British Monetary Sovereignty: A Cultural Analysis

In this thesis, I will document and analyze historical aspects of the British debate over adopting a common currency with the European Community primarily during the last half of the twentieth century until the present. More specifically, while on the surface such a decision would seem to turn on economic or political considerations, I will show that this historic British decision not to surrender their pound sterling in exchange for the euro was rooted in the nation's cultural identity. During this decades long British debate over the euro, two opposing, but strongly held, positions developed; one side believed that Britain had a compelling interest in bonding with the rest of Europe economically as well as politically, the other side believed that Britain's independent heritage was deeply rooted in many of its traditions including maintaining control of its own monetary matters, which included keeping its pound sterling. As part of this thesis, I have conducted interviews with business leaders, economists, and social scientists as well as researched public records in order to assess many of the arguments favoring and opposing Britain's adoption of the euro. Many Britons strongly believed that it was time to join other Europeans, who were willing to sacrifice their sovereign currency to a bold common currency experiment, while other Britons viewed the pound sterling as too integral a part of British heritage to abandon. Ultimately, British leaders and citizens had to determine whether such a currency tradeoff would be worth it to them as a nation. It was a gamble that twelve other nations (at the time of the euro's 2002 launch) were ready to take, optimistically calculating that easier credit and reduced exchange transaction costs would lead to greater economic prosperity. Many asserted that only with ! ! such a united European monetary coalition would Europe's nations be able to compete trade-wise with powerful economic nations like the United States and China. My conclusion is that Britain's refusal to join the euro was a decision that had less to do with economic opportunity or political motivations and much more to do with how the British people viewed themselves culturally and their identity as an independent nation.

The Cultural Construction Of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Sociopolitical Responses To Psychological Trauma In American And Vie

In my thesis, I incorporate both psychological research and personal narratives in order to explain why, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, the United States officially recognized Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder while the Vietnamese government did not. The absence of Vietnamese studies on the impact of PTSD on veterans, in comparison to the abundance of research collected on American soldiers, is reflective not of a disparity in the actual prevalence of the disorder, but of the influence of political policy on the scope of Vietnamese psychology. Personal narratives from Vietnamese civilians and soldiers thus reveal accounts of trauma otherwise hidden due to the absence of Vietnamese psychological research. Although these two nations conspicuously differed in their respective responses to the prevalence of psychological trauma in war veterans, these responses demonstrated that both the recognition and rejection of PTSD was a result of sociopolitical factors: political ideologies, rather than scientific reasons, dictated whether the postwar trajectory of psychological research focused on fully exploring the impact of PTSD on veteran populations. The association of military defeat with psychological trauma thus fixed attention on certain groups of veterans, including former American and South Vietnamese soldiers, while ignoring the impact of trauma on veterans of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army. The correlation of a soldier¿s ideological background with psychological trauma, rather than exposure to actual traumatic experiences, demonstrates that cultural and sociopolitical factors are far more influential in the construction of PTSD than objective indicators of the disorder¿s prevalence. Culturally-constructed responses to disorders such as PTSD therefore account for the subjective treatment of mental illness. The American and Vietnamese responses to veterans suffering from PTSD both demonstrated that the evidence of mental health problems in an individual does not guarantee an immediate or appropriate diagnosis and treatment regimen. External authorities whose primary aims are not necessarily concerned with the objective treatment of all victims of mental illness subjectively dictate mental health care policy, and therefore risk ignoring or marginalizing the needs of individuals in need of proper treatment.