Cell Types as Natural Kinds

Talk of different types of cells is commonplace in the biological sciences. We know a great deal, for example, about human muscle cells by studying the same type of cells in mice. Information about cell type is apparently largely projectible across species boundaries. But what defines cell type? Do cells come pre-packaged into different natural kinds? Philosophical attention to these questions has been extremely limited [see e.g., Wilson (Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp 187-207, 1999; Genes and the Agents of Life, 2005; Wilson et al. Philos Top 35(1/2): 189-215, 2007)]. On the face of it, the problems we face in individuating cellular kinds resemble those biologists and philosophers of biology encountered in thinking about species: there are apparently many different (and interconnected) bases on which we might legitimately classify cells. We could, for example, focus on their developmental history (a sort of analogue to a species' evolutionary history); or we might divide on the basis of certain structural features, functional role, location within larger systems, and so on. In this paper, I sketch an approach to cellular kinds inspired by Boyd's Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory, applying some lessons from this application back to general questions about the nature of natural kinds.

Saving morality: Why we cannot, and why we must

Philosophers and laymen alike have often used morality to invite misconceptions of human life into ethics, and also of ethics into human life. The Kant/Williams discourse provides a rich backdrop on which to consider these misconceptions. But the misconceptionsof morality involved are just as numerous and just as serious. One thing that the Kant/Williams discourse shows is this: that ethics can be neither contained by nor cultivated without morality. Though much of Williams’ critique of Kantian morality is quite astute, thephilosophical and ethical wisdoms of morality abound in spite of these. Morality understands the fundamental condition of moral loss, and the sometimes irreducible quandaries that this condition places human beings in. It understands the nature of the moral law, and theintricacies that the levels of letter and spirit invite into human life. Perhaps more importantly, it understands the uncompromising relationship between moral loss and moral law, and how the human navigation of this relationship leads into the ethical realm via giving rise to ethical conviction. Finally, for all of its pressures, morality abounds in valuable wisdoms for the one discovering that the human soul occupies a place of ethical significance in the world. It is responsible for pointing out, grounding and providing a framework for some of the most fundamental truths about the world and human beings; and these are essential to any viable ethical theory and sensible conception of human life.

Plato and Frankfurt: Two Theories of the Relations Between Love and Living Well

This thesis provides a comparison of the ideas of caring and love as they appear in the works of Plato and Frankfurt. Frankfurt, a contemporary philosopher, maintains that an individual arrives at the most meaningful life through understanding what it is that heor she cares about the most. Interestingly, the instances of eros in Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus resonate with this idea. We see throughout these erotic dialogues similarities to Frankfurt's notions of care and love.Throughout his many works, Frankfurt provides us with several distinct features of care and love. This thesis offers an in depth discussion of each of these features andalso provides commentary from other contemporary philosophers who are familiar with Frankfurt's work. In addition, this thesis applies these features of care and love to Plato's erotic dialogues, and emphasizes areas in which Plato and Frankfurt agree and those inwhich they disagree. In essence, it becomes apparent that while there are many similarities between the ideas of these two prominent thinkers, Plato and Frankfurt do not agree about what constitutes the best human life. Plato maintains that the best life is onespent dedicated to philosophy and in pursuit of the 'good'. Frankfurt, on the other hand,imposes no such limitations on what we should consider the best life because people are likely to have different life experiences that lead them to care about and love different things. Instead he suggests that the best or most meaningful human life is one in which a person spends his or her life caring about the things he or she does, indeed, care aboutand loving those things he or she does, indeed, love.

Plato's Doctrine Of Forms: Modern Misunderstandings

Among the philosophical ideas of Plato, perhaps the most famous is his doctrine of forms. This doctrine has faced harsh criticism due, in large part, to the interpretations of this position by modern philosophers such as René Descartes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant. For example, Plato has been interpreted as presenting a ¿two-worlds¿ approach to form and thing and as advancing a rationalist approach to epistemology. His forms have often been interpreted as ideas and as perfect copies of the things of the visible world. In this thesis, I argue that these, along with other interpretations of Plato presented by the moderns, are based on misunderstandings of Plato¿s overall philosophy. In so doing, I attempt to show that the doctrine of forms cannot be directly interpreted into the language of Cartesian, Lockean, and Kantian metaphysics and epistemology, and thus should not be prematurely dismissed because of these modern Platonic interpretations. By analyzing the Platonic dialogues beside the writings of the modern philosophers, I conclude that three of the most prominent modern philosophers, as representatives of their respective philosophical frameworks, have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of Plato¿s famous doctrine of forms. This could have significant implications for the future of metaphysics and epistemology by providing an interpretation of Plato which adds to, instead of contradicts, the developments of modern philosophy.

Must We Forgive?: Exploring the Limits and Possibilities of Forgiveness and Resentment

Conflict has marked civilization from Biblical times to the present day. Each of us, with our different and competing interests, and our desires to pursue those interests, have over time wronged another person. Not surprisingly then, forgiveness is a concern of individuals and groups¿communities, countries, religious groups, races¿yet it is a complex idea that philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and psychologists have grappled with. Some have argued that forgiveness is a therapeutic means for overcoming guilt, pain, and anger. Forgiveness is often portrayed as a coping mechanism¿how often we hear the phrase, ¿forgive and forget,¿ as an arrangement to help two parties surmount the complications of disagreement. But forgiveness is not simply a modus vivendi; the ability to forgive and conversely to ask for forgiveness, is counted as an admirable trait and virtue. This essay will explore the nature of forgiveness, which in Christian dogma is often posited as an unqualified virtue. The secular world has appropriated the Christian notion of forgiveness as such a virtue¿but are there instances wherein offering forgiveness is morally inappropriate or dangerous? I will consider the situations in which forgiveness, understood in this essay as the overcoming of resentment, may not be a virtue¿when perhaps maintaining resentment is as virtuous, if not more virtuous, than forgiving. I will explain the various ethical frameworks involved in understanding forgiveness as a virtue, and the relationship between them. I will argue that within Divine Command Theory forgiveness is a virtue¿and thus morally right¿because God commands it. This ethical system has established forgiveness as unconditional, an idea which has been adopted into popular culture. With virtue ethics in mind, which holds virtues to be those traits which benefit the person who possesses them, contributing to the good life, I will argue unqualified forgiveness is not always a virtue, as it will not always benefit the victim. Because there is no way to avoid wrongdoing, humans are confronted with the question of forgiveness with every indiscretion. Its limits, its possibilities, its relationship to one¿s character¿forgiveness is a concern of all people at some time if for no other reason than the plain fact that the past cannot be undone. I will be evaluating the idea of forgiveness as a virtue, in contrast to its counterpart, resentment. How can forgiveness be a response to evil, a way to renounce resentment, and a means of creating a positive self-narrative? And what happens when a sense of moral responsibility is impossible to reconcile with the Christian (and now, secularized imperative of) forgiveness? Is it ever not virtuous to forgive? In an attempt to answer that question I will argue that there are indeed times when forgiveness is not a virtue, specifically: when forgiveness compromises one¿s own self-respect; when it is not compatible with respect for the moral community; and when the offender is unapologetic. The kind of offense I have in mind is a dehumanizing one, one that intends to diminish another person¿s worth or humanity. These are moral injuries, to which I will argue resentment is a better response than forgiveness when the three qualifications cannot be met.