Government Influence and the Failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

In 2008 two government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were placed into conservatorship due to insolvency. The financial bailout of the two publically traded corporations came at the expense of the American tax payer. This study investigates the relationship between direct and indirect government influence and the increasing risk taking of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from the late 1990’s through their conservatorship in 2008. As government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have many special advantages that other publically traded companies did not possess. These advantages allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to increase their profitability. Theoretical literature regarding Congress and the bureaucracy suggests that the actions of bureaucrats can be linked to the preferences of Congressional members because bureaucrats are responsive to potential threats or perceived threats from the legislature. This theory is applicable to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and is used to explain why the government was able to directly and indirectly influence the government-sponsored enterprises. Overall this investigation has determined that the United States government pursued a clear mission that determined to increase the availability of housing to all Americans, specifically to low-income and under-served individuals, through the use of the government-sponsored enterprises. Despite this link there is no conclusive data to show that the pursuit of this housing mission led Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to operate in riskier business segments. This study has also found that motivation regarding profit-seeking and compensation structure provide a more plausible explanation for why the government-sponsored enterprises began to engage in riskier business practices that led to their insolvency.

A Historical-Institutional Study of the Welfare Systems in the United States and Sweden: Net Social Wage Approach

In this study I first look at the historical developments of the welfare systems in Sweden and the United States to understand why these countries have produced two distinct systems over the years. After understanding their historical context I turn to the question of the relationship between the welfare system and economic growth. Policy makers and the mainstream media commonly cite the critique that through government deficit and public debt, welfare systems are a drag on the economy. By calculating the net social wage, the difference in taxes paid and benefits received by workers, I test this hypothesis to see if welfare systems are self-financed by the workers. My findings demonstrate that the net social wage has been negative in the U.S. from 1962 to the early 2000s and in Sweden from 1965 to 2012. This shows that the welfare systems are entirely self-financed by the workers for the full period in Sweden and until the recent financial crisis in the U.S.