Applied Developmental Psychology as an Implementation of the Life-Span View of Human Development

Application of knowledge about psychological development should, ideally, be theory based. As such, these applications represent “natural ontogenetic experiments”; the results of the evaluation of such interventions feed back to the theory, helping to support, falsify, or refine the ideas from the theory which led to the particular application. Such applied developmental intervention research is central within a currently popular perspective of life-span human development. Thus, applied developmental intervention research provides critical tests of such key concepts within this life-span perspective as: plasticity; multidirectionality; the synthesis of continuous and discontinuous processes across ontogeny; contextual embeddedness; and the role of individuals as agents in their own development. This paper elucidates some of the major features of the dynamic linkage between applied developmental psychology and this view of life-span human development. Key elements of this life-span perspective and the facts of developmental intervention, as seen from this perspective, are specified. Finally, the doctoral training program at the authors' institution is presented as one example of how this link may be institutionalized in the form of graduate education.

Cell Types as Natural Kinds

Talk of different types of cells is commonplace in the biological sciences. We know a great deal, for example, about human muscle cells by studying the same type of cells in mice. Information about cell type is apparently largely projectible across species boundaries. But what defines cell type? Do cells come pre-packaged into different natural kinds? Philosophical attention to these questions has been extremely limited [see e.g., Wilson (Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays, pp 187-207, 1999; Genes and the Agents of Life, 2005; Wilson et al. Philos Top 35(1/2): 189-215, 2007)]. On the face of it, the problems we face in individuating cellular kinds resemble those biologists and philosophers of biology encountered in thinking about species: there are apparently many different (and interconnected) bases on which we might legitimately classify cells. We could, for example, focus on their developmental history (a sort of analogue to a species' evolutionary history); or we might divide on the basis of certain structural features, functional role, location within larger systems, and so on. In this paper, I sketch an approach to cellular kinds inspired by Boyd's Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory, applying some lessons from this application back to general questions about the nature of natural kinds.