The Blue Dog Coalition: Impact of a Single-Issue Caucus from the 104th to the 110th Congress

The Blue Dog Coalition is an informal organization of legislators within the House of Representatives that strives to influence policy on fiscal responsibility, attract the attention of the electorate, They are a group that elicits wide range of reactions covering the length of the political spectrum, but despite this, their claims of special defense of fiscal conservatism within the Democratic Party have gone relatively undocumented by the academic community.This project has integrated a party literature with a caucus literature, in the attempt of building a novel framework for research. Work on polarization, the significance of parties, the purpose and history of caucuses all have been fused in such away that the Blue Dogs have created an opportunity to test broad congressional questions on a caucus-microcosm scale. Three important questions have emerged from the many possible avenues of exploration on the topic: How does admission into the Blue Dog Coalition effect voting behavior - measured by interest, ideology, and party unityscores? How does party leadership delegate prestigious committee assignments, a traditional indicator of partisan favor and influence, towards Blue Dogs? Can we use the Blue Dog Coalition as an indicator of fiscal conservatism? To each of these questions, a number of interesting results emerged. Blue Dogs, in the 104th scored higher in conservative interest group scores, more towards the center in ideological methods, and lower in party unity Dogs began to behave closer to their Democratic counterparts. In addition, membership on these select committees rose from a very small number to greater proportional parity within the Democratic Party. Perhaps most interesting, the Blue Dog Coalition does behave as a significant, independent predictor effect on NTU scores, a variable used to demonstrate fiscal conservatism. This research has shown, first and foremost, that it is useful and practical to applyold arguments within the party literature to a smaller, caucus level of analysis that is relatively untouched by the political science field. For the Blue Dogs, specifically, we have tested the validity of their claims in an attempt to reach broader questions ofdemocratic responsibility and electoral clarity. This work, and other work I have drawn upon, has barely scratched the surface on Blue Dog Democrats and other caucuses of comparable influence and popularity, and there remains a wealth of research material onthis caucus alone to be explored by scholars in the field of congressional politics.

The Supreme Court Confirmation Process and Its Implications

In recent history, there has been a trend of increasing partisan polarization throughout most of the American political system. Some of the impacts of this polarization are obvious; however, there is reason to believe that we miss some of the indirect effects of polarization. Accompanying the trend of increased polarization has been an increase in the contentiousness of the Supreme Court confirmation process. I believe that these two trends are related. Furthermore, I argue that these trends have an impact on judicial behavior. This is an issue worth exploring, since the Supreme Court is the most isolated branch of the federal government. The Constitution structured the Supreme Court to ensure that it was as isolated as possible from short-term political pressures and interests. This study attempts to show how it may be possible that those goals are no longer being fully achieved. My first hypothesis in this study is that increases in partisan polarization are a direct cause of the increase in the level of contention during the confirmation process. I then hypothesize that the more contention a justice faces during his or her confirmation process, the more ideologically extreme that justice will then vote on the bench. This means that a nominee appointed by a Republican president will tend to vote even more conservatively than was anticipated following a contentious confirmation process, and vice versa for Democratic appointees. In order to test these hypotheses, I developed a data set for every Supreme Court nominee dating back to President Franklin D. Roosevelt¿s appointments (1937). With this data set, I ran a series of regression models to analyze these relationships. Statistically speaking, the results support my first hypothesis in a fairly robust manner. My regression results for my second hypothesis indicate that the trend I am looking for is present for Republican nominees. For Democratic nominees, the impacts are less robust. Nonetheless, as the results will show, contention during the confirmation process does seem to have some impact on judicial behavior. Following my quantitative analysis, I analyze a series of case studies. These case studies serve to provide tangible examples of these statistical trends as well as to explore what else may be going on during the confirmation process and subsequent judicial decision-making. I use Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and Alito as the subjects for these case studies. These cases will show that the trends described above do seem to be identifiable at the level of an individual case. These studies further help to indicate other potential impacts on judicial behavior. For example, following Justice Rehnquist¿s move from Associate to Chief Justice, we see a marked change in his behavior. Overall, this study serves as a means of analyzing some of the more indirect impacts of partisan polarization in modern politics. Further, the study offers a means of exploring some of the possible constraints (both conscious and subconscious) that Supreme Court justices may feel while they decide how to cast a vote in a particular case. Given the wide-reaching implications of Supreme Court decisions, it is important to try to grasp a full view of how these decisions are made.