Parameters of Reform and Unification in Modern Japanese Buddhist Thought: Murakami Senshō and Critical Buddhism

Reform is a word that, one might easily say, characterizes more than any other the history and development of Buddhism. Yet, it must also be said that reform movements in East Asian Buddhism have often taken on another goal—harmony or unification; that is, a desire not only to reconstruct a more worthy form of Buddhism, but to simultaneously bring together all existing forms under a single banner, in theory if not in practice. This paper explores some of the tensions between the desire for reform and the quest for harmony in modern Japanese Buddhism thought, by comparing two developments: the late 19th century movement towards ‘New Buddhism’ (shin Bukkyō) as exemplified by Murakami Senshō 村上専精 (1851–1929), and the late 20th century movement known as ‘Critical Buddhism’ (hihan Bukkyō), as found in the works of Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭. In all that has been written about Critical Buddhism, in both Japanese and English, very little attention has been paid to the place of the movement within the larger traditions of Japanese Buddhist reform. Here I reconsider Critical Buddhism in relation to the concerns of the previous, much larger trends towards Buddhist reform that emerged almost exactly 100 years previous—the so-called shin Bukkyō or New Buddhism of the late-Meiji era. Shin Bukkyō is a catch-all term that includes the various writings and activities of Inoue Enryō, Shaku Sōen, and Kiyozawa Manshi, as well as the so-called Daijō-hibussetsuron, a broad term used (often critically) to describe Buddhist writers who suggested that Mahāyāna Buddhism is not, in fact, the Buddhism taught by the ‘historical’ Buddha Śākyamuni. Of these, I will make a few general remarks about Daijō-hibusseturon, before turning attention more specifically to the work of Murakami Senshō, in order to flesh out some of the similarities and differences between his attempt to construct a ‘unified Buddhism’ and the work of his late-20th century avatars, the Critical Buddhists. Though a number of their aims and ideas overlap, I argue that there remain fundamental differences with respect to the ultimate purposes of Buddhist reform. This issue hinges on the implications of key terms such as ‘unity’ and ‘harmony’ as well as the way doctrinal history is categorized and understood, but it also relates to issues of ideology and the use and abuse of Buddhist doctrines in 20th-century politics.

Does Israel Follow the Law? A Critical Analysis of Israel's Application of the International Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Occupied Territories

Israel's occupation of territories it captured in 1967 has become one of the longest and most controversial occupations of the last fifty years. Eschewing the traditional political analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this paper aims to explore whether Israel has adequately applied international law in the occupied territories, in particular, the law of belligerent occupation. The two actors under assessment are the Israeli government, particularly its military which enforces and maintains the law in the territories, and the Supreme Court of Israel, which has the power of review over military actions in the territories. The particular issues of the occupation that are critically analyzed are the general legal framework that Israel established in the territories, Israel's civilian settlement policy in territories, and Israel's construction of a barrier in the West Bank. This paper concludes that Israel has incorrectly applied the legal framework of belligerent occupation by refusing to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention; it has wrongly concluded that the establishment of civilian settlements in the territories conform with international law; yet it has rightly concluded that the construction of the barrier in the West Bank is permissible under international law, in contrast to the conclusion of the much publicized International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on the 'Wall.' Along with these general assessments, the author will also provide some historical and political insight into why the Israeli government and the Supreme Court may have applied the law in the way that they did.