Effects Of Perceived Financial Accessibility Of Colleges And Universities On Studentsâ¿ Assesment Of Institutional Desirability

This study focused on the effects of socioeconomic exclusivity indicators on college students¿ attitudes toward a hypothetical private liberal arts university. Students enrolled in two undergraduate courses in Education at an elite private liberal arts university in the northeast were randomly presented with one of three versions of an admissions brochure describing a fictitious university. The three versions of the brochure varied in their portrayals of the institution¿s financial exclusivity, ranging from high exclusivity to low exclusivity. Each student was asked to review the brochure and respond to a questionnaire, containing items pertaining to the overall desirability of the institution, as well as its student culture, academic program, campus traditions, and alumni network. Based on Thorstein Veblen¿s theory of the leisure class and Pierre Bourdieu¿s theory of social reproduction, it was hypothesized that students would judge the institution most favorably in all areas under the high exclusivity condition and least favorably under the low exclusivity condition. It was further hypothesized that differences in students¿ ratings of institutional desirability would be mediated by their own financial aid statuses. Results of a two-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed significant (p < .05) interactive effects of institutional exclusivity and student aid status on the perceived desirability of the academic program and campus traditions of the institution. While recipients of need-based financial aid tended to rate more socioeconomically exclusive institutions more favorably on these two variables, those who were not receiving need-based financial aid tended to rate such institutions less favorably. Implications of the findings for student affairs practice are discussed and recommendations for further research are presented.

The Pre-1980 Roots of Neoliberal Financial Deregulation

U.S. financial deregulation is often popularly presented as a fundamental attack on financial regulation that began with neoliberalism's Big Bang in 1980. This paper argues this position is wrong in two ways. First, it is a process that stretches back decades before 1980. Textbook mentions of 1970s precursor "financial innovations" fall far short of presenting the breadth and duration of the pre-1980 attack on the system of regulation. Second, it has not been an across-the-board attack on financial regulation in the name of market efficiency as required by its ideology and claimed by its advocates, but rather a focused attack on only one of the five pillars of the system of regulation. This paper develops both of these assertions through a presentation of the five central pillars of the pre-1980 system of financial regulation, and the four major attacks on the three different aspects of the restrictions on financial competition.

A Historical-Institutional Study of the Welfare Systems in the United States and Sweden: Net Social Wage Approach

In this study I first look at the historical developments of the welfare systems in Sweden and the United States to understand why these countries have produced two distinct systems over the years. After understanding their historical context I turn to the question of the relationship between the welfare system and economic growth. Policy makers and the mainstream media commonly cite the critique that through government deficit and public debt, welfare systems are a drag on the economy. By calculating the net social wage, the difference in taxes paid and benefits received by workers, I test this hypothesis to see if welfare systems are self-financed by the workers. My findings demonstrate that the net social wage has been negative in the U.S. from 1962 to the early 2000s and in Sweden from 1965 to 2012. This shows that the welfare systems are entirely self-financed by the workers for the full period in Sweden and until the recent financial crisis in the U.S.