Metamemory judgments for familiar and unfamiliar tunes

Metamemory is an important skill that allows humans to monitor their own memory abilities; however, little research has concerned what perceptual information influences metamemory judgments. A series of experiments assessed the accuracy of metamemory judgments for music as well as determined if metamemory judgments are affected by ease of processing of musical features. A recognition memory task inconjunction with metamemory judgments (Judgments of Learning, or JOLs) were used to determine actual and predicted memory performance. We found that changing the ease of processing of the volume and timbre of unfamiliar tunes affected metamemory judgments, but not memory performance, for unfamiliar tunes. Manipulating the ease ofprocessing of the timbre and tempo of familiar tunes did not affect metamemory judgments or memory performance although metamemory accuracy on an item-by-item basis was better for familiar tunes as compared to unfamiliar tunes. Thus, metamemory judgments for unfamiliar tunes are more sensitive to ease of processing changes ascompared to familiar tunes, suggesting that different types of information are processed in different ways.

A Test of Absolute Numerousness Judgments in Lion-Tailed Macaques (Macaca Silenus)

Numerous studies have shown that animals have a sense of quantity and can distinguish between relative amounts. The concepts of relative numerousness, estimation, and subitizing are well established in species as diverse as chimpanzees and salamanders. Mobile animals have practical use for an understanding of number in common situations such as predation, mating, and competition. However, the ability to identify discrete quantities has only been firmly established in humans. The purpose of this study was to test for such “absolute numerousness” judgments in three lion-tailed macaques (Macaca silenus), a non-human primate. The three macaques tested had previously been trained on a computerized matchto- sample (MTS) task using geometric shapes. In this study, they were introduced to a MTS task containing a numerical cue, which required the monkeys to match stimuli containing either one or two items for rewards. If monkeys were successful at the initial matching task, they were tested with stimuli in which the position of the items and then the surface area of the items was controlled. If the monkeys could match successfully without using these non-numerical cues, they would demonstrate the capability to make absolute numerousness judgments. None of the monkeys matched successfully using the numerical cue, so no evidence of absolute numerosity was found. Each macaque progressed through the experiment in an individualized manner, attempting a variety of strategies to obtain rewards. These included side preferences and an alternating-side strategy that were unrelated to the numerical cues in the stimuli. When it became clear that the monkeys were not matching based on a stimulus-based cue, they were tested again on matching geometric shapes. All three macaques stopped using their alternate strategies and were able to match shapes successfully, demonstrating that they were still capable of completing the matching task. The data suggest that the monkeys could not transfer this ability to the numerical stimuli. This indicates that the macaques lack a sense of exact quantity, or that they could not recognize the numerical cues in the stimuli as being relevant to the task.

An Analysis of Capacities, Moral Hierarchies, and the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals in Contemporary Animal Rights Work

The primary objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the pernicious impact that moral hierarchies have on our perception and subsequent treatment of non-human animals. Moral hierarchies in general are characterized by a dynamic in which one group is considered to be fundamentally superior to a lesser group. This thesis focuses specifically on the moral hierarchies that arise when humans are assumed to be superior to non-human animals in virtue of their advanced mental capabilities. The operative hypothesis of this thesis is essentially that moral hierarchies thwart the provision of justice to non-human animals in that they function as a justification for otherwise impermissible actions. When humans are assumed to be fundamentally superior to non-human animals then it becomes morally permissible for humans to kill non-human animals and utilize them as mere instrumentalities. This thesis is driven primarily by an in-depth analysis of the approaches to animal rights that are provided by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione. Each of these thinkers claim that they overcome anthropocentrism and provide approaches that preclude the establishment of a moral hierarchy. One of the major findings of this thesis, however, is that Singer and Regan offer approaches that remain highly anthropocentric despite the fact that each thinker claims that they have overcome anthropocentrism. The anthropocentrism persists in these respective approaches in that each thinkers gives humans Regan and Singer have different conceptions of the criteria that are required to afford a being moral worth, but they both give preference to beings that have the cognitive ability to form desires regarding the future.. As a result, a moral hierarchy emerges in which humans are regarded to be fundamentally superior. Francione, however, provides an approach that does not foster a moral hierarchy. Francione creates such an approach by applying the principle of equal consideration of interests in a consistent manner. Moreover, Francione argues that mere sentience is both a necessary and sufficient condition for being eligible and subsequently receiving moral consideration. The upshot of this thesis is essentially that the moral treatment of animals is not compatible with the presence of a moral hierarchy. As a result, this thesis demonstrates that future approaches to animal rights must avoid the establishment of moral hierarchies. The research and analysis within this thesis demonstrates that this is not a possibility, however, unless all theories of justice that are to accommodate animals abandon the notion that cognition matters morally.