Biomechanics on the Half Shell: Functional Performance Influences Patterns of Morphological Variation in the Emydid Turtle carapace

This study uses the carapace of emydid turtles to address hypothesized differences between terrestrial and aquatic species. Geometric morphometrics are used to quantify shell shape, and performance is estimated for two shell functions: shell strength and hydrodynamics. Aquatic turtle shells differ in shape from terrestrial turtle shells and are characterized by lower frontal areas and presumably lower drag. Terrestrial turtle shells are stronger than those of aquatic turtles; many-to-one mapping of morphology to function does not entirely mitigate a functional trade-off between mechanical strength and hydrodynamic performance. Furthermore, areas of morphospace characterized by exceptionally poor performance in either of the functions are not occupied by any emydid species. Though aquatic and terrestrial species show no significant differences in the rate of morphological evolution, aquatic species show a higher lineage density, indicative of a greater amount of convergence in their evolutionary history. The techniques employed in this study, including the modeling of theoretical shapes to assess performance in unoccupied areas of morphospace, suggest a framework for future studies of morphological variation.

Cell Types as Natural Kinds

Talk of different types of cells is commonplace in the biological sciences. We know a great deal, for example, about human muscle cells by studying the same type of cells in mice. Information about cell type is apparently largely projectible across species boundaries. But what defines cell type? Do cells come pre-packaged into different natural kinds? Philosophical attention to these questions has been extremely limited [see e.g., Wilson (Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp 187-207, 1999; Genes and the Agents of Life, 2005; Wilson et al. Philos Top 35(1/2): 189-215, 2007)]. On the face of it, the problems we face in individuating cellular kinds resemble those biologists and philosophers of biology encountered in thinking about species: there are apparently many different (and interconnected) bases on which we might legitimately classify cells. We could, for example, focus on their developmental history (a sort of analogue to a species' evolutionary history); or we might divide on the basis of certain structural features, functional role, location within larger systems, and so on. In this paper, I sketch an approach to cellular kinds inspired by Boyd's Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory, applying some lessons from this application back to general questions about the nature of natural kinds.