9 resultados para Buddhist sculpture
em Bucknell University Digital Commons - Pensilvania - USA
Resumo:
Reform is a word that, one might easily say, characterizes more than any other the history and development of Buddhism. Yet, it must also be said that reform movements in East Asian Buddhism have often taken on another goal—harmony or unification; that is, a desire not only to reconstruct a more worthy form of Buddhism, but to simultaneously bring together all existing forms under a single banner, in theory if not in practice. This paper explores some of the tensions between the desire for reform and the quest for harmony in modern Japanese Buddhism thought, by comparing two developments: the late 19th century movement towards ‘New Buddhism’ (shin Bukkyō) as exemplified by Murakami Senshō 村上専精 (1851–1929), and the late 20th century movement known as ‘Critical Buddhism’ (hihan Bukkyō), as found in the works of Matsumoto Shirō 松本史朗 and Hakamaya Noriaki 袴谷憲昭. In all that has been written about Critical Buddhism, in both Japanese and English, very little attention has been paid to the place of the movement within the larger traditions of Japanese Buddhist reform. Here I reconsider Critical Buddhism in relation to the concerns of the previous, much larger trends towards Buddhist reform that emerged almost exactly 100 years previous—the so-called shin Bukkyō or New Buddhism of the late-Meiji era. Shin Bukkyō is a catch-all term that includes the various writings and activities of Inoue Enryō, Shaku Sōen, and Kiyozawa Manshi, as well as the so-called Daijō-hibussetsuron, a broad term used (often critically) to describe Buddhist writers who suggested that Mahāyāna Buddhism is not, in fact, the Buddhism taught by the ‘historical’ Buddha Śākyamuni. Of these, I will make a few general remarks about Daijō-hibusseturon, before turning attention more specifically to the work of Murakami Senshō, in order to flesh out some of the similarities and differences between his attempt to construct a ‘unified Buddhism’ and the work of his late-20th century avatars, the Critical Buddhists. Though a number of their aims and ideas overlap, I argue that there remain fundamental differences with respect to the ultimate purposes of Buddhist reform. This issue hinges on the implications of key terms such as ‘unity’ and ‘harmony’ as well as the way doctrinal history is categorized and understood, but it also relates to issues of ideology and the use and abuse of Buddhist doctrines in 20th-century politics.
Resumo:
This article focuses on several key philosophical themes in the criticism of Sakaguchi Ango (1906–1955), one of postwar Japan’s most influential and controversial writers. Associated with the underground Kasutori culture as well as the Burai-ha of Tamura Taijirō (1911–1983), Oda Sakunosuke (1913–1947) and Dazai Osamu (1909–1948), Ango gained fame for two provocative essays on the theme of daraku or “decadence”—Darakuron and Zoku darakuron—pubished in 1946, in the wake of Japan’s traumatic defeat and the beginnings of the Allied Occupation. Less well-known is the fact that Ango spent his student years studying classical Buddhist texts in Sanskrit, Pali and Tibetan, and that he at at one time aspired to the priesthood. The article analyses the concept of daraku in the two essays noted above, particularly as it relates to Ango’s vision of a refashioned morality based on an interpretation of human subjectivity vis-à-vis the themes of illusion and disillusion. It argues that, despite the radical and modernist flavor of Ango’s essays, his “decadence” is best understood in terms of Mahāyāna and Zen Buddhist concepts. Moreover, when the two essays on decadence are read in tandem with Ango’s wartime essay on Japanese culture (Nihon bunka shikan, 1942), they form the foundation for a “postmetaphysical Buddhist critique of culture,” one that is pragmatic, humanistic, and non-reductively physicalist.
Resumo:
In the early decades of the twentieth century, as Japanese society became engulfed in war and increasing nationalism, the majority of Buddhist leaders and institutions capitulated to the status quo. One notable exception to this trend, however, was the Shinkō Bukkyō Seinen Dōmei (Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism), founded on 5 April 1931. Led by Nichiren Buddhist layman Seno’o Girō and made up of young social activists who were critical of capitalism, internationalist in outlook, and committed to a pan-sectarian and humanist form of Buddhism that would work for social justice and world peace, the league’s motto was “carry the Buddha on your backs and go out into the streets and villages.” This article analyzes the views of the Youth League for Revitalizing Buddhism as found in the religious writings of Seno’o Girō to situate the movement in its social and philosophical context, and to raise the question of the prospects of “radical Buddhism” in twenty-first century Japan and elsewhere.
Resumo:
This paper provides an analysis of the key term aidagara (“betweenness”) in the philosophical ethics of Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), in response to and in light of the recent movement in Japanese Buddhist studies known as “Critical Buddhism.” The Critical Buddhist call for a turn away from “topical” or intuitionist thinking and towards (properly Buddhist) “critical” thinking, while problematic in its bipolarity, raises the important issue of the place of “reason” versus “intuition” in Japanese Buddhist ethics. In this paper, a comparison of Watsuji’s “ontological quest” with that of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Watsuji’s primary Western source and foil, is followed by an evaluation of a corresponding search for an “ontology of social existence” undertaken by Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962). Ultimately, the philosophico-religious writings of Watsuji Tetsurō allow for the “return” of aesthesis as a modality of social being that is truly dimensionalized, and thus falls prey neither to the verticality of topicalism nor the limiting objectivity of criticalism.
Resumo:
The decline of traditional religions in Japan in the past century, and especially since the end of World War Two, has led to an explosion of so-called “new religions” (shin shūkyō 新宗教), many of which have made forays into the political realm. The best known—and most controversial—example of a “political” new religion is Sōka Gakkai 創価学会, a lay Buddhist movement originally associated with the Nichiren sect that in the 1960s gave birth to a new political party, Komeitō 公明党 (lit., Clean Government Party), which in the past several decades has emerged as the third most popular party in Japan (as New Komeitō). Since the 1980s, Japan has also seen the emergence of so-called “new, new religions” (shin shin shūkyō 新新宗教), which tend to be more technologically savvy and less socially concerned (and, in the eyes of critics, more akin to “cults” than the earlier new religions). One new, new religion known as Kōfuku-no-Kagaku 幸福の科学 (lit., Institute for Research in Human Happiness or simply Happy Science), founded in 1986 by Ōkawa Ryūho 大川隆法, has very recently developed its own political party, Kōfuku Jitsugentō 幸福実現党 (The Realization of Happiness Party). This article will analyse the political ideals of Kōfuku Jitsugentō in relation to its religious teachings, in an attempt to situate the movement within the broader tradition of religio-political syncretism in Japan. In particular, it will examine the recent “manifesto” of Kōfuku Jitsugentō in relation to those of New Komeitō and “secular” political parties such as the Liberal Democratic Party (Jimintō 自民党) and the Democratic Party (Minshutō 民主党).
Resumo:
While it is only in recent decades that scholars have begun to reconsider and problematize Buddhist conceptions of “freedom” and “agency,” the thought traditions of Asian Buddhism have for many centuries struggled with questions related to the issue of “liberation”—along with its fundamental ontological, epistemological and ethical implications. With the development of Marxist thought in the mid to late nineteenth century, a new paradigm for thinking about freedom in relation to history, identity and social change found its way to Asia, and confronted traditional religious interpretations of freedom as well as competing Western ones. In the past century, several attempts have been made—in India, southeast Asia, China and Japan—to bring together Marxist and Buddhist worldviews, with only moderate success (both at the level of theory and practice). This paper analyzes both the possibilities and problems of a “Buddhist materialism” constructed along Marxian lines, by focusing in particular on Buddhist and Marxist conceptions of “liberation.” By utilizing the theoretical work of Japanese “radical Buddhist” Seno’o Girō, I argue that the root of the tension lies with conceptions of selfhood and agency—but that, contrary to expectations, a strong case can be made for convergence between Buddhist and Marxian perspectives on these issues, as both traditions ultimately seek a resolution of existential determination in response to alienation. Along the way, I discuss the work of Marx, Engels, Gramsci, Lukàcs, Sartre, and Richard Rorty in relation to aspects of traditional (particularly East Asian Mahāyāna) Buddhist thought.
Resumo:
This thesis provides a critique of Western media articles concerning self-immolation in Tibet. I begin by illustrating how the Western media provides reductionist accounts of Tibetan self-immolation by depicting the act solely as a form of political protest in response to Chinese occupation. I argue that these limited portrayals of self-immolation can be attributed to the Shangri-La imagery that characterizes much of the Western conceptions of Tibet. Through Shangri-La imagery, both Tibetans and their Buddhist religion are portrayed as utopic, peaceful, and able to provide the antidote to solving Western problems relating to modernization and consumerism. After illustrating the ways in which Shangri-La imagery influences Western media portrayals of Tibetan self-immolation, this thesis explores the commonly disregarded Buddhist dimensions of the act. Looking to Buddhist doctrine, scripture, and history, this thesis establishes a clear relationship between self-immolation and Buddhism, which situates the act as being more complicated than mere political protest. I argue that these limited portrayals given by the Western media are problematic because they overlook a fundamental aspect of self-immolation, thus potentially misrepresenting Tibetans. This thesis explores the Buddhist dimensions of self-immolation as a possible way to further understand what has led more than one hundred Tibetans to perform this act during the time of political crisis.
Resumo:
Anxiety, depression, and tragedy are all unavoidable aspects of existence that we find ourselves grappling with at some point in our lives. In those darker moments we often look beyond ourselves for a means to cope with our struggles in the hopes of transcending into enhanced states of being. The world¿s religions have provided various answers to problems of mental and physical affliction. Across cultures and throughout history, numerous techniques for ¿mending the mind¿ have emerged, conditioned by a number of factors, including the normative values of a society as well as the scientific advances and technologies available for therapeutic application. Buddhism encompasses a broad tradition of beliefs, practices, and philosophies that, taken together, aim at eliminating suffering from the human experience. It is suggested that anyone who comes to understand and practice Buddhist teachings¿Dharma¿will rise out of the life of suffering and into a condition of awakening or nirvana. With this as an intended goal, a person who is unfulfilled in their life or who is experiencing feelings of depression will, it might be assumed, find great potential in turning to Buddhism as means for alleviation of these states. In contemporary western society, however, the most common route for eliminating emotional distress is to take antidepressant medication, which aims for immediate relief of the negative feelings and experiences that arise from depression. As I will argue, while this may be a successful approach to masking unwanted feelings, it in fact fails to treat the actual roots or cause of the undesirable experiences. Moreover, such a ¿therapeutic¿ approach lacks any aspect geared towards developing a consistently rewarding lifestyle. I will argue that the incorporation of Dharma¿both a set of ideas and as a form of practices¿into daily routines and modes of thinking provides the means for a balanced lifestyle, allowing the individual to relieve suffering and depression in a manner that the narrow scope of western medicine cannot provide.