Saving morality: Why we cannot, and why we must

Philosophers and laymen alike have often used morality to invite misconceptions of human life into ethics, and also of ethics into human life. The Kant/Williams discourse provides a rich backdrop on which to consider these misconceptions. But the misconceptionsof morality involved are just as numerous and just as serious. One thing that the Kant/Williams discourse shows is this: that ethics can be neither contained by nor cultivated without morality. Though much of Williams’ critique of Kantian morality is quite astute, thephilosophical and ethical wisdoms of morality abound in spite of these. Morality understands the fundamental condition of moral loss, and the sometimes irreducible quandaries that this condition places human beings in. It understands the nature of the moral law, and theintricacies that the levels of letter and spirit invite into human life. Perhaps more importantly, it understands the uncompromising relationship between moral loss and moral law, and how the human navigation of this relationship leads into the ethical realm via giving rise to ethical conviction. Finally, for all of its pressures, morality abounds in valuable wisdoms for the one discovering that the human soul occupies a place of ethical significance in the world. It is responsible for pointing out, grounding and providing a framework for some of the most fundamental truths about the world and human beings; and these are essential to any viable ethical theory and sensible conception of human life.

Harry Potter and the Theory of Things

This thesis investigates the boundaries between body and object in J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series, seven children’s literature novels published between 1997 and 2007. Lord Voldemort, Rowling’s villain, creates Horcruxes—objects that contain fragments of his soul—in order to ensure his immortality. As vessels for human soul, these objects rupture the boundaries between body and object and become “things.” Using contemporary thing theorists including John Plotz and materialists Jean Baudrillard and Walter Benjamin, I look at Voldemort’s Horcruxes as transgressive, liminal, unclassifiable entities in the first chapter. If objects can occupy the juncture between body and object, then bodies can as well. Dementors and Inferi, dark creatures that Rowling introduces throughout the series, live devoid of soul. Voldemort, too, becomes a thing as he splits his soul and creates Horcruxes. These soulless bodies are uncanny entities, provoking fear, revulsion, nausea, and the loss of language. In the second chapter, I use Sigmund Freud’s theorization of the uncanny as well as literary critic Kelly Hurley to investigate how Dementors, Inferi, and Voldemort exist as body-turned-object things at the juncture between life and death. As Voldemort increasingly invests his immaterial soul into material objects, he physically and spiritually degenerates, transforming from the young, handsome Tom Marvolo Riddle into the snake-like villain that murdered Harry’s parents and countless others. During his quest to find and destroy Voldemort’s Horcruxes, Harry encounters a different type of object, the Deathly Hallows. Although similarly accessing boundaries between body/object, life/death, and materiality/immateriality, the three Deathly Hallows do not transgress these boundaries. Through the Deathly Hallows, Rowling provides an alternative to thingification: objects that enable boundaries to fluctuate, but not breakdown. In the third chapter, I return to thing theorists, Baudrillard, and Benjamin to study how the Deathly Hallows resist thingification by not transgressing the boundaries between body and object.