Risk Judgment in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: Testing a Dual-Systems Account

Dual-systems theorists posit distinct modes of reasoning. The intuition system reasons automatically and its processes are unavailable to conscious introspection. The deliberation system reasons effortfully while its processes recruit working memory. The current paper extends the application of such theories to the study of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). Patients with OCD often retain insight into their irrationality, implying dissociable systems of thought: intuition produces obsessions and fears that deliberation observes and attempts (vainly) to inhibit. To test the notion that dual-systems theory can adequately describe OCD, we obtained speeded and unspeeded risk judgments from OCD patients and non-anxious controls in order to quantify the differential effects of intuitive and deliberative reasoning. As predicted, patients deemed negative events to be more likely than controls. Patients also took more time in producing judgments than controls. Furthermore, when forced to respond quickly patients' judgments were more affected than controls'. Although patients did attenuate judgments when given additional time, their estimates never reached the levels of controls'. We infer from these data that patients have genuine difficulty inhibiting their intuitive cognitive system. Our dual-systems perspective is compatible with current theories of the disorder. Similar behavioral tests may prove helpful in better understanding related anxiety disorders. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

An Analysis of Capacities, Moral Hierarchies, and the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals in Contemporary Animal Rights Work

The primary objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the pernicious impact that moral hierarchies have on our perception and subsequent treatment of non-human animals. Moral hierarchies in general are characterized by a dynamic in which one group is considered to be fundamentally superior to a lesser group. This thesis focuses specifically on the moral hierarchies that arise when humans are assumed to be superior to non-human animals in virtue of their advanced mental capabilities. The operative hypothesis of this thesis is essentially that moral hierarchies thwart the provision of justice to non-human animals in that they function as a justification for otherwise impermissible actions. When humans are assumed to be fundamentally superior to non-human animals then it becomes morally permissible for humans to kill non-human animals and utilize them as mere instrumentalities. This thesis is driven primarily by an in-depth analysis of the approaches to animal rights that are provided by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione. Each of these thinkers claim that they overcome anthropocentrism and provide approaches that preclude the establishment of a moral hierarchy. One of the major findings of this thesis, however, is that Singer and Regan offer approaches that remain highly anthropocentric despite the fact that each thinker claims that they have overcome anthropocentrism. The anthropocentrism persists in these respective approaches in that each thinkers gives humans Regan and Singer have different conceptions of the criteria that are required to afford a being moral worth, but they both give preference to beings that have the cognitive ability to form desires regarding the future.. As a result, a moral hierarchy emerges in which humans are regarded to be fundamentally superior. Francione, however, provides an approach that does not foster a moral hierarchy. Francione creates such an approach by applying the principle of equal consideration of interests in a consistent manner. Moreover, Francione argues that mere sentience is both a necessary and sufficient condition for being eligible and subsequently receiving moral consideration. The upshot of this thesis is essentially that the moral treatment of animals is not compatible with the presence of a moral hierarchy. As a result, this thesis demonstrates that future approaches to animal rights must avoid the establishment of moral hierarchies. The research and analysis within this thesis demonstrates that this is not a possibility, however, unless all theories of justice that are to accommodate animals abandon the notion that cognition matters morally.