Government Influence and the Failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

In 2008 two government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were placed into conservatorship due to insolvency. The financial bailout of the two publically traded corporations came at the expense of the American tax payer. This study investigates the relationship between direct and indirect government influence and the increasing risk taking of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from the late 1990’s through their conservatorship in 2008. As government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have many special advantages that other publically traded companies did not possess. These advantages allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase their profitability. Theoretical literature regarding Congress and the bureaucracy suggests that the actions of bureaucrats can be linked to the preferences of Congressional members because bureaucrats are responsive to potential threats or perceived threats from the legislature. This theory is applicable to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and is used to explain why the government was able to directly and indirectly influence the government-sponsored enterprises. Overall this investigation has determined that the United States government pursued a clear mission that determined to increase the availability of housing to all Americans, specifically to low-income and under-served individuals, through the use of the government-sponsored enterprises. Despite this link there is no conclusive data to show that the pursuit of this housing mission led Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to operate in riskier business segments. This study has also found that motivation regarding profit-seeking and compensation structure provide a more plausible explanation for why the government-sponsored enterprises began to engage in riskier business practices that led to their insolvency.

Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the United States: The Differences Between Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures

This paper uses a survey experiment to examine differences in public attitudes toward 'direct' and 'indirect' government spending. Federal social welfare spending in the USA has two components: the federal government spends money to directly provide social benefits to citizens, and also indirectly subsidizes the private provision of social benefits through tax expenditures. Though benefits provided through tax expenditures are considered spending for budgetary purposes, they differ from direct spending in several ways: in the mechanisms through which benefits are delivered to citizens, in how they distribute wealth across the income spectrum, and in the visibility of their policy consequences to the mass public. We develop and test a model explaining how these differences will affect public attitudes toward spending conducted through direct and indirect means. We find that support for otherwise identical social programs is generally higher when such programs are portrayed as being delivered through tax expenditures than when they are portrayed as being delivered by direct spending. In addition, support for tax expenditure programs which redistribute wealth upward drops when citizens are provided information about the redistributive effects. Both of these results are conditioned by partisanship, with the opinions of Republicans more sensitive to the mechanism through which benefits are delivered, and the opinions of Democrats more sensitive to information about their redistributive effects.