Harry Potter and the Theory of Things

This thesis investigates the boundaries between body and object in J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series, seven children’s literature novels published between 1997 and 2007. Lord Voldemort, Rowling’s villain, creates Horcruxes—objects that contain fragments of his soul—in order to ensure his immortality. As vessels for human soul, these objects rupture the boundaries between body and object and become “things.” Using contemporary thing theorists including John Plotz and materialists Jean Baudrillard and Walter Benjamin, I look at Voldemort’s Horcruxes as transgressive, liminal, unclassifiable entities in the first chapter. If objects can occupy the juncture between body and object, then bodies can as well. Dementors and Inferi, dark creatures that Rowling introduces throughout the series, live devoid of soul. Voldemort, too, becomes a thing as he splits his soul and creates Horcruxes. These soulless bodies are uncanny entities, provoking fear, revulsion, nausea, and the loss of language. In the second chapter, I use Sigmund Freud’s theorization of the uncanny as well as literary critic Kelly Hurley to investigate how Dementors, Inferi, and Voldemort exist as body-turned-object things at the juncture between life and death. As Voldemort increasingly invests his immaterial soul into material objects, he physically and spiritually degenerates, transforming from the young, handsome Tom Marvolo Riddle into the snake-like villain that murdered Harry’s parents and countless others. During his quest to find and destroy Voldemort’s Horcruxes, Harry encounters a different type of object, the Deathly Hallows. Although similarly accessing boundaries between body/object, life/death, and materiality/immateriality, the three Deathly Hallows do not transgress these boundaries. Through the Deathly Hallows, Rowling provides an alternative to thingification: objects that enable boundaries to fluctuate, but not breakdown. In the third chapter, I return to thing theorists, Baudrillard, and Benjamin to study how the Deathly Hallows resist thingification by not transgressing the boundaries between body and object.

Applied Developmental Psychology as an Implementation of the Life-Span View of Human Development

Application of knowledge about psychological development should, ideally, be theory based. As such, these applications represent “natural ontogenetic experiments”; the results of the evaluation of such interventions feed back to the theory, helping to support, falsify, or refine the ideas from the theory which led to the particular application. Such applied developmental intervention research is central within a currently popular perspective of life-span human development. Thus, applied developmental intervention research provides critical tests of such key concepts within this life-span perspective as: plasticity; multidirectionality; the synthesis of continuous and discontinuous processes across ontogeny; contextual embeddedness; and the role of individuals as agents in their own development. This paper elucidates some of the major features of the dynamic linkage between applied developmental psychology and this view of life-span human development. Key elements of this life-span perspective and the facts of developmental intervention, as seen from this perspective, are specified. Finally, the doctoral training program at the authors' institution is presented as one example of how this link may be institutionalized in the form of graduate education.