Tempering the EU? NGO Advocacy in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice

The European Union’s (EU) area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) portfolio comprises policy areas such as immigration and asylum, and police and judicial cooperation. Steps were taken to bring this field into the mandate of the EU first by the Maastricht Treaty, followed by changes implemented by the Amsterdam and Lisbon Treaties, the last one ‘normalizing’ the EU’s erstwhile Third Pillar. As the emergent EU regime continues to consolidate in this field, NGOs of various kinds continue to seek to influence policy-making and implementation, with varying success. This article seeks to establish the context in which NGOs carry out their work and argues that the EU-NGO interface is impacted both by the institutional realities of the European Union and the capacities of EU-oriented NGOs to seize and expand opportunities for access and input into the policy cycle. Using EU instruments representing three different policy bundles in AFSJ (immigration, asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal matters), the article seeks to map out NGO strategies in engaging and oftentimes resisting European Union policy instruments.

Cooperation after war: International development in Bosnia, 1995 to 1999

This paper discusses how predispositions, incentives, the number and heterogeneity of participants, and leadership (Faerman et al. 2001) jointly influenced the international effort to develop Bosnia and Herzegovina. International coalitions, task forces, and advisory groups are increasingly charged with implementing reforms following civil conflict. This requires a complex web of interorganizational relationships among NGOS, donors and host nations at both global and ‘ground’ levels. To better understand development assistance, attention must be paid to the relationships between these varied players. We find that four factors influenced relationships between policy, donor, and implementing organizations; and those strained relationships, in turn, affected development success. The paper draws on interviews, conducted in Bosnia, with 43 development professionals, observation of development meetings in Tuzla and Sarajevo, and review of related documents from international development programs.

Nation building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Cooperation, coordination and collaboration

Cross-sectoral interorganizational relationships in post-conflict situations occur regularly. Whether formal task forces, advisory groups or other ad hoc arrangements, these relations take place in chaotic and dangerous situations with urgent and turbulent political, economic and social environments. Furthermore, they typically involve a large number of players from many different nations, operating across sectors, and between multiple layers of bureaucracy and diplomacy. The organizational complexity staggers many participants and observers, as do the tasks they are charged with completing. Reform efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina starting in 1995 may serve as the archetype model of conflict, transition and development for the 21st century. It wins this honor due not to its particular programmatic successes and failures, rather to the interorganizational complexity of the International Community. From the massive response to the crisis, to the modern nation-building policies it spawned, and the development assistance practices and institutional arrangements it created, the Bosnian development experience has much to offer by way of lessons learned. This manuscript frames the unique Bosnian development situation, and provides lessons learned from the experience of nation building given local realities. Pettigrew (1992) called this "contextualizing." While network and/or organizational structure, strategy and process explain many interorganizational relationship issues, the development variables identified in this manuscript prove equally important, yet elusive and difficult to measure despite their very real and overt presence.

IMPULSE CONTROL AND COOPERATION IN CAPUCHIN MONKEYS (Cebus apella)

The benefits animals derive from living in social groups have produced the evolution of many forms of cooperative behavior. To cooperate, two or more individuals coordinate their actions to accomplish a common goal. One cognitive process that has the potential to influence cooperation is self control. Individuals delaying their impulsive choice for an immediate reward may potentially receive a larger reward later by cooperating with others. In this study, I measured whether brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were capable of impulse control and whether impulse control was related to cooperation. Impulse control and cooperation were measured using a lazy susan-like apparatus, on which animals could turn a wheel to receive food rewards. The capuchins went through two training phases that taught them how to turn the wheel efficiently to obtain rewards and how to turn the wheel to obtain the larger of two rewards. After training, I tested impulse control by giving the capuchins a choice between a smaller and a larger reward placed at shorter or more distant locations on the wheel. The capuchins demonstrated impulse control in that they tended to inhibit the impulse to select the smaller reward when it was closer and easier to reach and instead selected the larger reward when it was farther away. Cooperation was tested in all possible dyads of seven individuals, a total of 21 dyads, by allowing each dyad 10 trials to work together with effort on the lazy-susan so that each would obtain a reward. Seventeen out of 21 dyads cooperated by simultaneously moving the wheel in the same direction. The correlation between how often a particular dyad cooperated and their average impulse control score was not statistically significant, r(21) = -.125, p = .591. Capuchins demonstrated impulse control and cooperation using this novel apparatus but the two abilities were not related. Other factors such as the unique social relationship between two individuals may play a more prominent role in the motivation to cooperate rather than the cognitive capacity to inhibit behavior.