Memory biases in left vs. right implied motion

People remember moving objects as having moved farther along in their path of motion than is actually the case; this is known as representational momentum (RM). Some authors have argued that RM is an internalization of environmental properties such as physical momentum and gravity. Five experiments demonstrated that a similar memory bias could not have been learned from the environment. For right-handed Ss, objects apparently moving to the right engendered a larger memory bias in the direction of motion than did those moving to the left. This effect, clearly not derived from real-world lateral asymmetries, was relatively insensitive to changes in apparent velocity and the type of object used, and it may be confined to objects in the left half of visual space. The left–right effect may be an intrinsic property of the visual operating system, which may in turn have affected certain cultural conventions of left and right in art and other domains.

Understanding Economic Biases in Representation: Income, Resources, and Policy Representation in the 110th House

This article explores the extent, and possible causes, of income-based biases in representation of citizens by members of the 110th Congress. The author finds that the preferences of wealthier citizens are modestly but significantly better reflected in the choices of their congressional representatives than are the preferences of poorer citizens. More importantly, the author shows that education, political sophistication, political engagement, ethnicity, and other sociodemographic factors can explain only a small part of this representation gap. Biases in representation across income lines appear to be driven by income alone, or at least not by politically relevant factors correlated with income.

Social Context and Economic Biases in Representation

This article explores the role of political context in shaping economic biases in representation-the degree to which wealthy citizens' views are more strongly represented than poorer citizens' views in the choices of policymakers. I develop a general model that explains why poorer citizens will be better represented relative to the rich in certain political contexts than others, arguing that the relative representation of the poor will be stronger in contexts that make the views of the poor relevant and accessible to policymakers. I then derive several specific hypotheses that flow from this model and test these hypotheses through a study of the dyadic relationships between citizens and their representatives in the U.S. Congress. The results show that poorer citizens are better represented relative to the rich in Congressional districts that are electorally competitive, have low median incomes, have relatively equal distributions of incomes, have a significant organized labor presence, and are represented by Democrats.