Frequency-dependent social dominance in a color polymorphic cichlid fish

A mechanism commonly suggested to explain the persistence of color polymorphisms in animals is negative frequency-dependent selection. It could result from a social dominance advantage to rare morphs. We tested for this in males of red and blue color morphs of the Lake Victoria cichlid, Pundamilia. Earlier work has shown that males preferentially attack the males of their own morph, while red males are more likely to win dyadic contests with blue males. In order to study the potential contribution of both factors to the morph co-existence, we manipulated the proportion of red and blue males in experimental assemblages and studied its effect on social dominance. We then tried to disentangle the effects of the own-morph attack bias and social dominance of red using simulations. In the experiment, we found that red males were indeed socially dominant to the blue ones, but only when rare. However, blue males were not socially dominant when rare. The simulation results suggest that an own-morph attack bias reduces the social dominance of red males when they are more abundant. Thus, there is no evidence of symmetric negative frequency-dependent selection acting on social dominance, suggesting that additional fitness costs to the red morph must explain their co-existence.

Species-level selection reduces selfishness through competitive exclusion

Adaptation does not necessarily lead to traits which are optimal for the population. This is because selection is often the strongest at the individual or gene level. The evolution of selfishness can lead to a 'tragedy of the commons', where traits such as aggression or social cheating reduce population size and may lead to extinction. This suggests that species-level selection will result whenever species differ in the incentive to be selfish. We explore this idea in a simple model that combines individual-level selection with ecology in two interacting species. Our model is not influenced by kin or trait-group selection. We find that individual selection in combination with competitive exclusion greatly increases the likelihood that selfish species go extinct. A simple example of this would be a vertebrate species that invests heavily into squabbles over breeding sites, which is then excluded by a species that invests more into direct reproduction. A multispecies simulation shows that these extinctions result in communities containing species that are much less selfish. Our results suggest that species-level selection and community dynamics play an important role in regulating the intensity of conflicts in natural populations.

The coevolution of cooperation and dispersal in social groups and its implications for the emergence of multicellularity

Background Recent work on the complexity of life highlights the roles played by evolutionary forces at different levels of individuality. One of the central puzzles in explaining transitions in individuality for entities ranging from complex cells, to multicellular organisms and societies, is how different autonomous units relinquish control over their functions to others in the group. In addition to the necessity of reducing conflict over effecting specialized tasks, differentiating groups must control the exploitation of the commons, or else be out-competed by more fit groups. Results We propose that two forms of conflict – access to resources within groups and representation in germ line – may be resolved in tandem through individual and group-level selective effects. Specifically, we employ an optimization model to show the conditions under which different within-group social behaviors (cooperators producing a public good or cheaters exploiting the public good) may be selected to disperse, thereby not affecting the commons and functioning as germ line. We find that partial or complete dispersal specialization of cheaters is a general outcome. The propensity for cheaters to disperse is highest with intermediate benefit:cost ratios of cooperative acts and with high relatedness. An examination of a range of real biological systems tends to support our theory, although additional study is required to provide robust tests. Conclusion We suggest that trait linkage between dispersal and cheating should be operative regardless of whether groups ever achieve higher levels of individuality, because individual selection will always tend to increase exploitation, and stronger group structure will tend to increase overall cooperation through kin selected benefits. Cheater specialization as dispersers offers simultaneous solutions to the evolution of cooperation in social groups and the origin of specialization of germ and soma in multicellular organisms.

Male reproductive pattern in a polygynous ungulate with a slow life-history: the role of age, social status and alternative mating tactics

According to life-history theory age-dependent investments into reproduction are thought to co-vary with survival and growth of animals. In polygynous species, in which size is an important determinant of reproductive success, male reproduction via alternative mating tactics at young age are consequently expected to be the less frequent in species with higher survival. We tested this hypothesis in male Alpine ibex (Capra ibex), a highly sexually dimorphic mountain ungulate whose males have been reported to exhibit extremely high adult survival rates. Using data from two offspring cohorts in a population in the Swiss Alps, the effects of age, dominance and mating tactic on the likelihood of paternity were inferred within a Bayesian framework. In accordance with our hypothesis, reproductive success in male Alpine ibex was heavily biased towards older, dominant males that monopolized access to receptive females by adopting the 'tending' tactic, while success among young, subordinate males via the sneaking tactic 'coursing' was in general low and rare. In addition, we detected a high reproductive skew in male Alpine ibex, suggesting a large opportunity for selection. Compared with other ungulates with higher mortality rates, reproduction among young male Alpine ibex was much lower and more sporadic. Consistent with that, further examinations on the species level indicated that in polygynous ungulates the significance of early reproduction appears to decrease with increasing survival. Overall, this study supports the theory that survival prospects of males modulate the investments into reproduction via alternative mating tactics early in life. In the case of male Alpine ibex, the results indicate that their life-history strategy targets for long life, slow and prolonged growth and late reproduction.

Intolerance Toward Immigrants in Switzerland: Diminished Threat Through Social Contacts?

Intolerance toward immigrants has recently reached noticeable highs in Switzerland. Referring to the conflict theory, the perception of a specific group as a threat tends to lead to intolerance toward that group. The expectation of a negative relationship between threat and tolerance is nevertheless not assumed to be universally valid for all members of society. In particular, the contact theory assumes that intercultural encounters should promote positive attitudes toward culturally different individuals and groups. Using a new and unique data set, our Heckman selection models reveal that Swiss who view rising immigration to mean a loss of economic privileges and an erosion of Swiss cultural values are less tolerant toward immigrants. Moreover, our results indicate that contact with immigrants may moderate this effect. However, not all group settings are able to reduce the perceived threats in a similar way, and not all sorts of social contact are able to foster tolerance toward immigrants.

Selection and influence effects in defending a victim of bullying: The moderating effects of school context

In this paper we examined whether defenders of victims of school bullying befriended similar peers, and whether the similarity is due to selection or influence processes or both. We examined whether these processes result in different degrees of similarity between peers depending on teachers’ self-efficacy and the school climate. We analyzed longitudinal data of 478 Swiss school students employing actor-based stochastic models. Our analyses showed that similarity in defending behavior among friends was due to selection rather than influence. The extent to which adolescents selected peers showing similar defending behavior was related to contextual factors. In fact, lower self-efficacy of teachers and positive school climate were associated with increased selection effects in terms of defending behavior.

Swiss Social Report: Generations in Perspective

Based on systematically prepared data and indicators, the Social Report 2012 informs about the current status and development trends in the Swiss society. This issue focuses on intergenerational relationships: How, for example, are intergenerational transfers carried out and what are they caused by? Does different cultural behaviour depend on the age group or do other social differences play a role? Do age-specific discriminations exist? Are young adults less politically involved than their parents? What impact has the demographic development of recent years had on the geographic structure? In addition to a selection of 75 indicators on these and other subjects, the Social Report contains five analytically oriented in-depth articles that are written from the perspective of the generational issue and which are dedicated to the following individual aspects: Equality of opportunities, cultural behaviour, age-specific discrimination, political involvement and the spatial reflection of the demographic changes. The Social Report 2012 is rooted in the tradition of the earlier issues of 2000, 2004 and 2008, which have been completely updated and supplemented with additional indicators. All the data are graphically presented and available in electronic form on this website. The five in-depth articles and all the short commentaries on the indicators were completely rewritten.

Patterns of positive selection in seven ant genomes

The evolution of ants is marked by remarkable adaptations that allowed the development of very complex social systems. To identify how ant-specific adaptations are associated with patterns of molecular evolution, we searched for signs of positive selection on amino-acid changes in proteins. We identified 24 functional categories of genes which were enriched for positively selected genes in the ant lineage. We also reanalyzed genome-wide datasets in bees and flies with the same methodology, to check whether positive selection was specific to ants or also present in other insects. Notably, genes implicated in immunity were enriched for positively selected genes in the three lineages, ruling out the hypothesis that the evolution of hygienic behaviors in social insects caused a major relaxation of selective pressure on immune genes. Our scan also indicated that genes implicated in neurogenesis and olfaction started to undergo increased positive selection before the evolution of sociality in Hymenoptera. Finally, the comparison between these three lineages allowed us to pinpoint molecular evolution patterns that were specific to the ant lineage. In particular, there was ant-specific recurrent positive selection on genes with mitochondrial functions, suggesting that mitochondrial activity was improved during the evolution of this lineage. This might have been an important step toward the evolution of extreme lifespan that is a hallmark of ants.

Self-esteem, narcissism, and stressful life events: Testing for selection and socialization

We examined whether self-esteem and narcissism predict the occurrence of stressful life events (i.e., selection) and whether stressful life events predict change in self-esteem and narcissism (i.e., socialization). The analyses were based on longitudinal data from 2 studies, including samples of 328 young adults (Study 1) and 371 adults (Study 2). The effects of self-esteem and narcissism were mutually controlled for each other and, moreover, controlled for effects of depression. After conducting the study-level analyses, we meta-analytically aggregated the findings. Self-esteem had a selection effect, suggesting that low self-esteem led to the occurrence of stressful life events; however, this effect became nonsignificant when depression was controlled for. Regardless of whether depression was controlled for or not, narcissism had a selection effect, suggesting that high narcissism led to the occurrence of stressful life events. Moreover, stressful life events had a socialization effect on self-esteem, but not on narcissism, suggesting that the occurrence of stressful life events decreased self-esteem. Analyses of trait–state models indicated that narcissism consisted almost exclusively of perfectly stable trait variance, providing a possible explanation for the absence of socialization effects on narcissism. The findings have significant implications because they suggest that a person’s level of narcissism influences whether stressful life events occur, and that self-esteem is shaped by the occurrence of stressful life events. Moreover, we discuss the possibility that depression mediates the selection effect of low self-esteem on stressful life events.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

The influence of parent's body mass index on peer selection: An experimental approach using virtual reality

Relatively little is known about the influence of psychosocial factors, such as familial role modeling and social network on the development and maintenance of childhood obesity. We investigated peer se- lection using an immersive virtual reality environment. In a virtual schoolyard, children were confronted with normal weight and overweight avatars either eating or playing. Fifty-seven children aged 7–13 participated. Interpersonal distance to the avatars, child's BMI, self-perception, eating behavior and parental BMI were assessed. Parental BMI was the strongest predictor for the children's minimal distance to the avatars. Specifically, a higher mothers' BMI was associated with greater interpersonal distance and children approached closer to overweight eating avatars. A higher father's BMI was associated with a lower interpersonal distance to the avatars. These children approached normal weight playing and overweight eating avatar peers closest. The importance of parental BMI for the child's social approach/ avoidance behavior can be explained through social modeling mechanisms. Differential effects of pa- ternal and maternal BMI might be due to gender specific beauty ideals. Interventions to promote social interaction with peer groups could foster weight stabilization or weight loss in children.