Bundling Strategies When Products Are Vertically Differentiated and Capacities Are Limited

We consider a seller who owns two capacity-constrained resources and markets two products (components) corresponding to these resources as well as a bundle comprising the two components. In an environment where all customers agree that one of the two components is of higher quality than the other and that the bundle is of the highest quality, we derive the seller's optimal bundling strategy. We demonstrate that the optimal solution depends on the absolute and relative availabilities of the two resources as well as upon the extent of subadditivity of the quality of the products. The possible strategies that can arise as equilibrium behavior include a pure components strategy, a partial- or full-spectrum mixed bundling strategy, and a pure bundling strategy, where the latter strategy is optimal when capacities are unconstrained. These conclusions are contrary to findings in the prior literature on bundling that demonstrated the unambiguous dominance of the full-spectrum mixed bundling strategy. Thus, our work expands the frontier of bundling to an environment with vertically differentiated components and limited resources. We also explore how the bundling strategies change as we introduce an element of horizontal differentiation wherein different types of customers value the available components differently.

Estimating Willingness to Pay for River Amenities and Safety Measures Associated with Shale Gas Extraction

This paper utilizes a Contingent Valuation Method survey of a random sample of residents to estimate that households are willing to pay an average of $12.00 per month for public projects designed to improve river access and $10.46 per month for additional safety measures that would eliminate risks to local watersheds from drilling for natural gas from underground shale formations. These estimates can be compared to the costs of providing each of these two amenities to help foster the formation of efficient policy decisions.

British Monetary Sovereignty: A Cultural Analysis

In this thesis, I will document and analyze historical aspects of the British debate over adopting a common currency with the European Community primarily during the last half of the twentieth century until the present. More specifically, while on the surface such a decision would seem to turn on economic or political considerations, I will show that this historic British decision not to surrender their pound sterling in exchange for the euro was rooted in the nation's cultural identity. During this decades long British debate over the euro, two opposing, but strongly held, positions developed; one side believed that Britain had a compelling interest in bonding with the rest of Europe economically as well as politically, the other side believed that Britain's independent heritage was deeply rooted in many of its traditions including maintaining control of its own monetary matters, which included keeping its pound sterling. As part of this thesis, I have conducted interviews with business leaders, economists, and social scientists as well as researched public records in order to assess many of the arguments favoring and opposing Britain's adoption of the euro. Many Britons strongly believed that it was time to join other Europeans, who were willing to sacrifice their sovereign currency to a bold common currency experiment, while other Britons viewed the pound sterling as too integral a part of British heritage to abandon. Ultimately, British leaders and citizens had to determine whether such a currency tradeoff would be worth it to them as a nation. It was a gamble that twelve other nations (at the time of the euro's 2002 launch) were ready to take, optimistically calculating that easier credit and reduced exchange transaction costs would lead to greater economic prosperity. Many asserted that only with ! ! such a united European monetary coalition would Europe's nations be able to compete trade-wise with powerful economic nations like the United States and China. My conclusion is that Britain's refusal to join the euro was a decision that had less to do with economic opportunity or political motivations and much more to do with how the British people viewed themselves culturally and their identity as an independent nation.