Towards End-User Driven Power Saving Control in Android devices

Abstract. During the last decade mobile communications increasingly became part of people's daily routine. Such usage raises new challenges regarding devices' battery lifetime management when using most popular wireless access technologies, such as IEEE 802.11. This paper investigates the energy/delay trade-off of using an end-user driven power saving approach, when compared with the standard IEEE 802.11 power saving algorithms. The assessment was conducted in a real testbed using an Android mobile phone and high-precision energy measurement hardware. The results show clear energy benefits of employing user-driven power saving techniques, when compared with other standard approaches.

Resisting the power of temptations: the right prefrontal cortex and self-control.

Imagine you are overweight and you spot your favorite pastry in the storefront of a bakery. How do you manage to resist this temptation? Or to give other examples, how do you manage to restrain yourself from overspending or succumbing to sexual temptations? The present article summarizes two recent studies stressing the fundamental importance of inhibition in the process of decision making. Based on the results of these studies, we dare to claim that the capacity to resist temptation depends on the activity level of the right prefrontal cortex (PFC).

Control of Steroid 21-oic Acid Synthesis by Peroxisome Proliferator-activated Receptor and Role of the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis

A previous study identified the peroxisome proliferator-activated receptor alpha (PPARalpha) activation biomarkers 21-steroid carboxylic acids 11beta-hydroxy-3,20-dioxopregn-4-en-21-oic acid (HDOPA) and 11beta,20-dihydroxy-3-oxo-pregn-4-en-21-oic acid (DHOPA). In the present study, the molecular mechanism and the metabolic pathway of their production were determined. The PPARalpha-specific time-dependent increases in HDOPA and 20alpha-DHOPA paralleled the development of adrenal cortex hyperplasia, hypercortisolism, and spleen atrophy, which was attenuated in adrenalectomized mice. Wy-14,643 activation of PPARalpha induced hepatic FGF21, which caused increased neuropeptide Y and agouti-related protein mRNAs in the hypothalamus, stimulation of the agouti-related protein/neuropeptide Y neurons, and activation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, resulting in increased adrenal cortex hyperplasia and corticosterone production, revealing a link between PPARalpha and the HPA axis in controlling energy homeostasis and immune regulation. Corticosterone was demonstrated as the precursor of 21-carboxylic acids both in vivo and in vitro. Under PPARalpha activation, the classic reductive metabolic pathway of corticosterone was suppressed, whereas an alternative oxidative pathway was uncovered that leads to the sequential oxidation on carbon 21 resulting in HDOPA. The latter was then reduced to the end product 20alpha-DHOPA. Hepatic cytochromes P450, aldehyde dehydrogenase (ALDH3A2), and 21-hydroxysteroid dehydrogenase (AKR1C18) were found to be involved in this pathway. Activation of PPARalpha resulted in the induction of Aldh3a2 and Akr1c18, both of which were confirmed as target genes through introduction of promoter luciferase reporter constructs into mouse livers in vivo. This study underscores the power of mass spectrometry-based metabolomics combined with genomic and physiologic analyses in identifying downstream metabolic biomarkers and the corresponding upstream molecular mechanisms.

Cognitive response control in writer's cramp

Disturbances of the motor and sensory system as well as an alteration of the preparation of movements have been reported to play a role in the pathogenesis of dystonias. However, it is unclear whether higher aspects of cortical – like cognitive – functions are also involved. Recently, the NoGo-anteriorization (NGA) elicited with a visual continuous performance test (CPT) during recording of a 21-channel electroencephalogram has been proposed as an electrophysiological standard-index for cognitive response control. The NGA consists of a more anterior location of the positive area of the brain electrical field associated with the inhibition (NoGo-condition) compared with that of the execution (Go-condition) of a prepared motor response in the CPT. This response control paradigm was applied in 16 patients with writer’s cramp (WC) and 14 age matched healthy controls. Topographical analysis of the associated event-related potentials revealed a significant (P < 0.05) NGA effect for both patients and controls. Moreover, patients with WC showed a significantly higher global field power value (P < 0.05) in the Go-condition and a significantly higher difference-amplitude (P < 0.05) in the NoGo-condition. A source location analysis with the low resolution electromagnetic tomography (LORETA) method demonstrated a hypoactivity for the Go-condition in the parietal cortex of the right hemisphere and a hyperactivity in the NoGo-condition in the left parietal cortex in patients with WC compared with healthy controls. These results indicate an altered response control in patients with WC in widespread cortical brain areas and therefore support the hypothesis that the pathogenesis of WC is not restricted to a pure sensory-motor dysfunction.

Immunodeficiency and the risk of cervical intra-epithelial neoplasia 2/3 and cervical cancer: A nested case-control study in the Swiss HIV Cohort Study.

HIV-infected women are at increased risk of cervical intra-epithelial neoplasia (CIN) and invasive cervical cancer (ICC), but it has been difficult to disentangle the influences of heavy exposure to HPV infection, inadequate screening, and immunodeficiency. A case-control study including 364 CIN2/3 and 20 ICC cases matched to 1,147 controls was nested in the Swiss HIV Cohort Study (1985-2013). CIN2/3 risk was significantly associated with low CD4+ cell counts, whether measured as nadir (odds ratio (OR) per 100-cell/μL decrease=1.15, 95% CI: 1.08, 1.22), or at CIN2/3 diagnosis (1.10, 95% CI: 1.04, 1.16). An association was evident even for nadir CD4+ 200-349 versus ≥350 cells/μL (OR=1.57, 95% CI: 1.09, 2.25). After adjustment for nadir CD4+, a protective effect of >2-year cART use was seen against CIN2/3 (OR versus never cART use=0.64, 95% CI: 0.42, 0.98). Despite low study power, similar associations were seen for ICC, notably with nadir CD4+ (OR for 50 versus >350 cells/μL= 11.10, 95% CI: 1.24, 100). HPV16-L1 antibodies were significantly associated with CIN2/3, but HPV16-E6 antibodies were nearly exclusively detected in ICC. In conclusion, worsening immunodeficiency, even at only moderately decreased CD4+ cell counts (200-349 CD4+ cells/μL), is a significant risk factor for CIN2/3 and cervical cancer. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.