Cooperation after war: International development in Bosnia, 1995 to 1999

This paper discusses how predispositions, incentives, the number and heterogeneity of participants, and leadership (Faerman et al. 2001) jointly influenced the international effort to develop Bosnia and Herzegovina. International coalitions, task forces, and advisory groups are increasingly charged with implementing reforms following civil conflict. This requires a complex web of interorganizational relationships among NGOS, donors and host nations at both global and ‘ground’ levels. To better understand development assistance, attention must be paid to the relationships between these varied players. We find that four factors influenced relationships between policy, donor, and implementing organizations; and those strained relationships, in turn, affected development success. The paper draws on interviews, conducted in Bosnia, with 43 development professionals, observation of development meetings in Tuzla and Sarajevo, and review of related documents from international development programs.

Privatization in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Insights from and into the craft of interorganizational process analysis.

International efforts to help Bosnia and Herzegovina privatize its state-owned enterprises proved dif.cult, but the complex web of interorganizational relationships (IORs) among international donors, implementers, contractors, and local players, at times, seemed even more daunting to effective implementation of reforms than the technical dif.culties of the task itself. By employing a theoretical framework of IOR development over time, important stages in the evolution of the International Advisory Group on Privatization were identi.ed, and variables within each discussed. Analysis employed linear and nonlinear process logics to help explain what linked some variables withinand betweenthese various phases. Insights seemed valuable for practitioners seeking to implement interdependent tasks, organizational representatives trying to form relationships with others, and scholars trying to understand process theories of IOR formation. In addition, this research provides an introduction to the complexities of international development assistance — a crucially important and under-researched arena.

Nation building in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Cooperation, coordination and collaboration

Cross-sectoral interorganizational relationships in post-conflict situations occur regularly. Whether formal task forces, advisory groups or other ad hoc arrangements, these relations take place in chaotic and dangerous situations with urgent and turbulent political, economic and social environments. Furthermore, they typically involve a large number of players from many different nations, operating across sectors, and between multiple layers of bureaucracy and diplomacy. The organizational complexity staggers many participants and observers, as do the tasks they are charged with completing. Reform efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina starting in 1995 may serve as the archetype model of conflict, transition and development for the 21st century. It wins this honor due not to its particular programmatic successes and failures, rather to the interorganizational complexity of the International Community. From the massive response to the crisis, to the modern nation-building policies it spawned, and the development assistance practices and institutional arrangements it created, the Bosnian development experience has much to offer by way of lessons learned. This manuscript frames the unique Bosnian development situation, and provides lessons learned from the experience of nation building given local realities. Pettigrew (1992) called this "contextualizing." While network and/or organizational structure, strategy and process explain many interorganizational relationship issues, the development variables identified in this manuscript prove equally important, yet elusive and difficult to measure despite their very real and overt presence.

Does Israel Follow the Law? A Critical Analysis of Israel's Application of the International Law of Belligerent Occupation in the Occupied Territories

Israel's occupation of territories it captured in 1967 has become one of the longest and most controversial occupations of the last fifty years. Eschewing the traditional political analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this paper aims to explore whether Israel has adequately applied international law in the occupied territories, in particular, the law of belligerent occupation. The two actors under assessment are the Israeli government, particularly its military which enforces and maintains the law in the territories, and the Supreme Court of Israel, which has the power of review over military actions in the territories. The particular issues of the occupation that are critically analyzed are the general legal framework that Israel established in the territories, Israel's civilian settlement policy in territories, and Israel's construction of a barrier in the West Bank. This paper concludes that Israel has incorrectly applied the legal framework of belligerent occupation by refusing to apply the Fourth Geneva Convention; it has wrongly concluded that the establishment of civilian settlements in the territories conform with international law; yet it has rightly concluded that the construction of the barrier in the West Bank is permissible under international law, in contrast to the conclusion of the much publicized International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on the 'Wall.' Along with these general assessments, the author will also provide some historical and political insight into why the Israeli government and the Supreme Court may have applied the law in the way that they did.