Brown Capuchins (Cebus apella) Exhibit Self-Control on a Delay of Gratification Food Exchange Task When Food Options Differ Qualitatively

Self-control allows an individual to obtain a more preferred outcome by forgoing an immediate interest. Self-control is an advanced cognitive process because it involves the ability to weigh the costs and benefits of impulsive versus restrained behavior, determine the consequences of such behavior, and make decisions based on the most advantageous course of action. Self-control has been thoroughly explored in Old World primates, but less so in New World monkeys. There are many ways to test self-control abilities in non-human primates, including exchange tasks in which an animal must forgo an immediate, less preferred reward to receive a delayed, more preferred reward. I examined the self-control abilities of six capuchin monkeys using a task in which a monkey was given a less preferred food and was required to wait a delay interval to trade the fully intact less preferred food for a qualitatively higher, more preferred food. Partially eaten pieces of the less preferred food were not rewarded, and delay intervals increased on an individual basis based on performance. All six monkeys were successful in inhibiting impulsivity and trading a less preferred food for a more preferred food at the end of a delay interval. The maximum duration each subject postponed gratification instead of responding impulsively was considered their delay tolerance. This study was the first to show that monkeys could inhibit impulsivity in a delay of gratification food exchange task in which the immediate and delayed food options differed qualitatively and a partially eaten less preferred food was not rewarded with the more preferred food at the end of a delay interval. These results show that New World monkeys possess advanced cognitive abilities similar to those of Old World primates.

The Supreme Court Confirmation Process and Its Implications

In recent history, there has been a trend of increasing partisan polarization throughout most of the American political system. Some of the impacts of this polarization are obvious; however, there is reason to believe that we miss some of the indirect effects of polarization. Accompanying the trend of increased polarization has been an increase in the contentiousness of the Supreme Court confirmation process. I believe that these two trends are related. Furthermore, I argue that these trends have an impact on judicial behavior. This is an issue worth exploring, since the Supreme Court is the most isolated branch of the federal government. The Constitution structured the Supreme Court to ensure that it was as isolated as possible from short-term political pressures and interests. This study attempts to show how it may be possible that those goals are no longer being fully achieved. My first hypothesis in this study is that increases in partisan polarization are a direct cause of the increase in the level of contention during the confirmation process. I then hypothesize that the more contention a justice faces during his or her confirmation process, the more ideologically extreme that justice will then vote on the bench. This means that a nominee appointed by a Republican president will tend to vote even more conservatively than was anticipated following a contentious confirmation process, and vice versa for Democratic appointees. In order to test these hypotheses, I developed a data set for every Supreme Court nominee dating back to President Franklin D. Roosevelt¿s appointments (1937). With this data set, I ran a series of regression models to analyze these relationships. Statistically speaking, the results support my first hypothesis in a fairly robust manner. My regression results for my second hypothesis indicate that the trend I am looking for is present for Republican nominees. For Democratic nominees, the impacts are less robust. Nonetheless, as the results will show, contention during the confirmation process does seem to have some impact on judicial behavior. Following my quantitative analysis, I analyze a series of case studies. These case studies serve to provide tangible examples of these statistical trends as well as to explore what else may be going on during the confirmation process and subsequent judicial decision-making. I use Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and Alito as the subjects for these case studies. These cases will show that the trends described above do seem to be identifiable at the level of an individual case. These studies further help to indicate other potential impacts on judicial behavior. For example, following Justice Rehnquist¿s move from Associate to Chief Justice, we see a marked change in his behavior. Overall, this study serves as a means of analyzing some of the more indirect impacts of partisan polarization in modern politics. Further, the study offers a means of exploring some of the possible constraints (both conscious and subconscious) that Supreme Court justices may feel while they decide how to cast a vote in a particular case. Given the wide-reaching implications of Supreme Court decisions, it is important to try to grasp a full view of how these decisions are made.