Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

State-Level Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs for the Elderly: A national survey.

In order to put Pennsylvania's Pharmaceutical Assistance Contract for the Elderly (PACE) Program in a national context, a nationwide mail survey and telephone follow-up to each of the 58 State Unit Directors on Aging in the United States and its territories identified 10 programs. The results reported in this article are specific to the seven state-level pharmaceutical assistance programs which were in operation during the fiscal year 1984-85. In general, the programs varied on select program characteristics and on their efforts to address major policy issues. Data from the non-program states indicated support, legislative efforts, and a high interest in fiscal concerns. The findings reflect a lack of program uniformity and have implications for program development and implementation. Suggestions on how to identify the "optimum" or best combination of program and policy options are discussed.

State Pharmaceutical Assisstance for the Elderly and Disabled: Planning Issues for Program and Non-Program States

The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) would have mandated federal assistance for Medicare beneficiaries who have high annual prescription medication costs, High national expenditures for such drugs have encouraged the development of private and state insurance programs to help with these costs. Ten state pharmaceutical assistance programs (SPAPs), designed to help certain elderly, low income, or disabled people, exist for those ineligible for Medicaid or unable to purchase coverage privately. Coordination of state and federal benefits was a consideration for established programs, and programs being planned needed to determine the feasibity of integration of federal assistance. But the enactment and subsequent appeal of the Act affected both planning and policy implications for these SPAPs. All U.S. states and territories were surveyed before the bill's repeal to collect data on the effects of MCCA for those with prescription drug programs and those without. The repeal of the federal program places pressure on the nonprogram states to proceed, perhaps more cautiously, to initiate program; for their own residents, given increasing out-of-pocket and insurance costs, and no federal program.