Effects Of Perceived Financial Accessibility Of Colleges And Universities On Studentsâ¿ Assesment Of Institutional Desirability

This study focused on the effects of socioeconomic exclusivity indicators on college students¿ attitudes toward a hypothetical private liberal arts university. Students enrolled in two undergraduate courses in Education at an elite private liberal arts university in the northeast were randomly presented with one of three versions of an admissions brochure describing a fictitious university. The three versions of the brochure varied in their portrayals of the institution¿s financial exclusivity, ranging from high exclusivity to low exclusivity. Each student was asked to review the brochure and respond to a questionnaire, containing items pertaining to the overall desirability of the institution, as well as its student culture, academic program, campus traditions, and alumni network. Based on Thorstein Veblen¿s theory of the leisure class and Pierre Bourdieu¿s theory of social reproduction, it was hypothesized that students would judge the institution most favorably in all areas under the high exclusivity condition and least favorably under the low exclusivity condition. It was further hypothesized that differences in students¿ ratings of institutional desirability would be mediated by their own financial aid statuses. Results of a two-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) revealed significant (p < .05) interactive effects of institutional exclusivity and student aid status on the perceived desirability of the academic program and campus traditions of the institution. While recipients of need-based financial aid tended to rate more socioeconomically exclusive institutions more favorably on these two variables, those who were not receiving need-based financial aid tended to rate such institutions less favorably. Implications of the findings for student affairs practice are discussed and recommendations for further research are presented.

Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella) Fail to Be Equitable in an Ultimatum Game

The ultimatum game is a commonly used economics game testing humans' sense of fairness. In the game, a "proposer" is given a sum of money and is told they can split it however they want with another human partner. The partner can then either accept the division and both proposer and responder receive the proposed amounts, or the responder can reject the offer and neither player will get anything. Human subjects from most western cultures typically share almost half of an allotted amount, but it remains unknown whether our close primate relatives share this generosity. Recent attempts to present chimpanzees with the ultimatum game have provided inconclusive results, with some studies finding the animals share humans' disposition to behave 'fairly' and others concluding that chimpanzees act selfishly to maximize their own rewards. Capuchin monkeys are known to share many human and chimpanzee social and cooperative behaviors, and this study was the first to present capuchin monkeys with a version of the ultimatum game. Subjects were presented with two differently colored tokens representing different qualitative reward contingencies, one equitable and the other inequitable in favor of the subject proposer. Subjects could select and place one of the tokens in a transfer container. The capuchins were first tested with a "dictator game" where, after the subject monkey selected a token, the rewards (equitable or inequitable) were distributed to the subject and a nearby partner monkey that was not an active participant. The capuchins were then tested on an ultimatum game in which after the subject selected and placed a token in the container, the container was moved to the partner. The partner needed to remove the token and transfer it back to the experimenter for the rewards to be distributed. As such, the partner could reject the subject's offer by refusing to participate and neither would receive a reward. The experiment was conducted to determine if the subject monkey would select the equitable reward option rather than the selfish option in order to maintain the partner's cooperation in the task. Capuchin subjects behaved selfishly and selected the inequitable token significantly more often than the equitable token in both the dictator and ultimatum game with no significant difference in preference between the two games. Interestingly, despite the occasional occurrence of rejection by the partner monkeys (resulting in no reward for the subject), subjects never altered their strategy, continuing to prefer the selfish token. The study may indicate that capuchin monkeys have an inability to judge the effect of their behavior on a conspecific's reward outcome, or an indifference to the outcome if there is an individual cost associated with behaving prosocially.