Challenges of the Cooperative Movement In Addressing Issues of Human Security In the Context of a Neoliberal World: the Case of Argentina

The response of some Argentine workers to the 2001 crisis of neoliberalism gave rise to a movement of worker-recovered enterprises (empresas recuperadas por sus trabajadores or ERTs). The ERTs have emerged as former employees took over the control of generally fraudulently bankrupt factories and enterprises. The analysis of the ERT movement within the neoliberal global capitalist order will draw from William Robinson’s (2004) neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony. The theoretical framework of neo-Gramscian hegemony will be used in exposing the contradictions of capitalism on the global, national, organizational and individual scales and the effects they have on the ERT movement. The ERT movement has demonstrated strong level of resilience, despite the numerous economic, social, political and cultural challenges and limitations it faces as a consequence of the implementation of neoliberalism globally. ERTs have shown that through non-violent protests, democratic principles of management and social inclusion, it is possible to start constructing an alternative social order that is based on the cooperative principles of “honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for others” (ICA 2007) as opposed to secrecy, exclusiveness, individualism and self-interestedness. In order to meet this “utopian” vision, it is essential to push the limits of the possible within the current social order and broaden the alliance to include the organized members of the working class, such as the members of trade unions, and the unorganized, such as the unemployed and underemployed. Though marginal in number and size, the members of ERTs have given rise to a model that is worth exploring in other countries and regions burdened by the contradictory workings of capitalism. Today, ERTs serve as living proofs that workers too are capable of successfully running businesses, not capitalists alone.

Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella) Fail to Be Equitable in an Ultimatum Game

The ultimatum game is a commonly used economics game testing humans' sense of fairness. In the game, a "proposer" is given a sum of money and is told they can split it however they want with another human partner. The partner can then either accept the division and both proposer and responder receive the proposed amounts, or the responder can reject the offer and neither player will get anything. Human subjects from most western cultures typically share almost half of an allotted amount, but it remains unknown whether our close primate relatives share this generosity. Recent attempts to present chimpanzees with the ultimatum game have provided inconclusive results, with some studies finding the animals share humans' disposition to behave 'fairly' and others concluding that chimpanzees act selfishly to maximize their own rewards. Capuchin monkeys are known to share many human and chimpanzee social and cooperative behaviors, and this study was the first to present capuchin monkeys with a version of the ultimatum game. Subjects were presented with two differently colored tokens representing different qualitative reward contingencies, one equitable and the other inequitable in favor of the subject proposer. Subjects could select and place one of the tokens in a transfer container. The capuchins were first tested with a "dictator game" where, after the subject monkey selected a token, the rewards (equitable or inequitable) were distributed to the subject and a nearby partner monkey that was not an active participant. The capuchins were then tested on an ultimatum game in which after the subject selected and placed a token in the container, the container was moved to the partner. The partner needed to remove the token and transfer it back to the experimenter for the rewards to be distributed. As such, the partner could reject the subject's offer by refusing to participate and neither would receive a reward. The experiment was conducted to determine if the subject monkey would select the equitable reward option rather than the selfish option in order to maintain the partner's cooperation in the task. Capuchin subjects behaved selfishly and selected the inequitable token significantly more often than the equitable token in both the dictator and ultimatum game with no significant difference in preference between the two games. Interestingly, despite the occasional occurrence of rejection by the partner monkeys (resulting in no reward for the subject), subjects never altered their strategy, continuing to prefer the selfish token. The study may indicate that capuchin monkeys have an inability to judge the effect of their behavior on a conspecific's reward outcome, or an indifference to the outcome if there is an individual cost associated with behaving prosocially.