The Turkish Drawbridge: European Integration and the Cultural Economics of National Planning

This article examines the relations between the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) and the Western economic system during the first two decades of national planning in Turkey (1960–1980). It traces how the SPO, established with the guidance and full endorsement of international economic institutions came to vehemently oppose Turkish participation in one of their pillars: the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the European Union. It argues that the shift in the SPO's world-view was founded upon two distinct understandings of the Turkish nation and its development, situates these understandings within the intellectual history of Turkey's past ambivalence towards the West, and, in doing so, provides a historical case-study of the ideological clash between modernisation and dependency theories of development.

The Turkish Drawbridge: European Integration and the Cultural Economics of National Planning

This article examines the relations between the Turkish State Planning Organisation (SPO) and the Western economic system during the first two decades of national planning in Turkey (1960-1980). It traces how the SPO, established with the guidance and full endorsement of international economic institutions came to vehemently oppose Turkish participation in one of their pillars: the European Economic Community (EEC), the predecessor of the European Union. It argues that the shift in the SPO's world-view was founded upon two distinct understandings of the Turkish nation and its development, situates these understandings within the intellectual history of Turkey's past ambivalence towards the West, and, in doing so, provides a historical case-study of the ideological clash between modernisation and dependency theories of development.

What Ended the Great Depression? Re-Evaluating the Role of Fiscal Policy

Conventional wisdom contends that fiscal policy was of secondary importance for the economic recovery in the 1930s. The recovery is then connected to monetary policy that allowed non-sterilised gold inflows to increase the money supply. Often this is shown by measuring the fiscal multipliers and demonstrating that they were relatively small. This paper shows that problems with the conventional measures of fiscal multipliers in the 1930s may have created an incorrect consensus on the irrelevance of fiscal policy. The rehabilitation of fiscal policy is seen as a necessary step in the reinterpretation of the positive role of New Deal policies for the recovery.