The Body of Margaret Atwood: Sex Work and Prostitution within Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale, Oryx and Crake, and The Year of the Flood

In this paper, I will argue that Canadian author Margaret Atwood uses fiscal and socially conservative dystopias to show how sex work and prostitution are choices that women would never have to make in a world with true gender equality. In these radically different worlds, women have no agency beyond their sexuality and no ability to express themselves as equals within either society. And while the structures of both societies, the society of The Handmaid’s Tale and that of both Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood, are inherently different, they both stem from modern conservative philosophies: for example, the country of Gilead in The Handmaid’s Tale holds Christian conservative beliefs on the role of religion in the state and the culturally designated roles of women. I define social conservatism as the idea that government organizations are used to pursue an agenda promoting traditional religious values such as “public morality” and opposing “immoralities” such as abortion, prostitution, and homosexuality. I define fiscal conservatism as an agenda promoting privatization of the market, deregulation and lower taxes. In this paper I argue that because these philosophies are incompatible with gender equality, they drive women to occupations such as sex work. Women find that they have no choices and sex work provides something to “trade.” For Offred, this “trading” is more limited, because she is a sex slave. For Oryx, this trading allows her to travel to the West, yet not before her childhood is marked by prostitution and pornography. Sex work allows for Ren to reclaim some agency over her life, yet she only chooses sex work because she is presented with few other options. All of these issues stem from the philosophies that define these dystopias.

Does Israel Follow the Law? A Critical Analysis of Israel's Application of the International Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Occupied Territories

Israel's occupation of territories it captured in 1967 has become one of the longest and most controversial occupations of the last fifty years. Eschewing the traditional political analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this paper aims to explore whether Israel has adequately applied international law in the occupied territories, in particular, the law of belligerent occupation. The two actors under assessment are the Israeli government, particularly its military which enforces and maintains the law in the territories, and the Supreme Court of Israel, which has the power of review over military actions in the territories. The particular issues of the occupation that are critically analyzed are the general legal framework that Israel established in the territories, Israel's civilian settlement policy in territories, and Israel's construction of a barrier in the West Bank. This paper concludes that Israel has incorrectly applied the legal framework of belligerent occupation by refusing to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention; it has wrongly concluded that the establishment of civilian settlements in the territories conform with international law; yet it has rightly concluded that the construction of the barrier in the West Bank is permissible under international law, in contrast to the conclusion of the much publicized International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on the 'Wall.' Along with these general assessments, the author will also provide some historical and political insight into why the Israeli government and the Supreme Court may have applied the law in the way that they did.