General principles of therapy of pyogenic meningitis

In bacterial meningitis, several pharmacodynamic factors determine therapeutic success-when defined as sterilization of the CSF: (1) Local host defense deficits in the CNS require the use of bactericidal antibiotics to sterilize the CSF. (2) CSF antibiotic concentrations that are at least 10-fold above the MBC are necessary for maximal bactericidal activity. Protein binding, low pH, and slow bacterial growth rates are among the factors that may explain the high antibiotic concentrations necessary in vivo. (3) High CSF peak concentrations that lead to rapid bacterial killing appear more important than prolonged suprainhibitory concentrations, probably because very low residual levels in the CSF prevent bacterial regrowth, even during relatively long dosing intervals. (4) Penetration of antibiotics into the CSF is significantly impaired by the blood-brain barrier and thus, very high serum levels are necessary to achieve the CSF concentrations required for optimal bactericidal activity. Beyond these principles, recent data suggests that rapid lytic killing of bacteria in the CSF may have harmful effects on the brain because of the release of biologically active products from the lysed bacteria. Since rapid CSF sterilization remains a key therapeutic goal, the harmful consequences of bacterial lysis present a major challenge in the therapy of bacterial meningitis. Currently, dexamethasone represents that only clinically beneficial approach to reduce the harmful effects of bacterial lysis, and novel approaches are required to improve the outcome of this serious infection.

The coevolution of cooperation and dispersal in social groups and its implications for the emergence of multicellularity

Background Recent work on the complexity of life highlights the roles played by evolutionary forces at different levels of individuality. One of the central puzzles in explaining transitions in individuality for entities ranging from complex cells, to multicellular organisms and societies, is how different autonomous units relinquish control over their functions to others in the group. In addition to the necessity of reducing conflict over effecting specialized tasks, differentiating groups must control the exploitation of the commons, or else be out-competed by more fit groups. Results We propose that two forms of conflict – access to resources within groups and representation in germ line – may be resolved in tandem through individual and group-level selective effects. Specifically, we employ an optimization model to show the conditions under which different within-group social behaviors (cooperators producing a public good or cheaters exploiting the public good) may be selected to disperse, thereby not affecting the commons and functioning as germ line. We find that partial or complete dispersal specialization of cheaters is a general outcome. The propensity for cheaters to disperse is highest with intermediate benefit:cost ratios of cooperative acts and with high relatedness. An examination of a range of real biological systems tends to support our theory, although additional study is required to provide robust tests. Conclusion We suggest that trait linkage between dispersal and cheating should be operative regardless of whether groups ever achieve higher levels of individuality, because individual selection will always tend to increase exploitation, and stronger group structure will tend to increase overall cooperation through kin selected benefits. Cheater specialization as dispersers offers simultaneous solutions to the evolution of cooperation in social groups and the origin of specialization of germ and soma in multicellular organisms.

Reputation Formation and the Evolution of Cooperation in Anonymous Online Markets

Theoretical propositions stressing the importance of trust, reciprocity, and reputation for cooperation in social exchange relations are deeply rooted in classical sociological thought. Today’s online markets provide a unique opportunity to test these theories using unobtrusive data. Our study investigates the mechanisms promoting cooperation in an online-auction market where most transactions can be conceived as one-time-only exchanges. We first give a systematic account of the theoretical arguments explaining the process of cooperative transactions. Then, using a large dataset comprising 14,627 mobile phone auctions and 339,517 DVD auctions, we test key hypotheses about the effects of traders’ reputations on auction outcomes and traders’ motives for leaving feedback. Our statistical analyses show that sellers with better reputations have higher sales and obtain higher prices. Furthermore, we observe a high rate of participation in the feedback system, which is largely consistent with strong reciprocity—a predisposition to unconditionally reward (or punish) one’s interaction partner’s cooperation (or defection)—and altruism—a predisposition to increase one’s own utility by elevating an interaction partner’s utility. Our study demonstrates how strong reciprocity and altruism can mitigate the free-rider problem in the feedback system to create reputational incentives for mutually beneficial online trade.