Populism and Liberal Democracy: Populists in Government in Austria, Italy, Poland and Switzerland

The enduring electoral success of populist parties across Europe and the increasing opportunities they have gained to access government in recent years bring once more into relief the question of whether populism and democracy are fully compatible. In this article we show how, despite playing different roles in government within very different political systems, and despite the numerous constraints placed upon them (for instance, EU membership, international law and domestic checks and balances), populist parties consistently pursued policies that clashed with fundamental tenets of liberal democracy. In particular, the idea that the power of the majority must be limited and restrained, the sanctity of individual rights and the principle of the division of powers have all come under threat in contemporary Europe. This has contributed to the continuing erosion of the liberal consensus, which has provided one of the fundamental foundations of the European project from its start.

How the Euro divides the union: the effect of economic adjustment on support for democracy in Europe

As often pointed out in the literature on the European debt crisis, the policy programme of austerity and internal devaluation imposed on countries in the Eurozone's periphery exhibits a lack of democratic legitimacy. This article analyses the consequences these developments have for democratic support at both the European and national levels. We show that through the policies of economic adjustment, a majority of citizens in crisis countries has become ‘detached’ from their democratic political system. By cutting loose the Eurozone's periphery from the rest of Europe in terms of democratic legitimacy, the Euro has divided the union, instead of uniting it as foreseen by its architects. Our results are based on aggregated Eurobarometer surveys conducted in 28 European Union (EU) member states between 2002 and 2014. We employ quantitative time-series cross-sectional regression analyses. Moreover, we estimate the causal effect of economic adjustment in a comparative case study of four cases using the synthetic control method.

How exclusive is assembly democracy? Citizens assembly and ballot participation compared

This paper analyses the difference between two specific forms of citizens’ involvements, namely whether a vote is cast by ballot or in a citizens’ assembly in which people gather in town halls to decide legislative questions in a deliberative manner. We show both theoretically and empirically how citizens’ assemblies and decisions at the ballot box substantially differ not only in terms of their underlying model of democracy, but also in their structural conditions and, thus, with respect to the social inequality of participation. We test our hypotheses in a Bayesian multilevel framework using real participation data collected from 15 political decisions made in a Swiss commune. Our results show that citizens’ assemblies are not only characterised by lower participation rates, but also by a particular composition of the electorate. While citizens’ assemblies are more equal regarding income groups, ballots favour a more equitable participation in terms of gender and age.