Estimating Willingness to Pay for River Amenities and Safety Measures Associated with Shale Gas Extraction

This paper utilizes a Contingent Valuation Method survey of a random sample of residents to estimate that households are willing to pay an average of $12.00 per month for public projects designed to improve river access and $10.46 per month for additional safety measures that would eliminate risks to local watersheds from drilling for natural gas from underground shale formations. These estimates can be compared to the costs of providing each of these two amenities to help foster the formation of efficient policy decisions.

The Dual Ownership Structure: a Model to Connect the Cooperative Model With Financial Markets

In business literature, the conflicts among workers, shareholders and the management have been studied mostly in the frame of stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory recognizes this issue as an agency problem, and tries to solve the problem by establishing a contractual relationship between the agent and principals. However, as Marcoux pointed out, the appropriateness of the contract as a medium to reduce the agency problem should be questioned. As an alternative, the cooperative model minimizes the agency costs by integrating the concept of workers, owners and management. Mondragon Corporation is a successful example of the cooperative model which grew into the sixth largest corporation in Spain. However, the cooperative model has long been ignored in discussions of corporate governance, mainly because the success of the cooperative model is extremely difficult to duplicate in reality. This thesis hopes to revitalize the scholarly examination of cooperatives by developing a new model that overcomes the fundamental problem in the cooperative model: the limited access to capital markets. By dividing the ownership interest into financial and control interest, the dual ownership structure allows cooperatives to issue stock in the capital market by making a financial product out of financial interest.