Democratization, Education Reform, and the Mexican Teachers' Union

This study examines the effect of democratization on a key education reform across three Mexican states. Previous scholarship has found a positive effect of electoral competition on social spending, as leaders seek to improve their reelection prospects by delivering services to voters. However, the evidence presented here indicates that more money has not meant better educational outcomes in Mexico. Rather, new and vulnerable elected leaders are especially susceptible to the demands of powerful interest groups at the expense of accountability to constituents. In this case, the dominant teachers' union has used its leverage to exact greater control over the country's resource-rich merit pay program for teachers. It has exploited this control to increase salaries and decrease standards for advancement up the remuneration ladder. The evidence suggests that increased electoral competition has led to the empowerment of entrenched interests rather than voters, with an overall negative effect on education.

Things Fall Apart: Dictatorships, Development, and Democracy in Africa

Recent events in Africa provide evidence of the failure of dictatorships to meet the needs of citizens and serve to debunk a number of development theory assumptions: that democratization is culturally determined, that democratization will follow economic development, and that dictatorships tend to produce durable, stable development. Therefore, the attempt to achieve development without democratization is risky and potentially very costly. We argue that dictatorship in Africa serves a function akin to Myrdal's backwash effects, thwarting economic progress in a cumulative and circular way, and that democratization must become a necessary criterion of engagement with African countries.