A Test of Absolute Numerousness Judgments in Lion-Tailed Macaques (Macaca Silenus)

Numerous studies have shown that animals have a sense of quantity and can distinguish between relative amounts. The concepts of relative numerousness, estimation, and subitizing are well established in species as diverse as chimpanzees and salamanders. Mobile animals have practical use for an understanding of number in common situations such as predation, mating, and competition. However, the ability to identify discrete quantities has only been firmly established in humans. The purpose of this study was to test for such “absolute numerousness” judgments in three lion-tailed macaques (Macaca silenus), a non-human primate. The three macaques tested had previously been trained on a computerized matchto- sample (MTS) task using geometric shapes. In this study, they were introduced to a MTS task containing a numerical cue, which required the monkeys to match stimuli containing either one or two items for rewards. If monkeys were successful at the initial matching task, they were tested with stimuli in which the position of the items and then the surface area of the items was controlled. If the monkeys could match successfully without using these non-numerical cues, they would demonstrate the capability to make absolute numerousness judgments. None of the monkeys matched successfully using the numerical cue, so no evidence of absolute numerosity was found. Each macaque progressed through the experiment in an individualized manner, attempting a variety of strategies to obtain rewards. These included side preferences and an alternating-side strategy that were unrelated to the numerical cues in the stimuli. When it became clear that the monkeys were not matching based on a stimulus-based cue, they were tested again on matching geometric shapes. All three macaques stopped using their alternate strategies and were able to match shapes successfully, demonstrating that they were still capable of completing the matching task. The data suggest that the monkeys could not transfer this ability to the numerical stimuli. This indicates that the macaques lack a sense of exact quantity, or that they could not recognize the numerical cues in the stimuli as being relevant to the task.

Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella) Fail to Be Equitable in an Ultimatum Game

The ultimatum game is a commonly used economics game testing humans' sense of fairness. In the game, a "proposer" is given a sum of money and is told they can split it however they want with another human partner. The partner can then either accept the division and both proposer and responder receive the proposed amounts, or the responder can reject the offer and neither player will get anything. Human subjects from most western cultures typically share almost half of an allotted amount, but it remains unknown whether our close primate relatives share this generosity. Recent attempts to present chimpanzees with the ultimatum game have provided inconclusive results, with some studies finding the animals share humans' disposition to behave 'fairly' and others concluding that chimpanzees act selfishly to maximize their own rewards. Capuchin monkeys are known to share many human and chimpanzee social and cooperative behaviors, and this study was the first to present capuchin monkeys with a version of the ultimatum game. Subjects were presented with two differently colored tokens representing different qualitative reward contingencies, one equitable and the other inequitable in favor of the subject proposer. Subjects could select and place one of the tokens in a transfer container. The capuchins were first tested with a "dictator game" where, after the subject monkey selected a token, the rewards (equitable or inequitable) were distributed to the subject and a nearby partner monkey that was not an active participant. The capuchins were then tested on an ultimatum game in which after the subject selected and placed a token in the container, the container was moved to the partner. The partner needed to remove the token and transfer it back to the experimenter for the rewards to be distributed. As such, the partner could reject the subject's offer by refusing to participate and neither would receive a reward. The experiment was conducted to determine if the subject monkey would select the equitable reward option rather than the selfish option in order to maintain the partner's cooperation in the task. Capuchin subjects behaved selfishly and selected the inequitable token significantly more often than the equitable token in both the dictator and ultimatum game with no significant difference in preference between the two games. Interestingly, despite the occasional occurrence of rejection by the partner monkeys (resulting in no reward for the subject), subjects never altered their strategy, continuing to prefer the selfish token. The study may indicate that capuchin monkeys have an inability to judge the effect of their behavior on a conspecific's reward outcome, or an indifference to the outcome if there is an individual cost associated with behaving prosocially.