Carbon pools and poverty peaks in Lao PDR

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation and enhancing forest carbon stocks in developing countries (REDD+) is heavily promoted in Laos. REDD+ is often perceived as an opportunity to jointly address climate change and poverty and, therefore, could come timely for Laos to combine its prominent national target of poverty eradication with global climate mitigation efforts. Countrywide planning of the right approaches to REDD+ combined with poverty alleviation requires knowledge of the spatial combination of poverty and carbon stocks at the national level. This study combined spatial information on carbon stored in vegetation and on poverty and created carbon-poverty typologies for the whole country at the village level. We found that 11% of the villages of Laos have high to very high average village-level carbon stock densities and a predominantly poor population. These villages cover 20% of the territory and are characterized by low population density. Shifting cultivation areas in the northwestern parts of the country have a higher carbon mitigation potential than areas in the central and eastern highlands due to a more favorable climate. Finally, we found that in Laos the majority (58%) of poor people live in areas with low carbon stock densities without major potential to store carbon. Accordingly, REDD+ cannot be considered a core instrument for poverty alleviation. The carbon-poverty typologies presented here provide answers to basic questions related to planning and managing of REDD+. They could serve as a starting point for the design of systems to monitor both socioeconomic and environmental development at the national level.

An Undisclosed Story of Roses: Church, State and Nation in Contemporary Georgia

I will attempt to problematize the typologies of nationalism when applied to the Georgian context, particularly in relationship to nationalism of President Mikheil Saakashvili. I will argue that the state-driven nationalism of post-Rose Revolution government was a hybrid form of ethno-cultural and civic which had elements of ethnic particularism towards the Orthodox Church. By reflecting on the growing assistance of Western institutions to Georgia, I will problematize the extent to which the rise of American and European involvement in the region reinforced the perceptions of the “self” and the “other” among the religious elites since the Rose Revolution. By presenting field research data (interviews) gathered in 23 eparchies and perishes with religious clerics in 7 regions of Georgia, I will argue that religious nationalism in Georgia strengthened not in response to but as an outcome of President Saakashvili’s policies towards the church, and partially as a reaction to the growing dissatisfaction with Western institutions working in Georgia and Western governments’ response to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. By reflecting on empirical material, the paper attempts to problematize an understanding of religious nationalism as a social movement, an instance of cultural autonomy and a source of identity (Friedland 2001). In response, I suggest viewing religious nationalism in post-communist Georgia as medium of material and political interests