How Porous are the Walls that Separate Us?: Transformative Service-Learning, Women’s Incarceration, and the Unsettled Self

In this article, we refine a politics of thinking from the margins by exploring a pedagogical model that advances transformative notions of service learning as social justice teaching. Drawing on a recent course we taught involving both incarcerated women and traditional college students, we contend that when communication among differentiated and stratified parties occurs, one possible result is not just a view of the other but also a transformation of the self and other. More specifically, we suggest that an engaged feminist praxis of teaching incarcerated women together with college students helps illuminate the porous nature of fixed markers that purport to reveal our identities (e.g., race and gender), to emplace our bodies (e.g., within institutions, prison gates, and walls), and to specify our locations (e.g., cultural, geographic, socialeconomic). One crucial theoretical insight our work makes clear is that the model of social justice teaching to which we aspired necessitates re-conceptualizing ourselves as students and professors whose subjectivities are necessarily relational and emergent.

Cell Types as Natural Kinds

Talk of different types of cells is commonplace in the biological sciences. We know a great deal, for example, about human muscle cells by studying the same type of cells in mice. Information about cell type is apparently largely projectible across species boundaries. But what defines cell type? Do cells come pre-packaged into different natural kinds? Philosophical attention to these questions has been extremely limited [see e.g., Wilson (Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp 187-207, 1999; Genes and the Agents of Life, 2005; Wilson et al. Philos Top 35(1/2): 189-215, 2007)]. On the face of it, the problems we face in individuating cellular kinds resemble those biologists and philosophers of biology encountered in thinking about species: there are apparently many different (and interconnected) bases on which we might legitimately classify cells. We could, for example, focus on their developmental history (a sort of analogue to a species' evolutionary history); or we might divide on the basis of certain structural features, functional role, location within larger systems, and so on. In this paper, I sketch an approach to cellular kinds inspired by Boyd's Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory, applying some lessons from this application back to general questions about the nature of natural kinds.

Plato's Doctrine Of Forms: Modern Misunderstandings

Among the philosophical ideas of Plato, perhaps the most famous is his doctrine of forms. This doctrine has faced harsh criticism due, in large part, to the interpretations of this position by modern philosophers such as René Descartes, John Locke, and Immanuel Kant. For example, Plato has been interpreted as presenting a ¿two-worlds¿ approach to form and thing and as advancing a rationalist approach to epistemology. His forms have often been interpreted as ideas and as perfect copies of the things of the visible world. In this thesis, I argue that these, along with other interpretations of Plato presented by the moderns, are based on misunderstandings of Plato¿s overall philosophy. In so doing, I attempt to show that the doctrine of forms cannot be directly interpreted into the language of Cartesian, Lockean, and Kantian metaphysics and epistemology, and thus should not be prematurely dismissed because of these modern Platonic interpretations. By analyzing the Platonic dialogues beside the writings of the modern philosophers, I conclude that three of the most prominent modern philosophers, as representatives of their respective philosophical frameworks, have fundamentally misunderstood the nature of Plato¿s famous doctrine of forms. This could have significant implications for the future of metaphysics and epistemology by providing an interpretation of Plato which adds to, instead of contradicts, the developments of modern philosophy.