personal and political loyaties are strong. To the second level of political patronage in ministries belong the ministerial cabinet, press office and public relation office. The ministerial cabinet includes the private advisors and members of the personal staff of the minister. The press office and the PR office, if they exist, are not adjusted to the administrative hierarchy of the ministry, but under the direct control of the minister. In the beginning of the 1990s, such offices were exceptions; in the second half of the 90s they are accepted and to be found in most ministries. Mr. Korosenyi's work, a 92-page manuscript of a book in Hungarian, marks the first piece of literature within the field of political science which analyses the structure of the Hungarian government in the 1990s and the relationship between the political leadership and the public administration.