The Financial Rate of Profit: What Is It, and How Has It Behaved in the United States?

This work contributes to the almost nonexistent literature on the profit rate of the financial sector. It updates the single study to include financial variables to cover the past decade, compares this profit rate to the (almost unpublished) Weisskopf and NIPA financial profit rates, compares the financial and nonfinancial sector rates, and details the procedure to construct the profit rate in the financial sector including relevant financial variables which capitalists consider to make profit-rate decisions. JEL Classification: B50, E11

An Ethical History of Photography in Combat and of Combat Photography in the United States during World War II

With the United States‘ entry into the Second World War, the word ?censorship? was seen largely as antithetical to, rather than a necessary counterpart to, victory among Americans. People did not want to be censored in their writing, photographs or speech,but it proved to be necessary even before the war began, in order to protect government secrets and the people on the home-front from scenes that were too disturbing. Even before the war had officially begun, there were problems with censorship among journalists and newspapers. The initial response of outrage in reference to censorship in the United States was common among journalists, newspapers, magazines, and radio news; nevertheless, there was a necessity for censorship among Americans, on the home frontand the front lines, and it would be tolerated throughout the war to ensure that enemies of America did not gain access to information that would assist in a defeat of the United States in the Second World War. The research I have conducted has dealt with the censorship of combat photography during World War II, in conjunction with the ethics that were in play at the time that affected the censors. Through exploring the work of three combat photographers — Tony Vaccaro, James R. Stephens and Charles E. Sumners — I wasable to effectively construct an explanatory ethical history of these three men. Research on the censorship and effects it had on the United States brought me to three distinctareas of censorship and ethics that would be explored: (1) the restrictions and limitations enforced by the Office of Censorship, (2) a general overview of war and photography as it influenced the soldiers and their families on the home-front, (3) and the combat photographers and personal and military censorship that influenced their work. Although their work was censored both by the military and the government, these men saw the war in a different light that remained with them long after the battles and war had ceased.Using the narratives of Tony Vaccaro, Charles E. Sumners and James R. Stephens as means for more in depth research, this thesis strives to create lenses through which to view the history and ethics of censorship that shaped combat photography during the Second World War and the images to which we refer as representative of that war today.

Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.