Do Words Matter? The Impact of Communication on the PIIGS' CDS and Bond Yield Spreads during Europe's Sovereign Debt Crisis

The paper aims to shed light on the role of communication in the European debt crisis. It examines the effects of public statements by ECB Governing Council members, EU officials and national representatives on the PIIGS' CDS and bond yield spreads. The focus lies on dovish statements that signal strong determination in the rescue of indebted countries, and hawkish statements that indicate limited commitment to support the PIIGS and protect its creditors. The analysis of daily data for the period between January 1, 2009 and August 12, 2011 in an EGARCH framework suggests that communication by representatives of Germany, France, and the EU as well as ECB Governing Council members had an immediate impact on both types of securities. No effects.

Credibility for sale

We develop a model where a sovereign’s incentive to repay its debt depends on the identity of its creditors. Higher exposure to official lenders improves incentives and thus credibility, for instance, because default would jeopardize the benefits from membership in a club (such as EU or EMU). But higher exposure also carries costs, because of reduced flexibility ex post and because official lenders may collude to extract rents. We characterize the equilibrium composition of debt across creditor groups as well as equilibrium debt prices. Our model can account for an important— and still unexplained—feature of sovereign debt crises: Official lending to sovereigns takes place only in times of debt distress and carries a favorable rate. It also offers a novel perspective on the interaction between deficits, debt overhang and the availability of official funds in determining default risk.

Populist Communication in the Context of European Parliament Elections 2014

Over the last decade European democracies have been facing a challenge by the rising force of new populist movements. The emergence of the financial and sovereign debt crisis in Europe created new fertile soil for the strengthening of old-established – and the development of new – populist parties in several EU-member states. José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, emphasized his increased unease concerning these developments when he was speaking at the annual Brussels Think Tank Forum on 22. April 2013: “I am deeply concerned about the divisions that we see emerging: political extremes and populism tearing apart the political support and the social fabric that we need to deal with the crisis; […]” (Barroso 2013). Indeed, European elites seem to be increasingly worried by these recent developments which are perceived as an impending stress test of the Union and the project of European integration as a whole (Hartleb 2013). Sure enough, the results of the recent European Parliament Elections 2014 revealed a great support for populist political parties in many societies of EU-member countries. To understand the success of populist parties in Europe it is crucial to first shed light on the nature of populist party communication itself. Significant communicative differences may explain the varying success of populist parties between and within countries, while a pure demand-side approach (i.e. a focus on the preferences of the electorate) often fails to do so (Mudde 2010). The aim of this study is therefore to analyse what different types of populist communication styles emerge during the EP election campaign 2014 and under which conditions populist communication styles are selected by political parties. So far, the empirical measurement of populism has received only scarce attention (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). Besides, most of the existing empirical investigations of populism are single case studies (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008) and scholars have not yet developed systematic methods to measure populism in a comparative way (Rooduijn & Pauwels 2011). This is a consequence of a lack of conceptual clarity which goes along with populism (Taggart 2000; Barr 2009; Canovan 1999) due to its contextual sensitivity. Hence, populism in Europe should be analysed in a way that clarifies the concept of populism and moreover takes into account that the Europeanization of politics has an influence on the type of populist party communication, which is intended in the course of that study.

Drivers of populism - A four-country comparison of party communication in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament elections

The aim of this paper is to analyze what different types of populist communication styles emerged during the 2014 EP election campaign and under which conditions political parties selected specific populist communication styles. To do this, a comparative quantitative content analysis of press releases in the run-up of the latest EP elections has been conducted for parties in France, Germany, Austria and Greece. The paper presents a definition of populism based on the contemporary academic discourse, which focuses on the transnational nature of the European political field. It is shown that populist party communication is more pronounced on the fringes of the political spectrum and in countries struggling with severe macroeconomic difficulties. Contrary to intuitive expectations, the perceived populist rhetoric of exclusivity in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, which is identified as a central feature of right-wing populism, barely takes place within populist party communication.

Risk factors promoting hypertensive crises: evidence from a longitudinal study

Background Current knowledge about risk factors promoting hypertensive crisis originates from retrospective data. Therefore, potential risk factors of hypertensive crisis were assessed in a prospective longitudinal study. Methods Eighty-nine patients of the medical outpatient unit at the University Hospital of Bern (Bern, Switzerland) with previously diagnosed hypertension participated in this study. At baseline, 33 potential risk factors were assessed. All patients were followed-up for the outcome of hypertensive crisis. Cox regression models were used to detect relationships between risk factors and hypertensive crisis (defined as acute rise of systolic blood pressure (BP) ≥200mmHg and/or diastolic BP ≥120mmHg). Results The mean duration of follow-up was 1.6 ± 0.3 years (range 1.0–2.4 years). Four patients (4.5%) were lost to follow-up. Thirteen patients (15.3%) experienced hypertensive crisis during follow-up. Several potential risk factors were significantly associated with hypertensive crisis: female sex, higher grades of obesity, the presence of a hypertensive or coronary heart disease, the presence of a somatoform disorder, a higher number of antihypertensive drugs, and nonadherence to medication. As measured by the hazard ratio, nonadherence was the most important factor associated with hypertensive crisis (hazard ratio 5.88, 95% confidence interval 1.59–21.77, P < 0.01). Conclusions This study identified several potential risk factors of hypertensive crisis. Results of this study are consistent with the hypothesis that improvement of medical adherence in antihypertensive therapy would help to prevent hypertensive crises. However, larger studies are needed to assess potential confounding, other risk factors and the possibility of interaction between predictors.