Saving morality: Why we cannot, and why we must

Philosophers and laymen alike have often used morality to invite misconceptions of human life into ethics, and also of ethics into human life. The Kant/Williams discourse provides a rich backdrop on which to consider these misconceptions. But the misconceptionsof morality involved are just as numerous and just as serious. One thing that the Kant/Williams discourse shows is this: that ethics can be neither contained by nor cultivated without morality. Though much of Williams’ critique of Kantian morality is quite astute, thephilosophical and ethical wisdoms of morality abound in spite of these. Morality understands the fundamental condition of moral loss, and the sometimes irreducible quandaries that this condition places human beings in. It understands the nature of the moral law, and theintricacies that the levels of letter and spirit invite into human life. Perhaps more importantly, it understands the uncompromising relationship between moral loss and moral law, and how the human navigation of this relationship leads into the ethical realm via giving rise to ethical conviction. Finally, for all of its pressures, morality abounds in valuable wisdoms for the one discovering that the human soul occupies a place of ethical significance in the world. It is responsible for pointing out, grounding and providing a framework for some of the most fundamental truths about the world and human beings; and these are essential to any viable ethical theory and sensible conception of human life.

Smashing the Mirror of Yamato: Sakaguchi Ango, Decadence & a Postmetaphysical Buddhist Critique of Culture

This article focuses on several key philosophical themes in the criticism of Sakaguchi Ango (1906–1955), one of postwar Japan’s most influential and controversial writers. Associated with the underground Kasutori culture as well as the Burai-ha of Tamura Taijirō (1911–1983), Oda Sakunosuke (1913–1947) and Dazai Osamu (1909–1948), Ango gained fame for two provocative essays on the theme of daraku or “decadence”—Darakuron and Zoku darakuron—pubished in 1946, in the wake of Japan’s traumatic defeat and the beginnings of the Allied Occupation. Less well-known is the fact that Ango spent his student years studying classical Buddhist texts in Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan, and that he at at one time aspired to the priesthood. The article analyses the concept of daraku in the two essays noted above, particularly as it relates to Ango’s vision of a refashioned morality based on an interpretation of human subjectivity vis-à-vis the themes of illusion and disillusion. It argues that, despite the radical and modernist flavor of Ango’s essays, his “decadence” is best understood in terms of Mahāyāna and Zen Buddhist concepts. Moreover, when the two essays on decadence are read in tandem with Ango’s wartime essay on Japanese culture (Nihon bunka shikan, 1942), they form the foundation for a “postmetaphysical Buddhist critique of culture,” one that is pragmatic, humanistic, and non-reductively physicalist.

The Body of Margaret Atwood: Sex Work and Prostitution within Margaret Atwood's The Handmaid's Tale, Oryx and Crake, and The Year of the Flood

In this paper, I will argue that Canadian author Margaret Atwood uses fiscal and socially conservative dystopias to show how sex work and prostitution are choices that women would never have to make in a world with true gender equality. In these radically different worlds, women have no agency beyond their sexuality and no ability to express themselves as equals within either society. And while the structures of both societies, the society of The Handmaid’s Tale and that of both Oryx and Crake and The Year of the Flood, are inherently different, they both stem from modern conservative philosophies: for example, the country of Gilead in The Handmaid’s Tale holds Christian conservative beliefs on the role of religion in the state and the culturally designated roles of women. I define social conservatism as the idea that government organizations are used to pursue an agenda promoting traditional religious values such as “public morality” and opposing “immoralities” such as abortion, prostitution, and homosexuality. I define fiscal conservatism as an agenda promoting privatization of the market, deregulation and lower taxes. In this paper I argue that because these philosophies are incompatible with gender equality, they drive women to occupations such as sex work. Women find that they have no choices and sex work provides something to “trade.” For Offred, this “trading” is more limited, because she is a sex slave. For Oryx, this trading allows her to travel to the West, yet not before her childhood is marked by prostitution and pornography. Sex work allows for Ren to reclaim some agency over her life, yet she only chooses sex work because she is presented with few other options. All of these issues stem from the philosophies that define these dystopias.

ARISTOTLE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF VIRTUE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POLITICS AND THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS AND ITS RELATION TO TODAY

While much of Aristotle's works are preserved in various volumes, two of his famous works are the Nichmachean Ethics and the Politics, both of which contain a rich compilation of ethical and political thought. In the Ethics, Aristotle describes a thorough understanding of ethical and intellectual virtue. By pursuing these virtues, Aristotle argues that a person can achieve a life of fulfilling happiness. The ideal polis as described in the Politics serves as a place where the virtuous life is attained in the best manner.Citizens who pursue virtue make the polis better, and the rulers that guide the polis ensure that the citizens have every opportunity to pursue the virtuous life. In this thesis, I see how relevant Aristotle's theory is by laying out the basic principles of the Ethics and the Politics and the connections between the two works. Indoing so, I found that Aristotle's ideal theory points out a significant flaw in our political system: the fact that we do not share a common moral conception such as the one concerned with the virtuous life as Aristotle proposes. This does not suggest thatAristotle's view was actualized during his time period, but that Aristotle conceives of an ideal life and an ideal polis that could be realized. Certainly there are issues with Aristotle's thesis concerning the inferiority of slaves and women. But what is morepoignant is the impracticality of instituting a shared common conception when today's political system permits various ideas about ethics and morality.

Must We Forgive?: Exploring the Limits and Possibilities of Forgiveness and Resentment

Conflict has marked civilization from Biblical times to the present day. Each of us, with our different and competing interests, and our desires to pursue those interests, have over time wronged another person. Not surprisingly then, forgiveness is a concern of individuals and groups¿communities, countries, religious groups, races¿yet it is a complex idea that philosophers, theologians, political scientists, and psychologists have grappled with. Some have argued that forgiveness is a therapeutic means for overcoming guilt, pain, and anger. Forgiveness is often portrayed as a coping mechanism¿how often we hear the phrase, ¿forgive and forget,¿ as an arrangement to help two parties surmount the complications of disagreement. But forgiveness is not simply a modus vivendi; the ability to forgive and conversely to ask for forgiveness, is counted as an admirable trait and virtue. This essay will explore the nature of forgiveness, which in Christian dogma is often posited as an unqualified virtue. The secular world has appropriated the Christian notion of forgiveness as such a virtue¿but are there instances wherein offering forgiveness is morally inappropriate or dangerous? I will consider the situations in which forgiveness, understood in this essay as the overcoming of resentment, may not be a virtue¿when perhaps maintaining resentment is as virtuous, if not more virtuous, than forgiving. I will explain the various ethical frameworks involved in understanding forgiveness as a virtue, and the relationship between them. I will argue that within Divine Command Theory forgiveness is a virtue¿and thus morally right¿because God commands it. This ethical system has established forgiveness as unconditional, an idea which has been adopted into popular culture. With virtue ethics in mind, which holds virtues to be those traits which benefit the person who possesses them, contributing to the good life, I will argue unqualified forgiveness is not always a virtue, as it will not always benefit the victim. Because there is no way to avoid wrongdoing, humans are confronted with the question of forgiveness with every indiscretion. Its limits, its possibilities, its relationship to one¿s character¿forgiveness is a concern of all people at some time if for no other reason than the plain fact that the past cannot be undone. I will be evaluating the idea of forgiveness as a virtue, in contrast to its counterpart, resentment. How can forgiveness be a response to evil, a way to renounce resentment, and a means of creating a positive self-narrative? And what happens when a sense of moral responsibility is impossible to reconcile with the Christian (and now, secularized imperative of) forgiveness? Is it ever not virtuous to forgive? In an attempt to answer that question I will argue that there are indeed times when forgiveness is not a virtue, specifically: when forgiveness compromises one¿s own self-respect; when it is not compatible with respect for the moral community; and when the offender is unapologetic. The kind of offense I have in mind is a dehumanizing one, one that intends to diminish another person¿s worth or humanity. These are moral injuries, to which I will argue resentment is a better response than forgiveness when the three qualifications cannot be met.