Social Context and Economic Biases in Representation

This article explores the role of political context in shaping economic biases in representation-the degree to which wealthy citizens' views are more strongly represented than poorer citizens' views in the choices of policymakers. I develop a general model that explains why poorer citizens will be better represented relative to the rich in certain political contexts than others, arguing that the relative representation of the poor will be stronger in contexts that make the views of the poor relevant and accessible to policymakers. I then derive several specific hypotheses that flow from this model and test these hypotheses through a study of the dyadic relationships between citizens and their representatives in the U.S. Congress. The results show that poorer citizens are better represented relative to the rich in Congressional districts that are electorally competitive, have low median incomes, have relatively equal distributions of incomes, have a significant organized labor presence, and are represented by Democrats.

Party Size and Constituency Representation: Evidence from the 19th-Century U.S. House of Representatives

Research on congressional parties assumes, but has not directly shown, that party size affects individual members' calculations. Drawing on a key case from the nineteenth-century House the secession-driven Republican hegemony of 1861 this article explores the hypothesis that party voting not only declines but also becomes more strongly linked to constituency factors as relative party size increases. The analysis reveals that the jump in party size coincides with (1) a decrease in party voting among individual continuing members, (2) a strengthening association between some constituency factors and party voting, and (3) patterns of decline in individual party voting that are explained in part by constituency measures.