The Timeliness and Cost-Effectiveness of the Local and Regional Procurement of Food Aid

Local and regional procurement (LRP) of food aid is often claimed to lead to quicker and more cost-effective response. We generate timeliness and cost-effectiveness estimates by comparing US-funded LRP activities in nine countries against in-kind, transoceanic food aid shipments from the US to the same countries during the same timeframe. Procuring food locally or distributing cash or vouchers results in a time savings of nearly 14 weeks, a 62 percent gain. Cost-effectiveness varies significantly by commodity type. Procuring grains locally saved over 50 percent, on average, while local procurement of processed commodities was not always cost-effective. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

CROSS-SECTORAL COORDINATION OF DISASTER RELIEF

Coordinating organizational activity across different sectors is crucial in disaster management. We analysed the response of 291 aid workers to the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and found that common incentives and a high degree of equality among aid organizations positively affected perceived network coordination. Large and public organizations were more likely to take leadership roles and high numbers of public organizations involved in the disaster response network led to improved network coordination. These results indicate the need for mechanisms that enable smaller and non-profit organizations to participate in network coordination and leadership.

Market Prices and Food Aid Local and Regional Procurement and Distribution: A Multi-Country Analysis

To date, no research has rigorously addressed the concern that local and regional procurement (LRP) of food aid could affect food prices and food price volatility in food aid source and recipient countries. We assemble spatially and temporally disaggregated data and estimate the relationship between food prices and their volatility and local food aid procurement and distribution across seven countries for several commodities. In most cases, LRP activities have no statistically significant relationship with either local price levels or food price volatility. The few exceptions underscore the importance of market monitoring. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Recipients' Satisfaction with Locally Procured Food Aid Rations: Comparative Evidence from a Three Country Matched Survey

Using survey data from natural experiments in three countries that simultaneously received food aid sourced locally and from the United States, we test the hypothesis that locally-sourced commodities are more culturally appropriate and thus preferred over traditional food aid commodities sourced from the donor country. We use a semi-nonparametric regression method to estimate recipients' satisfaction with these commodities across a range of criteria. We establish that recipients of locally procured rations are generally more satisfied with the commodities they receive than are recipients of US-sourced foods. This pattern is especially pronounced among less-well-off recipients. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Tradeoffs or Synergies? Assessing Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement through Case Studies in Burkina Faso and Guatemala

We compare the impacts across a range of criteria of local and regional procurement (LRP) relative to transoceanic shipment of food aid in Burkina Faso and Guatemala. We find that neither instrument dominates the other across all criteria in either country, although LRP commonly performs at least as well as transoceanic shipment with respect to timeliness, cost, market price impacts, satisfying recipients' preferences, food quality and safety, and in benefiting smallholder suppliers. LRP is plainly a valuable food assistance tool, but its advantages and disadvantages must be carefully weighed, compared, and prioritized depending on the context and program objectives. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Aleatory Sovereignty and the Rule of Sensitive Spaces

Addressing life in borders and refugee camps requires understanding the way these spaces are ruled, the kinds of problems rule poses for the people who live there, and the abilities of inhabitants to remake their own lives. Recent literature on such spaces has been influenced by Agamben's notion of sovereignty, which reduces these spaces and their residents to abstractions. We propose an alternate framework focused on what we call aleatory sovereignty, or rule by chance. This allows us to see camps and borders not only as the outcomes of humanitarian projects but also of anxieties about governance and rule; to see their inhabitants not only as abject recipients of aid, but also as individuals who make decisions and choices in complex conditions; and to show that while the outcome of projects within such spaces is often unpredictable, the assumptions that undergird such projects create regular cycles of implementation and failure.