Terrestrial feeding in aquatic turtles: environment-dependent feeding behavior modulation and the evolution of terrestrial feeding in Emydidae

Evolutionary transitions between aquatic and terrestrial environments are common in vertebrate evolution. These transitions require major changes in most physiological functions, including feeding. Emydid turtles are ancestrally aquatic, with most species naturally feeding only in water, but some terrestrial species can modulate their feeding behavior appropriately for both media. In addition, many aquatic species can be induced to feed terrestrially. A comparison of feeding in both aquatic and terrestrial environments presents an excellent opportunity to investigate the evolution of terrestrial feeding from aquatic feeding, as well as a system within which to develop methods for studying major evolutionary transitions between environments. Individuals from eight species of emydid turtles (six aquatic, two terrestrial) were filmed while feeding underwater and on land. Bite kinematics were analyzed to determine whether aquatic turtles modulated their feeding behavior in a consistent and appropriate manner between environments. Aquatic turtles showed consistent changes between environments, taking longer bites and using more extensive motions of the jaw and hyoid when feeding on land. However, these motions differ from those shown by species that naturally feed in both environments and mostly do not seem to be appropriate for terrestrial feeding. For example, more extensive motions of the hyoid are only effective during underwater suction feeding. Emydids evolving to feed on land probably would have needed to evolve or learn to overcome many, but not all, aspects of the intrinsic emydid response to terrestrial feeding. Studies that investigate major evolutionary transitions must determine what responses to the new environment are shown by naïve individuals in order to fully understand the evolutionary patterns and processes associated with these transitions.

An Analysis of Capacities, Moral Hierarchies, and the Moral Status of Non-Human Animals in Contemporary Animal Rights Work

The primary objective of this thesis is to demonstrate the pernicious impact that moral hierarchies have on our perception and subsequent treatment of non-human animals. Moral hierarchies in general are characterized by a dynamic in which one group is considered to be fundamentally superior to a lesser group. This thesis focuses specifically on the moral hierarchies that arise when humans are assumed to be superior to non-human animals in virtue of their advanced mental capabilities. The operative hypothesis of this thesis is essentially that moral hierarchies thwart the provision of justice to non-human animals in that they function as a justification for otherwise impermissible actions. When humans are assumed to be fundamentally superior to non-human animals then it becomes morally permissible for humans to kill non-human animals and utilize them as mere instrumentalities. This thesis is driven primarily by an in-depth analysis of the approaches to animal rights that are provided by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione. Each of these thinkers claim that they overcome anthropocentrism and provide approaches that preclude the establishment of a moral hierarchy. One of the major findings of this thesis, however, is that Singer and Regan offer approaches that remain highly anthropocentric despite the fact that each thinker claims that they have overcome anthropocentrism. The anthropocentrism persists in these respective approaches in that each thinkers gives humans Regan and Singer have different conceptions of the criteria that are required to afford a being moral worth, but they both give preference to beings that have the cognitive ability to form desires regarding the future.. As a result, a moral hierarchy emerges in which humans are regarded to be fundamentally superior. Francione, however, provides an approach that does not foster a moral hierarchy. Francione creates such an approach by applying the principle of equal consideration of interests in a consistent manner. Moreover, Francione argues that mere sentience is both a necessary and sufficient condition for being eligible and subsequently receiving moral consideration. The upshot of this thesis is essentially that the moral treatment of animals is not compatible with the presence of a moral hierarchy. As a result, this thesis demonstrates that future approaches to animal rights must avoid the establishment of moral hierarchies. The research and analysis within this thesis demonstrates that this is not a possibility, however, unless all theories of justice that are to accommodate animals abandon the notion that cognition matters morally.