Managing a World Heritage Site: Potentials and limitations of transdisciplinary approaches

Balancing the frequently conflicting priorities of conservation and economic development poses a challenge to management of the Swiss Alps Jungfrau- Aletsch World Heritage Site (WHS). This is a complex societal problem that calls for a knowledge-based solution. This in turn requires a transdisciplinary research framework in which problems are defined and solved cooperatively by actors from the scientific community and the life-world. In this article we re-examine studies carried out in the region of the Swiss Alps Jungfrau-Aletsch WHS, covering three key issues prevalent in transdisciplinary settings: integration of stakeholders into participatory processes; perceptions and positions; and negotiability and implementation. In the case of the Swiss Alps Jungfrau-Aletsch WHS the transdisciplinary setting created a situation of mutual learning among stakeholders from different levels and backgrounds. However, the studies showed that the benefits of such processes of mutual learning are continuously at risk of being diminished by the power play inherent in participatory approaches.

Managing a World Heritage Site – Potentials and Limitations of Transdisciplinary Approaches

Management of the World Heritage Site Swiss Alps Jungfrau-Aletsch is challenged by the interplay of conservation and economic development. This is a situation where a knowledge-based solution is sought for a complex societal problem. This sets the frame for transdisciplinary research where the problem is defined and solved cooperatively by actors from science and the life-world. In this paper we re-examine studies carried out in the region of the WHS Jungfrau-Aletsch and reveal the issue of integration into participation, the issue of perceptions and positions as well as the issue of negotiability and implementation as key issues prevalent in transdisciplinary settings. The transdisciplinary setting in the case of the WHS Jungfrau-Aletsch constructs a situation of mutual learning among stakeholders from different levels and backgrounds. However, the positive effects of mutual learning are continuously challenged by the power play inherent in participatory approaches.

Critical issues in managing protected areas by multi-stakeholder participation - analysis of a process in the Swiss Alps

Balancing the frequently conflicting priorities of conservation and economic development poses a challenge to management of the Swiss Alps Jungfrau-Aletsch World Heritage Site (WHS). This is a complex societal problem that calls for a knowledge-based solution. This in turn requires a transdisciplinary research framework in which problems are defined and solved cooperatively by actors from the scientific community and the life-world. In this article we re-examine studies carried out in the region of the Swiss Alps Jungfrau-Aletsch WHS, covering three key issues prevalent in transdisciplinary settings: integration of stakeholders into participatory processes; perceptions and positions; and negotiability and implementation. In the case of the Swiss Alps Jungfrau-Aletsch WHS the transdisciplinary setting created a situation of mutual learning among stakeholders from different levels and backgrounds. However, the studies showed that the benefits of such processes of mutual learning are continuously at risk of being diminished by the power play inherent in participatory approaches.

CONMICOM – conflict mitigation in communities: LforS learning and simulation game

Three extended families live around a lake. One family are rice farmers, the second family are vegetable farmers, and the third are a family of livestock herders. All of them depend on the use of lake water for their production, and all of them need large quantities of water. All are dependent on the use of the lake water to secure their livelihood. In the game, the families are represented by their councils of elders. Each of the councils has to find means and ways to increase production in order to keep up with the growth of its family and their demands. This puts more and more pressure on the water resources, increasing the risk of overuse. Conflicts over water are about to emerge between the families. Each council of elders must try to pursue its families interests, while at the same time preventing excessive pressure on the water resources. Once a council of elders is no longer able to meet the needs of its family, it is excluded from the game. Will the parties cooperate or compete? To face the challenge of balancing economic well-being, sustainable resource management, and individual and collective interests, the three parties have a set of options for action at hand. These include power play to safeguard their own interests, communication and cooperation to negotiate with neighbours, and searching for alternatives to reduce pressure on existing water resources. During the game the players can experience how tensions may arise, increase and finally escalate. They realise what impact power play has and how alliances form, and the importance of trust-building measures, consensus and cooperation. From the insights gained, important conflict prevention and mitigation measures are derived in a debriefing session. The game is facilitated by a moderator, and lasts for 3-4 hours. Aim of the game: Each family pursues the objective of serving its own interests and securing its position through appropriate strategies and skilful negotiation, while at the same time optimising use of the water resources in a way that prevents their degradation. The end of the game is open. While the game may end by one or two families dropping out because they can no longer secure their subsistence, it is also possible that the three families succeed in creating a situation that allows them to meet their own needs as well as the requirements for sustainable water use in the long term. Learning objectives The game demonstrates how tension builds up, increases, and finally escalates; it shows how power positions work and alliances are formed; and it enables the players to experience the great significance of mutual agreement and cooperation. During the game and particularly during the debriefing and evaluation session it is important to link experiences made during the game to the players’ real-life experiences, and to discuss these links in the group. The resulting insights will provide a basis for deducing important conflict prevention and transformation measures.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Serious Play as a Practice of Paradox

A recent stream of organizational research has used the term serious play to describe situations in which people engage in playful behaviors deliberately with the intention to achieve serious, work-related objectives. In this article, the authors reflect on the ambiguity of this term, and reframe serious play as a practice characterized by the paradox of intentionality (when actors engage deliberately in a fun, intrinsically motivating activity as a means to achieve a serious, extrinsically motivated work objective). This reframing not only extends the explanatory power of the concept of serious play but also helps bridge the concerns of scholars and practitioners: first, by enabling us to understand a variety of activities in organizations as serious play, which can help practitioners address specific organizational challenges; second, by recognizing the potential for emergent serious play, and the creation of the conditions to foster this emergence; third, by pointing toward specific, individual or group-level outcomes associated with the practice; and finally, by uncovering its ethical dimensions and encouraging the understanding of the role of serious play on ethical decision making.

Thrombosis during pregnancy: Risks, prevention, and treatment for mother and fetus--harvesting the power of omic technology, biomarkers and in vitro or in vivo models to facilitate the treatment of thrombosis

Maternal thromboembolism and a spectrum of placenta-mediated complications including the pre-eclampsia syndromes, fetal growth restriction, fetal loss, and abruption manifest a shared etiopathogenesis and predisposing risk factors. Furthermore, these maternal and fetal complications are often linked to subsequent maternal health consequences that comprise the metabolic syndrome, namely, thromboembolism, chronic hypertension, and type II diabetes. Traditionally, several lines of evidence have linked vasoconstriction, excessive thrombosis and inflammation, and impaired trophoblast invasion at the uteroplacental interface as hallmark features of the placental complications. "Omic" technologies and biomarker development have been largely based upon advances in vascular biology, improved understanding of the molecular basis and biochemical pathways responsible for the clinically relevant diseases, and increasingly robust large cohort and/or registry based studies. Advances in understanding of innate and adaptive immunity appear to play an important role in several pregnancy complications. Strategies aimed at improving prediction of these pregnancy complications are often incorporating hemodynamic blood flow data using non-invasive imaging technologies of the utero-placental and maternal circulations early in pregnancy. Some evidence suggests that a multiple marker approach will yield the best performing prediction tools, which may then in turn offer the possibility of early intervention to prevent or ameliorate these pregnancy complications. Prediction of maternal cardiovascular and non-cardiovascular consequences following pregnancy represents an important area of future research, which may have significant public health consequences not only for cardiovascular disease, but also for a variety of other disorders, such as autoimmune and neurodegenerative diseases.