Investigation of Rudimentary Meta-Cognition in Lion-Tailed Macaques and Tufted Capuchins

Meta-cognition, or "thinking about thinking," has been studied extensively in humans, but very little is known about the process in animals. Although great apes and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) have demonstrated multiple apparently meta-cognitive abilities, other species have either been largely ignored or failed to convincingly display meta-cognitive traits. Recent work by Marsh, however, raised the possibility that some species may possess rudimentary or partial forms of meta-cognition. This thesis sought to further investigate this possibility by running multiple comparative experiments. The goal of the first study was to examine whether lion-tailed macaques, a species that may have a rudimentary form of meta-cognition, are able to use an uncertainty response adaptively, and if so, whether they could use the response flexibly when the stimuli for which the subjects should be uncertain changed. The macaques' acquisition of the initial discrimination task is ongoing, and as such there were not yet data to support a conclusion either way. In the second study, tufted capuchins were required to locate a food reward hidden beneath inverted cups that sat on a Plexiglas tray. In some conditions the capuchins were shown where the food was hidden, in others they could infer its location, and in yet others they were not given information about the location of the food. On all trials, however, capuchins could optionally seek additional information by looking up through the Plexiglas into the cups. In general, capuchins did this less often when they were shown the food reward, but not when they could infer the reward's location. These data suggest capuchins only meta-cognitively control their information seeking in some conditions, and thus, add support to the potential for a rudimentary form of meta-cognition. In convergence with other studies, these results may represent early models for rudimentary meta-cognition, although viable alternative explanations still remain.

Representations of the Human/ Nonhuman Primate Divide: the Influence of Science, Fiction, and Science-Fiction on the Concept of 'Being Human'

For as far back as human history can be traced, mankind has questioned what it means to be human. One of the most common approaches throughout Western culture's intellectual tradition in attempts to answering this question has been to compare humans with or against other animals. I argue that it was not until Charles Darwin's publication of The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) that Western culture was forced to seriously consider human identity in relation to the human/ nonhuman primate line. Since no thinker prior to Charles Darwin had caused such an identity crisis in Western thought, this interdisciplinary analysis of the history of how the human/ nonhuman primate line has been understood focuses on the reciprocal relationship of popular culture and scientific representations from 1871 to the Human Genome Consortium in 2000. Focusing on the concept coined as the "Darwin-Müller debate," representations of the human/ nonhuman primate line are traced through themes of language, intelligence, and claims of variation throughout the popular texts: Descent of Man, The Jungle Books (1894), Tarzan of the Apes (1914), and Planet of the Apes (1963). Additional themes such as the nature versus nurture debate and other comparative phenotypic attributes commonly used for comparison between man and apes are also analyzed. Such popular culture representations are compared with related or influential scientific research during the respective time period of each text to shed light on the reciprocal nature of Western intellectual tradition, popular notions of the human/ nonhuman primate line, and the development of the field of primatology. Ultimately this thesis shows that the Darwin-Müller debate is indeterminable, and such a lack of resolution makes man uncomfortable. Man's unsettled response and desire for self-knowledge further facilitates a continued search for answers to human identity. As the Human Genome Project has led to the rise of new debates, and primate research has become less anthropocentric over time, the mysteries of man's future have become more concerning than the questions of our past. The human/ nonhuman primate line is reduced to a 1% difference, and new debates have begun to overshadow the Darwin-Müller debate. In conclusion, I argue that human identity is best represented through the metaphor of evolution: both have an unknown beginning, both have an indeterminable future with no definite end, and like a species under the influence of evolution, what it means to be human is a constant, indeterminable process of change.