Men in Black: Fashioning Masculinity in Nineteenth-Century Spain

Clothes offer us a commentary on the individual who wears them, and one of those comments deals with gender. Clothing is fundamental to gender, turning male and female bodies into men and women. In the nineteenth century the preoccupation with appear- ances was greater than in previous periods thanks to changes in the social system and a reformulation of gender roles, as well as the popularity of physiognomic theory. Given this increased sensitivity to the gaze, it is curious that men would uniformly adopt the black suit as their garment of choice. This revolution in male fashion was born from contradic- tory motives. On the one hand, the man in black attempted to avoid the gaze so as not to be anyone’s object of desire. An exception to this rule was the elegante, for whom fashion was a way of life. The elegante became a frequent target of the satirical press, which ques- tioned his masculinity. On the other hand, the black suit came simbolize the power of the ascendant middle class because it recalled Spain’s most important monarchs, such as Carlos V and Felipe II. The black suit thus became a polysemic signifier, and the man who wore it attempted, impossibly, to be both the subject and object of the gaze.

Córdoban Discourses: A Drama of Interreligious Dialogue

SETTING: Cordoba, Spain, 1135 CE, 29th year of the reign of ‘Ali “amir al-muslimin,” second king of the Berber Almoravid dynasty, rulers of Moorish Spain from 1071 to 1147. Cordoba, the capital of Andalus and the center of the Almoravid holdings in Spain, is a bustling cosmopolitan center, a crossroads for Europe and the Middle East, and the meeting-point of three religious traditions. Most significantly, Cordoba at this time is the hub of European intellectual activity. From the square—itself impressively large and surrounded by a massive collonade, the regularity and ordered beauty of which typifies the Moorish taste for symmetry (so beloved of M.C. Escher)—can be seen the huge Cordoban mosque, erected in the 8th-century by Khalif Abd-er-Rahman I to the glory of Allah, oft forgiving, most merciful. It is the second largest building in Islam, and the bastion of the still entrenched but soon to fade Muslim presence in western Europe. SCENE: Three figures sit upon stone benches beneath the westernmost colonnade of the Cordoban mosque, involved in an animated, though friendly discussion on matters of faith and reason, knowledge and God, language and logic. The host is none other than Jehudah Halevi, and his esteemed guests Master Peter Abelard and the venerable Råmånuja, whose obviously advanced age belies his youthful voice, gleaming eye, quick hands, and general exuberance. It is autumn, early evening…

The Pursuit of Tangible Happiness: Religion and Politics in a Japanese New, New Religion

The decline of traditional religions in Japan in the past century, and especially since the end of World War Two, has led to an explosion of so-called “new religions” (shin shūkyō 新宗教), many of which have made forays into the political realm. The best known—and most controversial—example of a “political” new religion is Sōka Gakkai 創価学会, a lay Buddhist movement originally associated with the Nichiren sect that in the 1960s gave birth to a new political party, Komeitō 公明党 (lit., Clean Government Party), which in the past several decades has emerged as the third most popular party in Japan (as New Komeitō). Since the 1980s, Japan has also seen the emergence of so-called “new, new religions” (shin shin shūkyō 新新宗教), which tend to be more technologically savvy and less socially concerned (and, in the eyes of critics, more akin to “cults” than the earlier new religions). One new, new religion known as Kōfuku-no-Kagaku 幸福の科学 (lit., Institute for Research in Human Happiness or simply Happy Science), founded in 1986 by Ōkawa Ryūho 大川隆法, has very recently developed its own political party, Kōfuku Jitsugentō 幸福実現党 (The Realization of Happiness Party). This article will analyse the political ideals of Kōfuku Jitsugentō in relation to its religious teachings, in an attempt to situate the movement within the broader tradition of religio-political syncretism in Japan. In particular, it will examine the recent “manifesto” of Kōfuku Jitsugentō in relation to those of New Komeitō and “secular” political parties such as the Liberal Democratic Party (Jimintō 自民党) and the Democratic Party (Minshutō 民主党).

Beyond Belief: Japanese Approaches to the Meaning of Religion

For several centuries, Japanese scholars have argued that their nation’s culture—including its language, religion and ways of thinking—is somehow unique. The darker side of this rhetoric, sometimes known by the English term “Japanism” (nihon-jinron), played no small role in the nationalist fervor of the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While much of the so-called “ideology of Japanese uniqueness” can be dismissed, in terms of the Japanese approach to “religion,” there may be something to it. This paper highlights some distinctive—if not entirely unique—features of the way religion has been categorized and understood in Japanese tradition, contrasting these with Western (i.e., Abrahamic), and to a lesser extent Indian and Chinese understandings. Particular attention is given to the priority of praxis over belief in the Japanese religious context. Des siècles durant, des chercheurs japonais ont soutenu que leur culture – soit leur langue, leur religion et leurs façons de penser – était en quelque sorte unique. Or, sous son jour le plus sombre, cette rhétorique, parfois désignée du terme de « japonisme » (nihon-jinron), ne fut pas sans jouer un rôle déterminant dans la montée de la ferveur nationaliste à la fin du XIXe siècle, ainsi qu’au début du XXe siècle. Bien que l’on puisse discréditer pour l’essentiel cette soi-disant « idéologie de l’unicité japonaise », la conception nippone de la « religion » constitue, quant à elle, un objet d’analyse des plus utiles et pertinents. Cet article met en évidence quelques caractéristiques, sinon uniques du moins distinctives, de la manière dont la religion a été élaborée et comprise au sein de la tradition japonaise, pour ensuite les constrater avec les conceptions occidentale (abrahamique) et, dans une moindre mesure, indienne et chinoise. Une attention toute particulière est ici accordée à la praxis plutôt qu’à la croyance dans le contexte religieux japonais.

Men's Modesty, Religion, and the State: Spaces of Collision

This article examines religious practices in the United States, which govern modesty and other dress norms for men. I focus both on the spaces within which they most collide with regulatory regimes of the state and the legal implications of these norms, particularly for observant Muslim men. Undergirding the research are those ‘‘gender equality’’ claims made by many religious adherents, that men are required to maintain proper modesty norms just as are women. Also undergirding the research is the extensive anti-Islam bias in American culture today. The spaces within which men’s religiously proscribed dress and grooming norms are most at issue—indicated by First Amendment legal challenges to rights of religious practice—are primarily those state-controlled, total institutions Goffman describes, such as in the military and prisons. The implications of gendered modesty norms are important, as state control over religious expression in prisons, for example, is much more difficult to contest than in other spaces, although this depends entirely on who is doing the contesting and within which religious context. In American society today—and particularly within the context of growing Islamaphobia following the 9/11 attacks—the implications are greatest for those men practicing ‘‘prison Islam.’’

The Little Metropolis: Religion, Politics, & Spolia

There have been numerous councils throughout the Catholic Church?s history. From the First Council of Nicaea in 325 CE to Vatican II in 1962, only a few centuries have passed without any major church doctrinal change. Following hand in hand with changes in doctrine came the bifurcation of the Christian Church into the Roman CatholicChurch and the Orthodox Church. The first split came in 325 CE with Arianism. Arius of Alexandria and his followers did not agree with the Catholic Church?s viewpoint that the son, Jesus, should be on equal footing with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Constantine the Great brought the Arianism debate to the First Council of Nicaea,which declared Arianism a heretical religion. The following Catholic council?s decisions separated the two Churches even more, eventually creating the formal separation of the Church during the East-West Schism in the middle of the 11th century. Although the twoChurches constantly tried to unite, the Churches hit speed bumps along the way. Eventually, the 1274 Second Council of Lyons officially united the two Churches, even if only for an ephemeral time. At first glance, it might not seem that much resulted from the 1274 Second Council of Lyons. Almost immediately after the council?s ruling, the two Churches split again. Little is known as to why the 1274 Second Council of Lyons ultimately failed in its unification attempt. In this thesis, I will examine the churches of the Little Metropolis at Athens, Merbaka in the Argolid, and Agioi Theodoroi in Athens. In detailing the architectural features of these buildings, I will reconstruct the church building program in association with the 1274 Second Council of Lyons. I will also compare these churchesusing historical sources to keep the sociological, religious, political, and historical context accurate.

The Failure of Silence and the Manipulation of Memory: How Spain's pact of oblivion has failed to rid the country of its troubled past

This thesis is an analysis of Spain’s development from dictatorship to democracy in light of the trauma that it endured during the Spanish Civil War of 1936 – 1939 and the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, which lasted until 1975. Drawing from the work of Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora, this thesis seeks to use the concepts of collective memory and lieux de mémoire to analyze what role memory has played in Spanish society from 1939 to the present day. Theanalysis begins with an overview of the Spanish Civil War and Franco’s ensuing dictatorship in order to establish an understanding of the trauma endured by Spain and its people. Of importance will be the manner in which the presentation of history became manipulated anddistorted under Franco as the dictator sought to control the country’s collective memory. With this background in mind, the thesis then turns to analyze how the memory of Spain’s past has affected the country’s development in two eras: during its transition to democracy in the 1970s and in the present day. Of central importance is the pact of silence that was established during the transition to democracy, which was a tacit agreement among the Spanish people to notdiscuss the past. This pact of silence still clouds Spain’s memory today and affects modern discourse concerning the past. Yet it is clear that Spain has not been reconciled to its past, as the provocation of history inevitably results in tension and controversy. The central contention of this thesis is that the pact of silence that surrounds Spain’s past has not eliminated the trauma of the Civil War and dictatorship, as demonstrated by the controversy stirred up by people, groups and places in the present day. This contention has repercussions for the study of history as a whole, as it indicates that the past cannot be muted in order to achievereconciliation; rather, it suggests that we must engage the past in order to be reconciled to it.

"Enemigos de la virilidad": Sex, Masturbation, and Celibacy in Nineteenth-Century Spain

The discourse on sexuality in nineteenth-century Spain presents a fundamental difference between the masculine ideal of that period and our current definition of masculinity. According to today’s popular stereotype, the typical man seeks out sexual contact and takes any opportunities that arise. By contrast, within the hygiene texts of the nineteenth century one detects a sense of unease associated with sexual activity and its corresponding role in the construction of hegemonic masculinity. In particular, sexual excess, masturbation, and celibacy were viewed as antagonistic to middle-class masculinity, which was instead associated with venereal moderation, marriage, and fatherhood. Men who transgressed this model risked their health as well as their masculinity. This formula reveals an element of fragility with regard to notions of manhood, in contrast to the traditional image of Spanish masculinity that originated during the Reconquest and is based on bellicose heroism, bravado, and sexual prowess.