Paternity of subordinates raises cooperative effort in cichlids

Background In cooperative breeders, subordinates generally help a dominant breeding pair to raise offspring. Parentage studies have shown that in several species subordinates can participate in reproduction. This suggests an important role of direct fitness benefits for cooperation, particularly where groups contain unrelated subordinates. In this situation parentage should influence levels of cooperation. Here we combine parentage analyses and detailed behavioural observations in the field to study whether in the highly social cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher subordinates participate in reproduction and if so, whether and how this affects their cooperative care, controlling for the effect of kinship. Methodology/Principal Findings We show that: (i) male subordinates gained paternity in 27.8% of all clutches and (ii) if they participated in reproduction, they sired on average 11.8% of young. Subordinate males sharing in reproduction showed more defence against experimentally presented egg predators compared to subordinates not participating in reproduction, and they tended to stay closer to the breeding shelter. No effects of relatedness between subordinates and dominants (to mid-parent, dominant female or dominant male) were detected on parentage and on helping behaviour. Conclusions/Significance This is the first evidence in a cooperatively breeding fish species that the helping effort of male subordinates may depend on obtained paternity, which stresses the need to consider direct fitness benefits in evolutionary studies of helping behaviour.

Subordinate removal affects parental investment, but not offspring survival in a cooperative cichlid

Summary Subordinates in cooperative breeding systems may provide help to dominant pairs, who can benefit by either an increased total investment in their current brood or a reduced personal contribution to this investment. In the social cichlid Julidochromis ornatus, one large male subordinate generally spends 90% of his time in close proximity to the breeding shelter, whereas the dominants only spend 50% of their time close to the shelter. We experimentally removed the large subordinate for 30 days (approximating one breeding cycle) to study the investment strategies of dominants and the effects on offspring survival, while accounting for subordinate immigration. Experimental groups were compared with control groups, from which subordinates were also caught but not removed. On day one following removal, we tested whether dominants overcompensated, fully compensated or undercompensated for absence of the subordinate on several parental behaviours. Moreover, we tested whether the pairs' potential compensatory behaviour remained high seven days following large subordinate removal. One day following removal, dominants increased their time spent in the territory and their frequency of breeding shelter visits and defence, compared with the pre-removal phase and control groups. The dominant pair overcompensated for the loss of subordinate help in their breeding shelter visits, fully compensated in defence and undercompensated their time spent in the territory. Seven days after large subordinate removal, behavioural differences between treatments had disappeared. However, when distinguishing between groups with or without a new immigrant subordinate, dominant pairs only diminished investment in the presence of an immigrant, suggesting a compensatory role of the large subordinate. Finally, survival of juvenile group members was not affected by the treatment. Our experiments indicate that the presence of a large subordinate does not increase the dominant pairs' current reproductive success, but instead allows them to reduce their personal contribution to investment in the current brood. In addition, we illustrate that dominants may show strikingly different compensatory responses depending on the type of behaviour and emphasize the importance of immigrant subordinates to relieve dominants from costly compensatory responses in cooperative breeding systems.

The effect of superiors' exogenous constraints on budget negotiations

In a world characterized by increasing pressure from financial and product markets, the question of how exogenous constraints affect internal coordination and control processes has become increasingly important. This experiment investigates how two exogenous constraints that superiors can face in budget negotiation settings, increased opportunity costs and financial pressure to meet unit targets, affect budget negotiations and subordinate effort. The results show that both constraints induce more cooperation, but in different ways. Financial pressure on the superior leads to more cooperative negotiation behavior by superiors and subordinates than increased opportunity costs. Specifically, subordinates do not take advantage of the superior's increased financial pressure to enforce lower budgets. After negotiation, both constraints strongly mitigate the negative effects of superior budget imposition on subordinate effort because exogenous constraints eliminate the effect of procedural fairness considerations on subordinate effort.

Using negotiated budgets for planning and performance evaluation: An experimental study : an experimental study

Budgets are often simultaneously used for the conflicting purposes of planning and performance evaluation. While economic theory suggests that firms should use separate budgets for conflicting purposes this contrasts with existing evidence that firms rarely do so. We address two open questions related to these observations in an experiment. Specifically, we investigate how a planning task that is in conflict with the performance evaluation task affects behavior in budget negotiations and their outcomes. Additionally, we analyze whether a single budget can be effectively used for both purposes compared to two separate budgets. We develop theory to predict that adding a planning task that is in conflict with the superior’s performance evaluation task increases the subordinate’s cooperation in and after the negotiation of a performance evaluation budget. Moreover, we predict that subordinate cooperation increases even more when the superior is restricted to use a single budget for both purposes. Our results broadly support our hypotheses. Specifically, we find that when budgets are used for both planning and performance evaluation, this increases the subordinate’s budget proposals during the negotiation and his performance after the negotiation. These effects tend to be even larger when the superior is restricted to a single budget rather than separate budgets for planning and performance evaluation, particularly with respect to subordinate performance. In our experimental setting, the benefits of increased subordinate cooperation even more than offset the loss in flexibility from the superior’s restriction to a single budget. The results of this study add to the understanding of the interdependencies of conflicting budgeting purposes and contribute to explain why firms often use a single budget for multiple purposes.

Evaluation of Leaders – Does Gender Really Matter?

We examined the leaders’ self-evaluation and their evaluation by subordinates. We found that, over time, female leaders evaluated themselves better than male leaders and that subordinates evaluated female leaders better than male leaders at the beginning of the project. The latter gender differences disappeared over the course of the project.